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ABSTRACT 
This research explains the role of aligned inter-firm performance measures as a 
predictor of success in of contractual alliances. Contractual alliances, a popular 
type of inter-firm relations, are also known as non-equity alliances and often 
display conflicting objectives in their contractual agreements.  This research 
proposes that the assessment of contractual alliances performance must go 
beyond the contract’s ability to deliver to its internal performance targets or 
service level agreements (SLA). The success of contractual alliances lies in the 
alliance’s capability to contribute to the specific performance objectives of the 
firms involved as well as to fulfil its internal SLAs. This capability is called 
alignment and the results of this research show that is critical to the success of 
inter-firm relationships.    
The data for the research was gathered from outsourcing contracts between a 
logistics service provider and 149 users. Each contract includes its SLAs and 
two years of actual performance measures. The research design considers the 
firms’ financial measures as a proxy for their performance objectives during the 
same period of time. The alignment construct was operationalised by creating 
an inter-firm alignment (IFA) coefficient calculated with mathematical techniques 
to assess multi-dimensional fit amongst constructs. The three dimensions 
included in the IFA coefficient are i) alignment of contract’s SLAs and actual 
performance values, ii) alignment of contract’s SLAs and provider’s 
performance objectives, and iii) alignment of contract’s SLAs and user’s 
performance objectives.  
Success of contractual alliances was operationalised using known measures 
from the inter-firm management literature, such as longevity, stability, formality 
and relative profitability of the relationship. Information for all determinants was 
available in the 149 contracts. The quantitative correlations were specified and 
calculated using structural equation models (SEM). The results show that 
aligned inter-firm performance measures are a strong predictor of contractual 
alliance success. The empirical model supports the positive correlation of 
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longevity and formality as measures of contractual alliance success, as stated 
in extant literature. The findings dispute the expected positive correlation 
between formality and stability with alliance success as described in the alliance 
literature. The results confirm the positive role of renegotiations as stated in the 
organization learning literature. Additional in-depth interviews were conducted 
with relationship managers, during the pilot study. The qualitative results 
support the quantitative findings.  
This research contributes to theory by: a) conceptualising and measuring the 
concept alignment to inter-firm performance measures; b) estimating the 
contribution of relation-specific measures to contractual alliance success, and c) 
introducing alignment of inter-firm performance measures as a predictor of 
contractual alliance success.  
The research and its results fill a substantive gap in managing contractual 
alliances. It provides the outsourcing industry with a tool that predicts the 
likelihood of relationship survival based on the degree of alignment of the inter-
firm’s performance measures. The quantitative methods employed in the 
research extend the use of current techniques for assessing ‘fit’ in the strategy 
literature, into the field of performance measurement systems. 
Keywords: co-alignment; strategic fit of performance measures, inter-firm 
relationships; alliance success; longevity; renegotiations; successful logistics 
outsourcing, aligned metrics, performance measurement systems 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Context and Purpose 
The research presented in this thesis explores the role of aligned inter-firm 
performance measures as a predictor to the success of contractual alliances 
(CA). The research is positioned at the intersection of three streams of the 
academic literature: inter-firm relationships1 (IFR), performance measurement 
systems (PMS) and strategic alignment.  These three streams, though widely 
and deeply researched, are rarely considered jointly. This research has a focus 
on contractual alliances, a popular type of IFR. Contractual alliances, also 
known as non-equity relationships, generate a complex system of performance 
measurements with the interplay of the contract’s internal performance 
measures and the members’ performance objectives.  This complex inter-firm 
PMS is prone to conflicting and misaligned objectives.  
This research aims to explore the alignment between the contract’s internal 
performance goals or service level agreements (SLA), and the performance 
objectives of the participating firms. It evaluates whether these factors 
contribute to the overall success of the inter-firm relationship.  To do so, a 
coefficient of inter-firm alignment (IFA) was conceptualised and calculated, and 
will be considered the independent variable of the analysis. The dependent 
variable is the contractual alliance success (CAS) defined by a relationship that 
is stable, longevous, formal, and relatively profitable for both parties involved.  
The research designed a theoretical model, tested quantitatively, that correlates 
the IFA coefficient with the CAS index; the principal hypothesis under study.   
This research builds upon extant academic contributions on determinants of 
contractual alliance success (Ariño and Reuer, 2004) but proposes a new 
predictor and determinant:  the alignment of the inter-firm performance 
                                            
1
 The concept of inter-firm relationships (IFR) has many synonyms such as inter-organisational 
relationships (IOR), alliances (A) or strategic alliances (SA). These terms may be used 
interchangeably throughout the document and refer to a strategic decision of the firm to engage 
in a relationship with another firm to achieve a strategic objective.  
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
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measurement system.  Alignment is a central concept in the research. It has 
been extensively studied and measured in strategic management research 
(Venkatraman and Camillus, 1984; Venkatraman and Prescott, 1990; 
Venkatraman, 1990). It is defined as the process of making conflicting local 
objectives fit within a greater objective. Alignment seeks congruence amongst 
different objectives (McAdam and Bailie, 2002; Venkatraman and Prescott, 
1990). When extrapolated to performance management systems (PMS), 
alignment has been prescribed as a desirable feature (Kaplan and Norton, 
2006). It has not been assessed quantitatively, although it is identified as an 
area of research in collaborative enterprises (Busi and Bititci, 2006).  The aim of 
this research is to explore the benefits of aligned inter-firm performance 
measurement systems and contribute to greater theoretical coherence and 
empirical testing, as needed in the fields of inter-firm relationships and 
performance measures (Kathuria et al., 2007; Nielsen, 2010; Nielsen and 
Gudergan, 2012). 
The empirical analysis was conducted based on the contractual alliances’ 
complexities of non-equity relationships. Contractual alliances are the opposite 
of equity-based relationships where partners actually share and build individual 
equity in the new governance mechanism (Gulati and Singh, 1998; Anand and 
Khanna, 2000).  Contractual alliances are complex governance structures 
because their design does not consider a central coordination instance in order 
to aid in aligning opposite objectives.  
The data used in this research comes from the logistics outsourcing industry.  It 
was provided by one of the largest global service providers in the industry.  
Outsourcing offers an ideal context in which to study contractual alliances 
because both parties involved in the relationship may have conflicting objectives 
(Knemeyer and Murphy, 2004; Tsai et al., 2012). The conflict arises when 
providers seek to maximise revenue and profits and users look to minimise 
costs and capital expenses via outsourcing contracts.   
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Logistics outsourcing relationships are governed by service level agreements 
(SLAs2) (Sharafali and Bhakoo, 2007). The terms of SLAs are agreed upon by 
key performance indicators that users have negotiated with the service provider. 
SLAs include a desirable state of performance – what is called a target level – 
and the actual value of each indicator that is compared on an on-going basis 
with the target.  SLAs are typically associated with a performance-based rate 
structure to determine the provider’s compensation. These variable rate 
structures bring additional conflicts in contractual alliances. Service users seek 
lower fixed rates from service providers and flexible contractual arrangements. 
However, service providers aim for long-term relationships with cost plus rates 
(Tsai et al., 2012; Krauth et al., 2005).  The industry’s standard response has 
been to negotiate the conflict by using multiple performance metrics that 
represent the views of both parties.  This, however, generates cumbersome 
SLAs and contracts with too many indicators to be tracked. It also causes 
constant tension regarding the priority of specific metrics.  
If the alignment of objectives is a desirable feature within intra-firm PMS that 
have central governance instances, it should even be a more important feature 
within inter-firm PMS lacking a centralised coordination instance. This research 
calculates the inter-firm alignment (IFA) coefficient by quantifying the fit 
between: i) contract’s SLAs and actual performance, ii) contract’s SLAs and 
provider’s performance objectives, and iii) contract’s SLAs and user’s 
performance objectives. If the SLAs fit the participating firms’ performance 
objectives perfectly the IFA coefficient will be equal to zero3. Good alignment, 
representing a very small distance (or misalignment) between two constructs, 
yields calculations of very small values, ideally as close as possible to zero. The 
IFA coefficient becomes the independent variable of the analysis that may 
determine the success of the contractual alliance success (CAS); CAS is the 
dependent variable of the equation.  
                                            
2
 Throughout the rest of the document a contract’s Service Level Agreements will be referred to 
as SLAs 
3
 It is the result of zero misalignment or zero Euclidean distance between two constructs. The 
methodological details will be clarified in Chapter 4. 
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The alignment calculations are generated from contracts between one leading 
logistics service provider and 149 users. All contracts provided data on agreed 
upon SLAs, their target levels and actual performance values during a two-year 
period. The performance objectives of the provider and the users were 
generated from available financial metrics of the 150 firms in the analysis. 
These were used as approximations of the firms’ performance objectives 
participating in a contractual alliance (Kaplan and Norton, 2001; Kaplan and 
Norton, 1996; Kennerley and Neely, 2000; Neely et al., 2005).   
The resulting alignment coefficient becomes the independent variable to be 
correlated with relational success as the dependent variable. The key argument 
of this research is that greater alignment of inter-firm performance metrics is 
positively related and significant to predict overall success of contractual 
alliances (Bititci et al., 2005; Bititci et al., 2006).  
1.2. Gaps and Research Questions 
1.2.1 Knowledge Gaps 
Gaps became apparent after reviewing the relevant academic literature on inter-
firm relationships (IFR), performance measurement systems (PMS) and 
strategic alignment.  The use and design of performance measurements in 
inter-firm contexts could benefit from additional testing of some recommended 
features such as alignment. These gaps have been previously identified in 
published literature reviews (Bititci et al., 2005; Busi and Bititci, 2006; Parung 
and Bititci, 2008). Some will be addressed by the contributions of this research.    
The literature review, presented in Chapter 2, identifies four types of gaps that 
will be addressed in this dissertation: (1) gaps in theory, (2) gaps in empirical 
studies, (3) contextual gaps to study the topics, and (4) substantive gaps related 
to the application of these concepts in managing inter-firm relationships.  
Gaps in theory are related to the inability to predict or explain a phenomenon 
based on tested hypotheses.  Available frameworks for performance 
measurement systems only reach the single firm hierarchy and are insufficient 
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to assess the alignment of their performance objectives in inter-firm 
relationships (Neely et al., 2005).   No studies were found that explain or predict 
the success or failure of a contractual alliance based upon the level of 
alignment between the contracts’ SLAs and the financial objectives of the firms 
in the relationship.  That fact supports the purpose of this research.  The current 
assumption from the literature is that success of a contractual alliance is based 
on the ability of the provider to deliver results against the contracted SLAs 
(Knemeyer and Murphy, 2004; Ariño and Reuer, 2004).  This research will add 
to the discussion the fact that success in contractual alliances is due in part to 
greater alignment with the partners’ performance objectives. When alignment is 
not present it may explain why some apparently successful contractual alliances 
fail, even when they deliver results against contractual SLAs.   
Empirical gaps reflect the lack of studies that connect the phenomena 
explaining when and where greater alignment of performance measures 
contribute to contractual alliance success.  The studies that deal with concepts 
of collaborative or cross-enterprise performance measures do not empirically 
measure the alignment feature (Parung and Bititci, 2006). Moreover, such 
studies do not correlate ‘alignment’ with the ‘success’ of the relationship either 
conceptually or empirically (Coletti et al., 2005; Vitasek and Manrodt, 2012).  
Contextual gaps refer to the ability to generalise the findings of existing 
research in specific industries or geographies.  Although logistics outsourcing 
serves as the context for many articles on contractual alliances, none of these 
studies explore the role of aligned performance measures in the success of a 
logistics outsourcing relationship. Nor do they measure alignment between 
contract’s SLAs and partners’ objectives (Tsai et al., 2012; Vitasek and 
Manrodt, 2012).   
Finally, and in the spirit of developing applied research relevant to practice, 
there were no studies that could explain to practitioners how to measure inter-
firm performance measurement alignment or how to predict the success or 
failure of a contractual outsourcing relationship based upon inter-firm alignment 
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results.  The available literature related to methods for measuring alignment, 
focuses on measuring alignment of one business function with the corporate 
strategy or between corporate strategy and the market environment 
(Venkatraman and Camillus, 1984; Venkatraman and Prescott, 1990; 
Venkatraman, 1990; Venkatraman, 1989). This research proposes the 
application of such methods to a new context which has far reaching 
management implications.  
The evidence of theoretical, empirical, contextual and substantive gaps in the 
academic literature is translated into the questions that will be addressed in this 
doctoral research and translated into hypotheses to be tested. 
1.2.2 Research Questions 
The research aim of the study is to correlate alignment of inter-firm performance 
measures with the success of contractual alliances. If alignment of inter-firm 
performance measures matters to contractual alliance success it will help to 
explain why some contractual alliances are terminated abruptly when internal 
goals are achieved.  
Keeping in mind the gaps documented in the literature review and introduced 
above, the research will answer the following questions: 
RQ1: How can inter-firm performance alignment be measured, 
considering contractual SLAs and the alliance members’ performance 
objectives?    
RQ2: How can contractual alliance success be operationalised, using 
known measures of that success such as longevity, formality, relative 
profitability, and stability?  
RQ3: How much does inter-firm alignment (IFA) contribute to predict 
contractual alliance success (CAS)?  
The above questions will form the research hypotheses, which are grounded in 
the literature and will be tested through the proposed structural equation model 
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(SEM) model (to be described in detail in Chapter 4, under quantitative 
methods).  
1.3. Research Model 
The study follows the research model presented below in Figure 1.  This model 
describes the overall relationship between inter-firm performance alignment and 
the success of the contractual alliance. A new construct was designed to 
measure alignment of inter-firm performance: the inter-firm alignment coefficient 
(IFA). The IFA is the result of estimating the distance (fit) amongst three sets of 
performance measures: i) the contract’s SLAs vs. actual performance, ii) the 
contract’s SLAs and the provider’s financial objectives, and iii) the contract’s 
SLAs and user’s financial objectives. The firms’ financial objectives are used as 
a proxy of their performance objectives.   
Once the IFA coefficient has been calculated, the model proposes to estimate 
an index for contractual alliance success (CAS). The CAS index includes four 
variables that indicate the degree of success of contractual alliances. Three of 
these variables were derived from previous research documented in the 
management literature.  They are longevity (duration of the relationship), 
stability (minimising the need to renegotiate), formality (existence of a signed 
formal contract), and relative profitability (Ariño, 2003; Reuer and Ariño, 2002; 
Zollo et al., 2002; Reuer and Zollo, 2005; Parkhe, 1993). The fourth variable, 
relative profitability, measures the impact of the contractual alliance to the 
provider’s revenue and the user’s cost structure. It was conceptualised from a 
game theory perspective and the associated switching costs.  
The research model will be explained in more detail at the end of Chapter 2 with 
the literature review, and will be translated in the research hypotheses.  
The research model is grounded in Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) theory.  
TCE supports the idea that firms seek to economise the costs involved in 
transacting either internally or externally, and that economisation takes place as 
firms select the appropriate governance structure for different types of 
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transactions.  Optimal governance structures minimise transaction costs and 
protect the firm against unavoidable opportunism in business. Chapter 3 will 
justify this choice in more detail.  
 
Figure 1 Proposed Research Model 
In the proposed research model, the inter-firm alignment coefficient (IAF) acts 
as the independent variable or predictor of the value of the contract alliance 
success (CAS) index. It is evident that alignment of performance measurement 
systems is not the only determinant of IFR success. With that in mind, the 
research will isolate the IFA coefficient to measure its single explanatory power 
of the CAS index.   
Chapter 2 describes in detail the literature review that supports the research 
model, the knowledge gaps to be addressed, and the hypotheses to be tested.  
1.4. Contributions and Findings 
This research contributes to management theory, business practice and 
quantitative methods in the fields of inter-firm relationship management, 
performance management systems and strategic alignment. The research 
project is placed at the intersection of these three literature domains, which are 
depicted in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2 Locus of Expected Contributions 
The study conceptualised and measured the inter-firm alignment (IFA) 
coefficient by adapting an existing method from the strategy literature. The 
method is based on measuring Euclidean distances between the numerical 
values of two or more constructs. The method has been used extensively to test 
alignment between functional strategy and corporate strategy (IT strategy is a 
premier example of this). It also tests the alignment between corporate strategy 
and the firm’s environment (Venkatraman and Camillus, 1984; Venkatraman 
and Prescott, 1990; Venkatraman, 1990; Venkatraman, 1989).  
The calculations of the inter-firm alignment (IFA) coefficient measured the fit 
between three different dimensions of performance: i) contract’s SLAs and 
actual performance, ii) contract’s SLAs and provider’s performance objectives, 
and iii) contract’s SLAs and user’s performance objectives. These three 
components created a general IFA coefficient by contract. A key finding in this 
phase of the research was the fact that there is one critical dimension of 
performance that drives alignment of the whole contract: .the alignment 
between the contracts’ SLAs and the users’ financial objectives. When 
alignment is high in this dimension, the overall alignment of the relationship is 
high as well. Chapter 6 shows the quantitative details of the model.  
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The calculation of the contractual alliance success index is another contribution 
of this research. The CAS index was calculated using existing measures of 
success that have been proposed and tested individually in the management 
literature. The CAS index includes contractual alliance characteristics such as 
longevity (Parkhe, 1993), stability (Ariño and Reuer, 2004; Reuer and Ariño, 
2002; Ariño et al., 2001), formality and the relative profitability of the relationship 
for the partners. Using data from 149 contracts this study shows the relevance 
of each variable to the overall CAS index. The quantitative analysis confirmed 
the contribution of longevity to CAS as predicted in the literature. However the 
results of the SEM contradict the proposed hypotheses that consider stability 
and formality measures of CAS. The research shows that low stability (high 
numbers of renegotiations) is closely correlated with the values of the CAS 
index. The same is true for low formality. These findings challenge traditional 
IFR management views. The fourth measure of CAS, relative profitably, was 
proposed during the full quantitative study when more data became available. It 
was positively correlated with CAS though with low contribution to success.  
The main contribution of this research was the causal correlation established 
between the levels of the IFA coefficient to predict the values of the CAS index. 
Higher levels of alignment of inter-firm performance contribute to greater 
contractual alliance success. The results concluded that inter-firm performance 
alignment is one of the determinants of success in inter-firm relationships. The 
analysis was conducted using a model of structural equations (SEM) that 
simultaneously established bivariate correlations and the overall fit of the 
estimated model versus the existing data. The SEM’s output estimated the 
goodness of fit of the model to validate all research hypotheses simultaneously.  
In summary, successful inter-firm relations have negotiated conflicting 
objectives that seek alignment towards common goals by leveraging their 
performance measurement systems as a management tool (Kaplan and Norton, 
2006; Kathuria et al., 2007; Decoene and Bruggeman, 2006; Neely and Najjar, 
2006).  By adapting and testing a method to measure degrees of alignment of 
inter-firm objectives, as well as the effect on successful contractual alliances, 
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this research expands on current theories of performance measurement and 
inter-firm relationship management. The research confirms the value of 
strategic alignment in a new context.  
Applied research must also inform and shape management practice. 
Considering the high level of activity in the formation (and dissolution) of 
contractual alliances, it is important that management research addresses the 
expanding use of service providers to manage non-core business functions 
(Gulati and Singh, 1998; Gulati and Kletter, 2005; Gulati, 2007). The 
conclusions and methods of this research will inform managers on how to set-
up better SLAs and the importance of aligning them to the financial objectives of 
signing firms.  In the case of existing contractual alliances, service providers will 
be able to identify and modify relationships that have a high risk of dissolution 
and low probability of success.  Getting access to this predictive capability 
motivated the sponsoring logistics service provider to support this research and 
grant access to their internal contracts and managers.  It is expected that the 
contextual contribution of this research in the logistics outsourcing industry will 
be extrapolated to other sectors facing similar challenges of aligning objectives 
across inter-firm relations. 
1.5. Research Approach and Thesis Structure 
The structure of this document follows closely the approach taken during the 
research. Chapter 1 introduces the context of the research topic and discusses 
the main motivations for pursuing the project, including the main knowledge 
gaps and research questions. Chapter 2 presents a thorough literature review of 
the three literature domains that frame the discussion on alignment of inter-firm 
performance   measures. The review confirms the knowledge gaps and 
proposes researchable hypotheses that will be answered using a multi-method 
research approach of quantitative statistical analysis combined with in-depth 
interviews. Chapter 3 introduces the theoretical model that will be used in light 
of the premises of Transaction Cost Economics and the philosophical position 
to approach the hypotheses. Chapter 4 presents the research methodology 
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including the operationalisation of variables using the service provider’s 
contracts. These contracts are of two types, one set of active (successful) 
contracts and a set of decommissioned (failed) contracts.  
As part of the research design, a triangulation of quantitative and qualitative 
research methods is proposed. The quantitative methods have been applied to 
the calculations of alignment and the computation of a structural equation model 
to explain the relationship between alignment and CA success. Quantitative 
results were generated from the Pilot Study with 11 contracts summarised in 
Chapter 5 and from the full study with all 149 contracts, analysed in Chapter 6. 
The qualitative method via interviews was applied to confirm the rationale of the 
proposed hypotheses, and to improve sense-making of the quantitative results 
of the pilot study. The interviews are summarised in Chapter 5 as well. The 
validation of the research hypotheses as a result of the full quantitative analysis 
from the SEM is offered in Chapter 6.  Chapter 7 summarises the findings of the 
research and states the contributions of the research and its limitations.  
Table 1, below, presents the overall structure of the document and key contents 
from each section.  
Table 1 Thesis Structure 
CHAPTER DESCRIPTION KEY CONTENT 
Chapter 1. 
Introduction 
Sets the context for the research by 
emphasizing the importance of managing 
inter-firm relationships and the use of 
performance measurement systems to seek 
alignment of conflicting objectives present in 
contractual alliances. 
Research Context 
Knowledge Gaps 
Research Questions 
Expected Contributions 
Research Approach and Thesis 
Structure 
Chapter 2. 
Literature 
Review 
Reviews key references of the academic 
literature covering three specific management 
fields relevant to the research. These fields 
are: management of inter-firm relationships 
and determinants of their success; 
performance measurement systems, features 
and applications to the IFR field; and concepts 
of strategic alignment with a review of 
methods to evaluate it.  
Types of IFRs  
Contractual Alliances 
Determinants of Success of 
Contractual Alliances 
Impact on Firm Performance 
Operationalisation of the Alignment 
Concept  
Knowledge Gaps and Hypotheses 
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Chapter 3. 
Theoretical 
Model & 
Hypotheses 
Explains the operationalisation of the research 
constructs and the choice of performance 
measures from contracts, users and providers 
to be aligned. Presents the choice of 
theoretical lens (Transaction Cost Economics 
– TCE) that informs the research and the 
philosophical position supporting research 
methods and contribution. The Chapter ends 
with arguments for advancing the research 
hypotheses.   
Operationalisation of Research 
Constructs 
TCE as a Theoretical Lens that 
Connects IFRs and Performance 
Management 
Philosophical Position Informing 
Research  
Research Model and Hypotheses 
 
Chapter 4. 
Research 
Methodology 
Describes the multi-method research design 
including the interview protocol, and the 
experimental design from a single data 
source. It presents in depth descriptions of the 
operationalisation of all variables used in the 
quantitative analysis. The Chapter ends with a 
description of the research strategy that was 
developed as a result of the selected research 
method and that will be applied for the pilot 
and full studies.  
Unit of Analysis and Context  
Operationalisation of Performance 
Variables 
Operationalisation of the (CAS) Index 
Operationalisation of the IFA 
Coefficient  
Interviewing as Qualitative Method  
SEM Quantitative Research Design 
Strategies for Pilot and Full Studies 
Chapter 5. 
Data Collection 
and Pilot 
Studies 
Presents data collection methods for both 
quantitative and qualitative sources. The 
Chapter describes the results of two pilot 
projects:  one to operationalise the two key 
constructs of the research: the inter-firm 
alignment (IFA) coefficient, the contractual 
alliance success (CAS) index; and the second 
to validate these constructs and the research 
hypotheses with in-depth expert interviews. 
The conclusions summarise the implications 
of the pilots for the full quantitative study.  
Quantitative Data Collection 
Pilot Study 1 for Construct 
Operationalisation 
Results of Pilot Study 1 
Pilot Study 2 for Construct Conceptual 
Validation 
Results of Pilot Study 2 
Implications for Full Quantitative Study 
Chapter 6. 
Model Results 
and Analysis 
In the context of the research hypotheses, this 
Chapter begins by justifying the suitability of 
structural equation modelling (SEM) as the 
technique selected for the full quantitative 
analysis. It also presents a step-by-step 
description of all actions recommended for 
using SEM—from data preparation to the 
analysis of significance tests.  
Data Preparation 
Model Specification 
Model Identification 
Model Estimation, Testing and 
Modification 
Final Model Estimation 
Analysis of Global Model Fit 
Analysis of Estimated Parameters  
Significance Tests by Theorised 
Relation (Hypotheses) 
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Chapter 7. 
Discussion of 
Results and 
Contributions 
This Chapter describes key findings of the 
research, connecting the results with the 
research hypotheses and the contributions of 
the research for theory and for practice.  The 
Chapter also acknowledges the limitations of 
the research and future avenues of research 
Results for Each Research 
Hypotheses 
Contributions to Theory 
Contributions to Practice 
Contributions to Methods 
Limitations 
Chapter 8. 
Conclusions 
This Chapter summarises the aim of the 
research, restates the rigour and importance 
of the topic and the method, and proposes 
new ideas for research projects in the field. 
Research Summary 
Rigour and Importance 
Further Research 
References Bibliography cited in the dissertation Cited references 
Appendices 
Detailed raw data received from the logistics 
service provider and 24 months of indicators. 
Raw data from logistics service 
provider 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW  
2.1 Introduction 
This Chapter presents the results of the literature review that demonstrates the 
existing knowledge gaps referred to in Chapter 1. The existence of 
researchable gaps in the extant management literature is fundamental in order 
to justify this doctoral research. The literature review indicates the need of 
additional research on the alignment of inter-firm performance measures and 
their role in predicting success of contractual alliances in particular and inter-
firm relations in general.   
The literature review was conducted using the Systematic Review. The review 
systematically identified, assessed and summarised pertinent contributions 
providing the theoretical foundation that informs this doctoral research (Tranfield 
et al, 2003).  The systematic review confirmed in a more definitive way, the 
opportunity to contribute to the body of knowledge in the fields of inter-firm 
relationships, performance measurement systems and strategic alignment.  
The systematic review refined the existing references in terms of quality of the 
contribution and applicability to my research problem. The inclusion and 
exclusion criteria are presented in Table 2. Considering the amount of available 
sources of information, the process of fully documenting the state of the 
knowledge in the selected domains required a structured and methodical review 
approach (Denyer and Tranfield, 2009).  
Table 2 Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria for the Systematic Review 
Ranking of 
Journals (Based 
on Cranfield 
University 
Guidelines) 
Grasp of existing 
knowledge 
Proposed 
problem or 
research question 
Research 
method: data 
collection, data 
processing, 
data analysis 
Quality of 
conclusions: 
Argumentation, 
Contribution, 
Identification of 
future areas of 
research. 
 
Excellent review of 
relevant literature 
and widely cited 
reference (+100 
Creative academic 
research question 
with clear 
application to 
Clear justification 
of selected 
research method, 
clarity in data 
Reaching the 
conclusions was a 
natural process from 
the literature review, 
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citations) management 
research 
collection, 
analysis and 
processing.  
the proposed 
question, and 
method for data 
analysis. 
 
 
Good review of the 
literature but 
missing some key 
concepts. Locally 
cited (50-100 
citations) 
Interesting problem 
to research from an 
academic 
perspective with 
little application to 
business 
More focus on 
the research 
method but 
limited clarity in 
data collection 
methods and 
analysis. 
The conclusions are 
interesting but the 
links between 
method and results 
are not clear. 
 
 
The literature cited 
missed key 
authors. Niche 
contribution with 
25-50 citations 
Good 
documentation of a 
management 
problem with little 
academic rigor in 
the discussion. 
More focus on 
data collection 
and analysis but 
little discussion 
on the pertinence 
of the research 
method. 
Conclusions are 
interesting but there 
is no correlation with 
gaps in the 
literature. 
 
 
The literature 
reviewed for the 
research does not 
reflect a current 
knowledge of 
concepts and 
authors in the field. 
Few citations (less 
-25) 
The paper does not 
propose a research 
problem relevant to 
academia or 
practitioners.  
The method 
utilized for data 
collection, 
analysis and 
processing did 
not fit the 
problem or the 
conclusions 
Conclusions do not 
add to the body of 
knowledge. Seem 
irrelevant or 
disconnected from 
method and data. 
Source: Table by Author based on Denyer and Tranfield (2009) 
Three knowledge domains are central to inform research within the scope 
mentioned above. Two of them are traditional management research fields: 
inter-firm relationships (IFR) and performance measurement systems (PMS).  
The third domain is centred on the concept of alignment, which connects, in an 
inter-firm context, the literature on IFRs and on performance management. 
Alignment is a more recent management concept, originated in the strategy 
literature. It was transposed to the PM literature after the advent of Balanced 
Scorecard (Kaplan and Norton, 2006; Kaplan and Norton, 1996; Kaplan and 
Norton, 2004; Kaplan and Norton, 1992) as a performance measurement 
framework. Balance Scorecard strongly advocates alignment as a desirable 
feature of a measurement system. As a construct, alignment is used primarily in 
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intra-firm contexts (Kaplan and Norton, 2006). However, in this research 
alignment will be conceptualised and measured in an inter-firm context.  
Within the IFR domain the literature review covered the common taxonomy of 
strategic alliances with a specific focus on contractual alliances (CA), also 
known as non-equity alliances. From an alignment-seeking perspective, 
contractual alliances pose an interesting management challenge because of the 
presence of often conflicting objectives between partners and the existence of a 
third set of performance measures (SLAs) to be aligned. These SLAs are 
embedded in the contract that governs the CA.  The review of the IFR literature 
includes a summary of the motivations for alliance formation, the determinants 
of IFR success (Gulati, 2007; Gulati et al., 2011; Gulati et al., 2009), and a 
connection to performance evaluation of the new governance structure.  
The second domain in the review is the vast field of performance management 
literature. To uncover the knowledge gaps that support this research, the review 
connects the fundamentals of performance measurement systems in an intra-
firm context with the assessment of IFR success. This includes specific 
characteristics of CA’s performance measurement systems, definitions and 
measurements of CA’s success and characteristics of performance 
measurements applied in to the inter-firm space rather than solely intra-firm 
performance (Neely et al., 2005; Martinez and Bititci, 2006). 
Considering the scope of the proposed research, alignment is explored in the 
literature review as a third domain.  Alignment has been a popular construct in 
management research for a diversity of purposes (McAdam and Bailie, 2002; 
Kathuria et al., 2007). It is believed to be a desirable and measurable quality in 
strategy formulation, and is often used when testing the fit between a firm’s 
strategy and its environment (Venkatraman and Prescott, 1990; Venkatraman, 
1990; Nielsen, 2010).  The construct has also been applied as a characteristic 
that ensures coherence between corporate strategy and local or functional 
strategy. And it assesses the fit of a specific project and corporate strategy.  In 
the field of performance measurement systems, alignment has been mentioned 
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as a desirable feature of the system where all performance measures must 
align with an overall goal of the firm (McAdam and Bailie, 2002; Kaplan and 
Norton, 2006; Zajac et al., 2000).  For this research it is crucial to explore the 
role of performance measures in IFR management and reviewing different 
methods to measure alignment in the context of contractual alliances.   
Alignment of performance measures in contractual alliances occurs among 
three different systems (Nielsen and Gudergan, 2012; Gulati et al., 2011):  
i) The performance measures of the governance mechanism or service 
level agreements (SLAs);  
ii) The performance measures of the firm providing products or services 
in the alliance; and,  
iii) The performance measures of the firm procuring those products or 
services.  
Overall, the goal of the review is to demonstrate gaps in the academic research 
connecting degrees of alignment of contractual alliance performance 
measurement systems as determinants of the inter-firm relation success.   
2.2 Inter-Firm Relationships 
2.2.1 Importance  
The years of the interconnected firm are upon us (Gulati and Kletter, 2005; 
Gulati et al., 2009; Lavie, 2006).  This is confirmed by the business world 
announcing, on a daily basis, the formation of a new kind of inter-firm 
relationship4 and vast amounts of strategic management literature devoted to 
the study of inter-firm relationships. Journal papers on alliances, constellations, 
networks, joint ventures, licensing agreements, franchises, outsourcing 
relationships, horizontal integrations, vertical integrations, supplier-buyer 
partnerships, and many more forms of inter-firm relationships, add to the body 
                                            
4
 The Association for Strategic Alliances (ASAP) estimates that in 2011 the number of new inter-
firm relationships created was in excess of 2,760 across all industries and geographies.  
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of IFR knowledge.  If the words ‘alliance’ ‘inter-firm relations’ are used in Google 
Scholar, the search results bring more than 15,100 articles since 2000 and over 
3.1m hits from trade and business sources accessible in the world wide web5.   
Management authors have long theorised over the perils of being alone in 
business. ‘Unitary organisations often suffer, amongst other things, from 
operational inefficiencies, resource scarcity, lack of facilities to take advantage 
of economies of scale, or risks that are more appropriately spread across 
multiple business units’ (Borys and Jemison, 1989).  Management scientists, 
always keen observers of business realities, note the ever shrinking core of the 
firm and its expanding boundaries (Gulati and Kletter, 2005). So it is not 
surprising that management research on inter-firm forms has mushroomed.   
2.2.2 Taxonomy of Inter-Firm Relationships 
However, despite this interest, the study of alliance performance is complex. 
There are many frameworks describing the typology of IFRs, the strategic intent 
of firms pursuing alliances and different subjective ideas describing the 
performance of a strategic alliance without much data (Zollo et al., 2002; Zollo 
et al., 2002).  Given this lack of consistency, it is appropriate to introduce some 
terms and definitions, and explain the way they are used for the reminder of the 
document.  
Inter-firm relationships have been classified using different frameworks and 
typologies. Often they are riddled with redundancies and gaps, making it difficult 
to represent real business structures. There is also little convergence around 
key concepts (Das and Teng, 2001; Oliver, 1990). For the purpose of this 
thesis, all of these terms will be referred to as inter-firm relationships or IFRs. 
This is a term widely used in the literature and a synonym of inter-organisational 
relations summarised by The Oxford Handbook of Inter-Organizational 
Relations (Cropper et al., 2008) and by other key authors in the field (Barringer 
                                            
5
 www.scholar.google.com search of the concepts of ‘alliance’ and ‘inter-firm 
relations’ conducted on March 31
st
, 2013 
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and Harrison, 2000; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Dyer et al., 2001).  Inter-firms 
relationships are business structures that involve the close relation of more than 
one firm engaged in joint activities to pursue strategic or operational objectives.  
IFRs ‘can occur as the result of a wide range of motives and goals, take a 
variety of forms, and occur across vertical and horizontal boundaries’ (Gulati 
and Singh, 1998; Gulati, 1998; Mitsuhashi and Greve, 2009).  
Table 3, below, offers a summarised typology of inter-firm relationships (IFR), 
generalised in some reviews as Strategic Alliances (SA). The typology is 
organised along the axes of hierarchies and market from Williamson’s 
fundamentals of the structure of organisations (1979 and 1984). IFRs can be 
classified based on:  
- The position of the focal firm in the network,  
- The number of firms in the relationship,  
- The degree of governance of the member firms in the IFR, and  
- The balance between level of internal control and commitment of resources 
(i.e. how close they are to an internal function in a corporate hierarchy, such 
as joint ventures, or how far is the level of control making it akin to a market 
relationship).  
This research will focus on non-equity contractual alliances which are located at 
the middle of the Williamson’s continuum between hierarchies and market.  
Some authors equate the concept of IFRs to strategic alliances or alliances in 
general (Bleeke and Ernst, 1995; Hamel et al., 1989; Kanter, 1994).  When this 
is the case, alliances include both equity and non-equity inter-firm 
arrangements.  Gulati and Singh (1998) provide probably the most popular 
definition of strategic alliance, as a ‘voluntary arrangements between firms 
involving exchange, sharing, and co-development of products, technologies or 
services’.   
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Table 3 Typology of Inter-Firm Relationships 
HIERARCHIES 
H
Y
B
R
ID
S
 
NETWORK 
POSITION                     
SIZE 
DEGREE OF 
GOVERNANCE 
BILATERAL 
CONTRACTS 
UNILATERAL 
CONTRACTS 
Vertical Dyads 
Joint Ventures 
(JV) 
Co-
Developments 
Supply 
Agreements 
Horizontal Triads 
Equity 
Arrangements 
(EA) 
Co-Licensing 
Marketing 
Agreements 
Diagonal Consortia 
Contractual 
Alliances  
(Non-Equity) 
Co-Marketing Licensing 
Prominent Networks 
Unilateral 
Contracts 
Outsourcing Franchising 
Entrepreneurial Constellations 
Inter-Locked 
Boards 
NON-EQUITY                                 
CONTRACTUAL ALLIANCES 
MARKETS 
Source: Developed by Author from Fundamental TCE Concepts Combined with Other Typologies in the 
Strategic Alliance Literature  
 ‘Popular forms of strategic alliances include such arrangements as joint 
ventures, research and development agreements, co-marketing contracts, and 
significant buyer-supplier relationships’ (Das and Teng, 2000; Sengun and 
Wasti, 2007).  In this case, alliances (Barringer and Harrison, 2000) are a type 
of inter-firm relationships that are characterised by not having equity 
participation of the partners when forming a new organisation. Rather, the 
partners simply share resources to pursue a joint goal. 
The table’s first column, network position, refers to the relative position of the 
partner in the value chain of the focal firm. If the partner is next upstream 
(supplier) or downstream (distribution channel), then the IFR is vertical in 
nature. This concept applies mostly for dyads or triads. If the partner shares the 
same industry and product line, (for example, firms with the same SIC code), 
the IFR is horizontal and could even become an inter-rival strategic alliance, 
anti-trust laws permitting. Diagonal IFRs are possible when members of 
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disparate industries come together to tackle new opportunities in product or 
market development (Gulati and Kletter, 2005).   
This classification is non-exclusive as we find examples of vertical dyads 
forming a joint venture to do new product development, for example. However 
some combinations are more prevalent than others; most joint-ventures are 
horizontal, and most bilateral contractual agreements are vertical.  Recent 
literature on the network of alliances (Koka and Prescott, 2008) describes two 
new types of IFRs based on relative position of the focal firm, where the firm 
could be the prominent centre of a network or an entrepreneurial member 
seeking some network advantages.   
The column size refers to the number of firms in the IFR. It will be a dyad if two 
firms are participating of the arrangement, a triad if there are three, and a 
consortium with more than three.  A larger number of firms in an inter-firm 
relationship, without finding specific quantities in the literature, are called a 
network (Gulati, 1998) or constellation.  It is prevalent in the management 
literature today to find the concept of alliance portfolios, which refers to the 
amount of alliances and IFR that a single firm manages.  
Most of the research on IFRs has been conducted at the dyadic level, although 
authors occasionally extrapolate their analytical frameworks to a web of 
relationships in which the firm operates (Wu et al., 2010). This web of 
relationships is again called a network, which reveals a pattern of ties amongst 
members. The concept of networks also refers to the environment or the ‘social 
network’ in which dyadic relations develop. These concepts of networks speak 
generally of a new way in which firms can generate additional rents and 
competitive advantage by specialising inter-firm (rather than intra-firm) assets. 
In that way, they obtain differentiating firm performance (Gulati, 1998), hence 
the term ‘value networks’.   
The column degree of governance stems from classifications based on the 
transaction cost economics paradigm. It is a popular typology of IFRs (Zollo et 
al., 2002; Barringer and Harrison, 2000; Oxley, 1997; Kogut, 1988) and was the 
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typology used for early research on joint ventures and other forms of equity-
based alliances.  Following the transaction cost economics’ logic, equity based 
arrangements and joint ventures are closest to hierarchies. Contractual non-
equity alliances, meanwhile, are closer to the logic of markets. All forms in 
between are considered hybrid governance structures. 
Das & Teng’s (2001) typology defines alliances based on degree of governance 
as well. Their framework considers four forms of alliances: two of equity, and 
two of non-equity. Examples of equity-based relationships include equity joint 
ventures and minority equity alliances, and non-equity alliances are bilateral 
and unilateral contract-based alliances. Bilateral contract-based alliances 
require that both members invest resources in the relationship and work 
constantly together so they are integrated tightly to the IFR. In unilateral 
alliances, one member contributes an asset that is desirable and procured by 
the other member but the activities of the providing party are carried 
independently of the interaction with the buyer.  
Regarding the nature of the resources to be shared bilateral alliances, could be 
define as a scale or link alliance (Dussauge et al., 2000 and 2004).  In scale 
alliances the partners contribute similar resources thereby creating economies 
of scale and scope.  In link alliances, members combine different resources and 
skills to generate new value for both members. Alliance portfolios tend to 
combine both types within the firm.  
As described above, each type of inter-firm relationship has unique 
characteristics regarding ownership structure, degree of inter-firm interaction, 
control mechanisms, duration, and adjustments required in the event of an 
unplanned alliance termination.  Using the taxonomy depicted in Table 3 above, 
this research focuses on bilateral non-equity alliances or contractual alliances 
(CA). They are characterised by lack of shared ownership, moderate degree of 
inter-firm interaction, mostly focused on the scope of the relation, and 
reciprocity as the key control mechanism (Nielsen, 2010).   
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2.2.3 Theoretical Lenses to Explain Alliance Formation  
Before uncovering gaps that explain the connection between alignment of 
performance measurement systems and contractual alliance success is critical 
to understand the rationale behind alliance formation.  Without understanding 
the theoretical lenses that explain IFR formation it will be difficult to articulate 
alliance success and impossible to connect success with degrees of goal 
alignment between members.  
A review of the IFR management literature shows that determinants of alliance 
success vary depending on the theoretical paradigm applied to the formation of 
alliances.  Any given theory will present a rationale for alliance formation, and 
will define the main purpose of the alliance, its expected outcomes and 
determinants for success.   
This section briefly summarises the six prevailing theoretical lenses used to 
explain alliance formation. This will serve as an introduction to the discussion on 
determinants of alliance performance. Table 4, next, presents the key 
theoretical paradigms to be reviewed. 
Table 4 Theoretical Paradigms to Explain Alliance Formation 
 
RATIONALE FOR  
ALLIANCE FORMATION 
Transaction Cost Economics 
Resource Dependence 
Strategic Choice 
Stakeholder Theory 
Organisational Learning 
Institutional Theory 
Source: Barringer & Harrison, 2000; p. 382 
The six lenses are organised from the most economical rationale embodied in 
transaction cost economics (TCE) to the most behavioural one represented by 
the institutional theory. 
Taken mainly from (Barringer and Harrison, 2000), Table 5 below presents a 
brief summary of the lenses, the rationale for alliance formation from each one, 
the strongest academic criticism and an example of a determinant of alliance 
success under that particular lens. More than an exhaustive review of theories 
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this is a selection of significant theoretical contributions and how each one 
explains IFR formation. Thus the determinants of alliance success change as 
well. It is worth mentioning that these theoretical lenses do not apply exclusively 
to the formation of CAs in particular but to strategic alliances and inter-firm 
relationships in general. 
2.2.3.1 Economic Lenses  
When transaction cost economics (TCE) is used as a theoretical lens (Das and 
Teng, 2001), alliances are defined as hybrid governance mechanisms that 
optimise transaction and production costs by minimising opportunism, bounded 
rationality and uncertainty (Barringer and Harrison, 2000; Williamson, 1993).  
Therefore, under TCE, determinants of alliance success are the pre-existing 
conditions of the alliance. Examples include relation-specific assets, - as a way 
to reduce opportunism -, (Dyer, 1997) and the appropriate governance structure 
and management competence to drive lowest transaction and production costs 
(Dyer and Chu, 2003).   Optimal governance structures minimise transaction 
costs and protect the firm against unavoidable factors in business such as 
opportunism, uncertainty and bounded rationality (Williamson, 1981).   
In Williamson’s seminal contribution on markets and hierarchies (1985), inter-
firm firms had not been yet conceptualised.  Most of the prescriptive application 
to managers was for deciding when to use what type of governance 
mechanism: markets and their efficiencies (and risks), or hierarchies to maintain 
control but perhaps at a higher cost.  A classic example that depicts this 
dichotomy is the make-or-buy decision (Walker and Weber, 1984).  In 1991, 
Williamson adds the concept of hybrid structures as governance mechanisms 
that sit in between markets and hierarchies, and that were used mostly to 
explain vertical integration (Das and Teng, 2001).  Oxley (1997) contributes with 
an additional taxonomy of hybrid structures by aligning joint ventures and equity 
alliances to hierarchies, and unilateral contracts (such as licensing, marketing, 
procurement and distribution agreements) to markets.  Bilateral contracts (co-
development agreements, outsourcing, cross-licensing and other reciprocal 
agreements) are in the middle of the hierarchy-market continuum.  
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The TCE explanation of alliance formation fails to articulate the concept of joint 
benefits or joint value creation. It assumes that one firm is willing to minimise 
transaction and production costs but it does not address what happens if both 
firms in an alliance are trying to apply the same logic.  Zajac (Zajac et al., 2000; 
Zajac and Olsen, 1993) and Dyer (1997) depart from transaction cost 
minimisation as a motivation for alliance formation, and complement the TCE 
approach with the concept of joint value creation.  There is additional criticism 
regarding the unit of analysis: TCE is focused on the transaction and its 
characteristics whereas other lenses are concerned with the characteristics of 
the firm and the factors, - strategic and social -, that explain IFR formation 
(Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Looking at alliance formation through the lens of the resource dependency and 
resource-based theories, alliances are vehicles to acquire critical resources that 
are available in the market, or to avoid dependencies from resource controlling 
entities (Das and Teng, 2000).  The resource view on alliance formation is 
deeply rooted in the concept of using resources as means to gain competitive 
advantage and power over critical resources that can differentiate the firm from 
its nearest competitors (Peteraf, 1993; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990).  The 
assumption exists that resources capable of creating competitive advantage are 
unique (Hamel et al., 1989) but reachable within the industry and at a lower 
price, if acquired in a collaborative context.  This context extends to the 
strategic and social motivations for formation of alliances as means to acquire 
and share resources (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996). Some IFRs are 
knowledge seeking vehicles that provide strong motivation to alliance formation 
(Mitsuhashi and Greve, 2009; Kotabe et al., 2003; McNamara, 1998). 
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Table 5  Six Theories to Explain Alliance Formation  
THEORETICAL LENS DESCRIPTION 
RATIONALE OF                                     
ALLIANCE FORMATION 
LIMITATIONS 
DETERMINANT OF ALLIANCE 
SUCCESS 
Transaction Cost Economics 
(TCE) 
Focuses on how an 
organisation should structure 
its boundary-spanning activities 
so as to minimise the sum of its 
production and transaction 
costs. 
Alliances will be formed if they 
provide a mechanism that 
reduces the uncertainty of 
market failure but can operate 
at lower costs than 
establishing a hierarchy. 
TCE is insufficient to explain 
other management motives, 
beyond cost minimisation, that 
drive alliance formation, such as 
learning or legitimacy. 
Relation-Specific Assets 
 
Governance Mechanisms 
Resource Dependence & 
Resource-Based View 
Theorises that firms must 
engage in exchanges with their 
environment in order to obtain 
resources. Resources can lead 
to competitive advantage if they 
are: rare, imperfectly imitable, 
valuable, and non-
substitutable. 
Firms enter alliances to 
minimise the dependency of a 
given resource by exerting 
control over organisations that 
possess that resource. 
Limited lens to explain how the 
transfer of competencies and 
resources take place in an 
alliance or other form of IFR. 
Network Resources 
(Complementarily) 
Strategic Choice 
Study of factors that provide 
opportunities for firms to 
increase in competitiveness or 
market power. Profit and 
growth are typically the major 
firm objectives that drive 
strategic behaviour. 
Entering alliances is a 
sensible strategy if the 
benefits of doing so (financial 
or strategic) exceed the 
associated costs (financial or 
perceived). Alliances may 
increase speed-to-market or 
neutralise a competitor. 
Very broad approach that 
encompasses all other 
motivations for alliance 
formation under the concept of 
"strategies". Limited empirical 
testing. 
Alliance Management 
Competencies 
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Stakeholder Theory 
Organisations are at the centre 
of an interdependent web of 
stakeholders and have a 
responsibility to consider the 
legitimate claims of their 
stakeholders when making 
decisions or conducting 
business transactions. 
Organisations form alliances 
to align their own interests 
with the interest of the 
stakeholders and also to 
reduce environmental 
uncertainty. 
Lack of empirical testing. 
Theory mostly accepted on 
bases of 'moral correctness'. 
Stakeholder models conclude 
that IFRs facilitate goal 
congruence amongst 
stakeholders but do not suggest 
how. 
Relational Capabilities 
Organisational Learning 
Is concerned over processes 
that lead to organisational 
learning. A key factor is 
absorptive capacity, which is 
defined as a firm's ability to 
recognise the value of new 
knowledge, assimilate it and 
apply it in a business setting. 
Alliances will provide a source 
of knowledge that must be 
absorbed as much as possible 
in order to increase 
organisational competencies 
and add value to the 
organisation. 
Focuses on skills development 
and transfers, without assessing 
costs of alternative knowledge 
acquisition vehicles. Does not 
adequately account for the risks 
of information sharing. 
Knowledge-Sharing Routines 
Institutional Theory 
Suggests that institutional 
environments impose 
pressures on organisations to 
appear legitimate and conform 
to prevailing social norms. 
Organisations form alliances 
to obtain legitimacy or to 
mimic, out of social pressure, 
other firms that have 
established IFRs. 
It is difficult to explain why a 
different variety of IFRs exist 
even when the prevalent 
environment do not use them. 
Partner Reputation 
Source: Theories from Table 3 in Barringer and Harrison (2000; p. 370). Correspondence to determinants by Author. 
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
51 
 
The RD/RBV lens rejects the perspective of cost minimisation and greater 
efficiencies embedded in TCE as the motivation to form alliances. Major 
criticisms arise from the fact that TCE focuses on static efficiency and routine 
operations (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996). It does not consider other determinant 
factors for alliance formation such as needs and opportunities to get or share 
resources with other firms.  Williamson critiques the ‘power’ aspect of the 
resource dependency view of the firm by saying that the advocates of the RBV 
lens reach a tautology when asserting that power allows the possession of 
critical resources, but possessing critical resources brings power (Williamson, 
1981). 
Using the strategic choice as a theoretical lens for alliance formation proposes 
that the motivation comes from opportunities for firms to increase their 
competitiveness and market power. Profit and growth are considered the major 
firm objectives that drive strategic behaviour (Barringer and Harrison, 2000) as 
they apply to formation of alliances and IFRs.  To explain the formation of 
alliances, the strategic choice lens is used when firms use a wide variety of 
strategic reasons to pursue them such as increase speed-to-market or 
neutralise a competitor. These strategic reasons may include cost minimisation 
and resource acquisition objectives, both seen as separate motivations under 
TCE and RD/RBV, but seen as one “strategic choice” under this powerful lens.   
The strategic choice lens has been applied more frequently in the analysis of 
joint ventures (Kogut, 1988; Harrigan, 1988), but the rationale applies to 
contractual alliances. However encompassing the “strategic choice” lens may 
be, critics argue that this very power, which seems to include almost all 
motivations for alliance formation under the concept of "strategic choice", has a 
limited empirical testing.  Furthermore, it fails to recognise when to use alliances 
versus another governance structure for the firm (Barringer and Harrison, 
2000). In short, under the strategic choice lens ‘the uniqueness of alliances, as 
strategic decisions, is not properly recognised’ (Das and Teng, 2001). 
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2.2.3.2 Behavioural Lenses  
The institutional theory suggests that firms enter alliances and other forms of 
inter-firm relationships to draw legitimacy from that of the partner (Dacin et al., 
2007).  Even though legitimisation is a valid outcome for some alliance 
members, the institutional lens has difficulties explaining why joining an IFR is 
the best available choice to gain such legitimacy and why firms form different 
types of IFRs (Barringer and Harrison, 2000). Additionally, operationalised 
metrics of these outcomes, as they relate to alliance, are not yet found in 
studies considering this theoretical lens. 
Some firms are at the centre of a network of stakeholders and use IFRs as the 
vehicle for coordinating multiple stakeholders’ interests. The stakeholder theory 
is used to explain alliance formation. It considers the firm as a nexus of treaties 
(Aoki et al., 1990) and places the centre of a network with explicit and implicit 
contracts that need to be satisfied and measured (Atkinson et al., 1997). 
Agency theory can be considered a subset of the stakeholder theory to the 
extent that it focuses on one specific stakeholder and its relationship to the firm. 
In agency theory the main stakeholder is the principal shareholder and 
management is its agent. Agency theory argues that in order to avoid conflicts 
between agent and principal, generated by the maximising behaviour of both, 
strict controls must be in place (Eisenhardt, 1989; Lajili and Mahoney, 2006). 
Organisational learning approaches, on the other hand, seem to be gaining 
traction as explanatory of inter-organisation relationships in general and 
alliances in particular. Hamel, Doz and Prahalad emphasise the value of 
international alliances in creating knowledge for competitive advantage (Hamel 
et al., 1989; Hamel, 1991).  Knowledge acquisition could be considered a case 
of resource acquisition (Ireland et al., 2002). However, these authors 
emphasise the importance of absorbing such knowledge within the firm relying 
heavily on theoretical issues like absorptive capacity and knowledge 
management (Dussauge et al., 2000). 
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A seminal study on value creation for firms forming joint ventures and licensing 
agreements (Anand and Khanna, 2000) demonstrated that firms do learn to 
create value by taking their cumulative experience in managing alliances and 
presenting better than average financial results for both members of the 
alliance.  Cumulative learning and improving absorptive capacity have also 
great impact in firm-level results when firms invest in alliance structures to 
coordinate alliance activity and code alliance-related know-how. This is 
demonstrated in a study with more than 200 organisations with different 
degrees of absorption of their alliance know-how (Dyer et al., 2001; Kale et al., 
2000, 2001, and 2002; Kale and Singh, 2007).  
Criticism to the organisational learning lens stems from the realisation that 
authors focus on management skills and knowledge transfer without assessing 
the costs of alternative vehicles of knowledge acquisition (besides IFRs). 
Additionally very few studies address the issue of risks in information sharing 
that are present in every alliance. One exception to this is found in Kale (2000), 
who proposes the use of relational governance mechanisms to protect 
proprietary assets in strategic alliances. 
2.2.4 Determinants of IFR Success 
Following Venkatraman and Ramanujam (1986) and Neely et al. (2005), IFR 
success is defined as the ability of the organisational form to deliver effective 
results to its partners and to be efficient in managing all internal shared 
resources available to fulfil the IFR-specific goals. This section reviews the 
different perspectives on determinants of IFR success, as a pre-requisite to 
exploring success measurement and alignment of IFR metrics.  
Determinants are defined as the conditions, antecedents or mediators to 
success. Alternatively, determinants are those conditions available to an 
alliance (from its partners, the environment or strategic mandate) to perform 
better than any alternative organisational structure (Wittmann et al., 2009).  
Determinants of alliance success are classified in two categories: a) 
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Determinants originated from the participating firms, and ii) Determinants 
generated within the scope of the IFR.  
There are characteristics present in the partners before the alliance was formed 
and made available to the new structure. This includes the nature of the 
resources to be shared; the relation-specific assets to be contributed to the 
alliance; and in general all competencies and experience that partners have in 
alliance management.  These determinants are grouped under the member-
provided determinants.  They exist whether the specific alliance materialises or 
not.   
The second group of determinants are those characteristics not available before 
the alliance is formed, but generated over time as the dynamics of post-
formation begin to take effect. This group is known as dynamic determinants, 
and they include relational capabilities, governance frameworks, and 
information and knowledge sharing routines amongst others.  
Determinants of alliance success are closely aligned with the particular 
theoretical lens used to explain alliance formation. These lenses were 
summarised in Table 5 above. Figure 3 depicts the two categories of 
determinants of alliance success with their correspondent theory to explain 
alliance formation. 
2.2.4.1 Member-Provided Determinants 
This section reviews the most frequent member-provided determinants of IFR 
success. The determinants range from the existing reputation of member firms, 
to a complex array of management capabilities related to alliance management. 
The review offers theoretical contributions and empirical demonstrations of the 
impact of these factors on alliance performance.  
It is worth mentioning that most of these determinants have been 
conceptualised as contributors to the success of inter-firm relationships in 
general and not necessarily contractual alliances in particular. Alliance 
management research has been active in theorising the role of a particular 
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determinant, creating and testing new constructs and measuring alliance 
success.  
 
Figure 3 Formation Rationales and Determinants of Success 
2.2.4.1.1 Network Resources 
For an alliance to be successful it must pool the right kind of resources from 
member firms. These are called network resources (Gulati and Kletter, 2005; 
Gulati, 2007) and to follow the definition of the RBV, they are rare, valuable, 
imperfectly imitable and non-substitutable (Barney, 1996; Barney, 2001).   
Value is created by combining or obtaining resources, under the assumption of 
resource deficiency (Lavie, 2006). Therefore resources ought to be 
complimentary (Anand and Khanna, 2000), compatible (Sarkar et al., 2001), 
reduce dependency from external sources (Barringer and Harrison, 2000) and 
contribute to a sustained competitive advantage  (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Hamel 
et al., 1989; Spanos and Lioukas, 2001).  If all those characteristics are 
accomplished there will then be empirical proof that resource owners achieve 
greater productivity through collaboration and specialisation (Dyer, 1997) with 
other firms.  
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2.2.4.1.2 Relation-specific Assets  
Relation-specific asset investments lock partners in a relationship. In the case 
of strategic buyer-supplier relationships, the supplier has an interest to leverage 
his initial investment, and the buyer would like to maintain the favourable 
conditions for accessing the assets. Predicting continuity of the relationship is 
desirable for managers so they can adjust their actions accordingly. 
Theoretical and empirical studies positively correlate a firm’s performance in 
inter-firm relationships if there is a previous investment in relational-specific 
investments or assets. Those assets include stock ownership on the partnering 
firm, without configuring an acquisition or an equity-based IFR (Parkhe, 1993; 
Dyer, 1997 and 2002).  In Oliver Williamson’s words (2005) ‘asset specificity is 
the most important dimension for describing transactions’. As we study alliance 
success, this determinant is critical.  In his view, relational-specific asset 
investments include human, physical and site assets. However, one derived 
conclusion of increased asset specificity is the increased complexity of 
governance costs (i.e. more complex contracts), which in turn may translate into 
higher transaction costs.  
Dyer (1997) demonstrated, with an empirical example from the automotive 
sector in the U.S. and Japan, that effective inter-firm collaboration (i.e. 
Japanese relationships) in the supply chain can prevent this undesirable effect. 
In doing so, firms may enjoy the benefits of both high asset specificity and low 
transaction costs.  Japanese automakers, for example, have lower transaction 
costs than their American counterparts. This is primarily due to repeated 
transactions with a small set of suppliers, economies of scale and scope of high 
volume of transactions within a small group, extensive inter-firm information 
sharing which avoids “guessing games” amongst partners, use of non-
contractual governance mechanisms with an indefinite time horizon, and 
investment in co-specialised assets.   
In two reviewed articles, authors emphasise the fact that experience in alliance 
management has become an asset to be brought into the relationship to create 
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
57 
 
alliance success (Anand and Khanna, 2000; Madhok, 2000).  In this scenario, 
more relation-specific investments generate more relational capital. In turn they 
increase the probability of alliance success. However, a recent empirical study 
conducted in the U.S. health care industry (Judge and Dooley, 2006) disputed 
the relation between relation-specific assets and protection against 
opportunistic behaviour, but other results of alliance outcomes and other 
determinants of the transaction cost met theoretical assumptions.  These other 
determinants of success will be reviewed in more detail below.  
2.2.4.1.3 Management Competencies  
Under the lens of organisational learning we approach some of the discussions 
about the role of alliances in providing knowledge for the firm. Management 
competencies, as determinants of alliance success, propose the opposite 
relation: the more internal knowledge available on alliance management, the 
higher the probability of success.  
It is a fairly straightforward proposition but one with interesting empirical 
validations in the literature. The more alliance experience a firm has, the greater 
value it derives from IFRs, especially equity and knowledge-based (Anand and 
Khanna, 2000).  In other terms, alliance management competency could be 
also interpreted (Lambe et al., 2002) as the organisational ability to find, 
develop and manage inter-firm relationships.   
Recent results from empirical studies support the importance of alliance 
management competencies as a determinant of success but mediated by a 
stronger role of ‘learning processes’. For learning to take place it needs a strong 
degree of formalisation of different routines to articulate, code, share and 
internalise learning from previous alliances (experience) and to develop new 
capabilities applied to new ones (Kale and Singh, 2007). Figure 4 depicts the 
cycle of alliance learning, its determinants and correlation with alliance success 
rate.  
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Figure 4 Structural Model of Alliance Learning 
Table 6 below summarises alliance management competencies provided by 
members of the inter-firm relationship and their contributions to alliance 
success. 
Adapted from: Kale & Singh (2007)   
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Table 6 Alliance Management Competencies Provided by Alliance Members and Critical to Alliance Success 
MANAGEMENT 
COMPETENCY 
AUTHORS DEFINITION      EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON SPECIFIC COMPETENCIES 
Alliance  
Management 
Experience 
Day (1995) 
Anand and Khanna 
(2000) 
Spekman, et al (1999) 
Simonin (1997) 
Kale, Dyer, Singh (2002) 
Kale & Singh (2007) 
Experience in managing alliances 
and alliance management as tacit 
knowledge that can be leveraged 
across organisations.  
Selecting and negotiating with potential partners 
Planning clear roles and responsibilities 
Attempting more complex and ambitious alliances.  
Correlates with the concept of the shadow of the future and pay-off  patterns 
in Parkhe (1993) 
Alliance Manager 
Development 
Capability 
Lambe, et al (2002) 
Firms with alliance  management 
competence have the ability to 
develop capable alliance  
managers 
To review continuously the fit of the alliance to the changing environment 
and make modifications as necessary. 
To plan and navigate the mechanics of the alliance  so roles and 
responsibilities are clearly defined 
To minimise chances of alliance  mismanagement and poor conflict 
resolutions 
Alliance Partner 
Identification 
Lambe, et al (2002) 
Ability to scan the environment and 
find optimal alliance partners  
To secure attractive partners 
To work with partners to successfully combine complementary resources 
into new alliances 
Top Management 
Support for Alliance 
Sivadas & Dwyer 2000 
Lambe, et al (2002) 
Top management support drives 
the implementation of a dedicated 
alliance management function. 
Allocation of corporate resources to alliance monitoring and development 
Dedicated Alliance 
Management 
Function 
Kale, et al (2002) 
Kale & Singh (2007) 
Institutionalisation of tacit alliance 
management knowledge into an 
explicit knowledge in a formal 
function. (Kale & Singh, 2007) 
Kale, et al 2002 verified that having a dedicated alliance management 
function is even more important as a determinant of success than overall 
alliance experience. An alliance learning process that involves articulation, 
codification, sharing and internalisation of alliance management know-how is 
positively correlated to firm-level alliance success.  
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2.2.4.1.4 Reputation  
Under the institutional theory lens, in order to provide legitimacy to one firm 
through an alliance, the key determinant of success is the reputation of the 
other partner, and the legitimate motives to enter the alliance (Dacin et al., 
2007). The scant number of references exploring this determinant of success 
easily suggests that it is either not very interesting for management researchers 
or plainly not highly explanatory of alliance success.  
Parkhe (1993) links the reputation of the partners as a replacement to the 
analysis of past pay-offs and also as a determinant of successful alliance 
cooperation. This factor is built on TCE paradigms where “reputation effects 
have information content that can attenuate or intensify fear of opportunism 
modifying firm behaviour” (Parkhe, 1993). 
2.2.4.2 Dynamic Determinants of Success 
The second category of determinants of alliance success encompasses the 
dynamic determinants. As mentioned before dynamic determinants are not 
provided by the members but generated as the IFR develops overtime. The 
most recent discussions in the alliance management literature are related to 
dynamic determinants of success and include contributions on formal vs. 
relational governance, control vs. trust, contracting theory, relational capital 
formation, and knowledge management.  
2.2.4.2.1 Governance Frameworks  
Governance frameworks were typically assumed to be formal structures that 
contained all the details related to a specific transaction. Today, when the issue 
of governance arise in the context of inter-firm relationships, most of the 
theoretical contributions are centred in the concept of ‘relational governance’. 
This section will cover the traditional interpretation of governance frameworks 
as formal structures like contracts, letters of agreement, service-level 
agreements, etc.  Relational governance will be covered under relational 
capabilities. 
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TCE as a theoretical lens and governance frameworks as determinants of 
alliance success have a natural connection.  Formal governance structures 
(such as contracts and letters of agreement) need to be in place to compensate 
for two facts present in the organisation man: bounded rationality, uncertainty 
and opportunistic behaviour (Williamson, 1981) which left uncontrolled, will 
translate in greater transaction costs (Oxley, 1997).  
In his experiment with automakers and part suppliers, Dyer (1997) tested that 
relation-specific assets create success only if the alliance chooses an 
appropriate level of governance framework (safeguard). Appropriate 
governance frameworks do not increase transaction cost but increase the level 
of trust and perceived commitment by the partners in the alliance. In Dyer’s 
experience effective governance frameworks include self-enforcing contracts 
and stock ownership investments (of the automaker in the supplier firm). Other 
views propose that governance frameworks should go beyond a pure cost 
minimisation effort and efficiency-seeking management tools (Das and Teng, 
2001).  
Governance structures should be chosen based on their ability to minimise 
relational risk (Nooteboom et al., 1997) and should be used in conjunction with 
other tactics to increase alliance success such as relation-specific assets or 
measuring cooperation costs (White, 2005). 
2.2.4.2.2 Knowledge Sharing Routines 
Theorists and researchers in the alliance field agree that management 
processes within the alliance are insufficiently explored (Barringer and Harrison, 
2000).  However in the analysis of dynamic determinants of alliance success 
there is an element that is the precursor to what we know today as relational 
capabilities or relational capital. That element is known as knowledge or 
information sharing routines.   
Initially described by Dyer (1997) and Anand & Khanna (2000) as key elements 
for building trust and opening communication channels amongst alliance 
partners, these inter-firm routines are regarded today as the baseline for 
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effective social interactions that create relational capital (Zollo et al., 2002). In 
Parkhe (1993) it was also demonstrated that frequent interactions can reduce 
fear of opportunism and drive alliance performance.   
Under knowledge-sharing routines this research adds the concept of the 
‘shadow of the future’ as described by Parkhe (1993). This is the link between 
the future benefits a partner anticipates from the alliance and its present 
actions. This concept has been linked to the past partner of alliance pay-offs as 
a determinant of alliance success. Under a game-theory lens, “iteration in the 
transactions improves the prospect for cooperation by encouraging strategies of 
reciprocity” (Parkhe, 1993).  
Using additional lenses such as the behavioural theory of the firm and 
organisational learning, these routines become much more significant in the 
discussion. Bititci et al (2007) have designed a theoretical model to create 
synergies in collaborative relationships; this is based on the ability of partner 
firms to assess their readiness for collaboration. One of the components of this 
assessment is referred to as ‘strategic synergy’. Strategic synergy speaks of the 
ability to understand each partner’s objectives and expectations.  
2.2.4.2.3 Relational Capabilities  
The field of alliance management has reached a new level of discussion since 
the Classic Contemporary authors in the 90s. This could be a sign of the new 
millennium, or a reflexion of the new “green and organic” themes that permeate 
our daily lives. The truth is that in the last few years, the discussion around 
alliance success is dominated by what are called ‘soft’ topics.  These 
determinants are summarised collectively as the relational capabilities of the 
firm that ultimately build the relational capital and the relational architecture of 
high-performing organisations (Gulati and Kletter, 2005).  
In the late 90s, the concepts of trust and commitment became central to the 
discussion of alliance success (Ariño et al., 2001; Das and Teng, 2001; Zaheer 
and Venkatraman, 1995; Nooteboom, 1996).  Former advocates of formal 
governance mechanisms like Williamson proposed a combination of formal and 
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informal mechanisms to mitigate ‘calculativeness in the economic organisation’ 
(Williamson, 1993). Well known researchers in contracting design and contract 
renegotiations combined their traditional research with discussions about 
‘relational quality’ and how to manage trust in business alliances (Ariño et al., 
2001).  Jeffrey Dyer (2003) repositioned his previous work in the automotive 
sector under the concept of ‘trustworthiness’ as a mechanism to reduce 
transaction costs and improve alliance performance (Dyer and Chu, 2003).    
Lambe and others (2002) evolved the concept of commitment from Dyer (1997) 
to go beyond ‘self-enforced contractual commitments’ like business volumes 
and repeat contracting, and move into the realm of firm’ commitment to the 
relationship.  Relational commitment, trust and communication, drive 
cooperation and as a dynamic determinant, generates alliance success.  
It is understood today, and from very different management disciplines such as 
accounting (Coletti et al., 2005), contracting (Ariño and Reuer, 2004; Reuer and 
Ariño, 2002 and 2007; Reuer et al., 2002), and supply chain management 
(Joshi and Campbell, 2003),  that alliance management principles need to 
introduce relational concepts. These include precepts such as trust, 
communication, cooperation and commitment, in order to understand alliance 
performance.  Those relational dimensions of alliance management challenged 
traditional formal control mechanisms of inter-firm organisations (Carson et al., 
2006; Poppo and Zenger, 2002) with relational governance mechanisms.   
In very recent theoretical and empirical contributions, researchers from 
marketing disciplines attempted to create a meta-theoretical model, by testing 
with the same data from 346 dyads, the assumptions of antecedents, 
determinants (mediators in their language), and alliance outcomes (Palmatier et 
al., 2007).  Even though the selection of theoretical paradigms is more 
appropriate for looking into IFRs from a marketing perspective, they accomplish 
an interesting level of integration. They do so by quantifying antecedents, 
relating them to quantifiable mediators and then correlating the results to firm-
level desirable outcomes in financial terms: sales growth, overall financial 
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performance, increased cooperation, and reduced level of conflict.  Figure 5 
depicts this contribution.  
 
Figure 5 Integrated Theoretical Perspective of IFR Performance 
It is evident that the main theoretical gap exposed by this review is that 
performance management is not considered a dynamic determinant of alliance 
success, although it is generally considered a success factor in intra-firm 
management success. Additionally there is no discussion about structuring 
performance tracking mechanisms that assure the alignment of IFR 
performance to performance objectives of the alliance members.  
2.3 Performance Measurement Systems 
2.3.1 Fundamentals of Performance Measurement Systems 
To introduce concepts of performance measurement in the context of inter-firm 
relationships it is important to understand the fundamental tenets of 
performance measurement systems and how ‘success’ is currently measured in 
contractual alliances.  
Performance measurement systems are managerial tools that enable firms to 
translate their global strategy into local action (Najmi et al., 2005), control 
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performance, drive alignment, provide feed-back to the organisation and serve 
as learning mechanisms (Neely and Najjar, 2006).  Faced with the new reality of 
inter-firm relations and alliances, managers explore the possibility that 
performance measurement systems (PMS) could be deployed to the inter-firm 
environment as a way to reduce uncertainty on the alliance meeting partner’s 
strategic goals and contribute to performance (Bititci et al., 2005; Busi and 
Bititci, 2006; Straub et al., 2004; Adams and Neely, 2000). By exploring 
characteristics of intra-firm performance systems some extrapolations can be 
generated to improve alliance management.  
To drive consistency of action, theorists propose that metrics must align with 
strategy, objectives (Kaplan and Norton, 1992 and 1996).  These constructs are 
typically limited to the scope of the firm, as the top echelon of alignment. It is up 
to this level that current measurement systems are designed.  
There is a fundamental assertion that firms achieve success when they meet 
stakeholders’ expectations (effectiveness), and they maximise the utilisation of 
their available resources (efficiency) (Neely et al., 2005).  Based on this 
affirmation measuring performance is really a task of measuring the current 
path to success and the likelihood of continuing such performance. Early 
academic references summarise the importance of performance definition and 
measurement by saying “theoretically, the concept of business performance is 
at the centre of strategic management. Most strategic management theories 
either implicitly or explicitly underscore performance implications, since 
performance is the time test of any strategy” (Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 
1986).  Venkatraman and Ramanujan point out that the discussion around 
measuring performance is not about the importance of measuring or 
prescriptions on how to improve performance. Rather it is about levels of 
analysis and definitions of desirable outcomes (Atkinson et al., 1997). 
From that perspective, designing a performance measurement system is the 
process of selecting and arranging metrics to measure the efficiency and 
effectiveness of past and present actions (Neely et al., 2005). To design a firm-
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specific performance measurement system, managers use different frameworks 
that suggest specific performance indicators, aligned in certain ways, and linked 
to particular units of analysis within the firm (Kennerley and Neely, 2000).  This 
approach has been powerful in driving local competitive advantages but it is 
limited as most corporations are shrinking their core operations, thus limiting the 
application of sophisticated performance measurement systems to a smaller 
scope over time.   
Additionally most measurement systems tend to drive local optimisation first 
when applied to a single function or process and later consider lateral 
coherence of goals across functions, or vertical alignment to superior objectives 
(Decoene and Bruggeman, 2006). No performance measurement system in the 
market allows for sub-optimising the parts in search of system-wide optimisation 
(Altiparmak et al., 2006; Venugopal and Narendran, 1990). 
Performance measurement systems (PMS) tend to agree on the way 
organisations should work and the ideologies they represent when dealing with 
multiple stakeholders of the firm (Bourguignon et al., 2004). Superior designs of 
performance measurement systems have the ability to integrate horizontally 
across functions and vertically through the echelons of the organisation. These 
key features have made the Tableau de Bord a popular framework for tightly 
structured firms (Epstein and Manzoni, 1998).  
Balanced Scorecard shares this philosophy with its objective to reflect the firm’s 
strategy and vision into metrics, goals and action plans in functional levels 
(Kaplan and Norton, 1992 and 1996; Bourguignon et al., 2004). Considered in 
this regard, Balanced Scorecard is more applicable to translating strategy into 
performance from the top echelon in the organisation rather than at the 
operational levels. The academic community regards the value of Balanced 
Scorecard as a strategy deployment and communication tool, but acknowledge 
its inability to evaluate or measure performance across and through all functions 
of the firm (Malina and Selto, 2001).   In other terms, Balanced Scorecard has 
the scope of well-designed systems but it is not a multi-hierarchical framework. 
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It cannot easily cascade metrics down the hierarchy or prioritise levels of local 
execution to achieve general objectives.  
Alignment is considered a desirable characteristic of intra-firm PMS. It promotes 
convergence of the organisation towards a single goal (Kaplan and Norton, 
1992, 1996, 2004 and 2006; Kennerley and Neely, 2000). Yet, it may become 
the major limitation of inter-firm performance measurement systems, 
considering that by definition inter-firm relationships have independent goals 
and objectives (Busi and Bititci, 2006; Bititci et al., 2006; Hitt, 1988; Yeung et 
al., 2006). 
If performance measurements are the tools companies use to monitor internal 
relationships (Atkinson et al., 1997) these tools need to be expanded to 
contractual inter-firm relationships both from the perspective of assessing the 
relationship’s contribution to the member firms, as well as evaluating the 
performance of the relation itself. Applied to CAs, alliance-wide performance 
measurement system could optimise the resources of the alliance and 
maximise its rent (Neely et al., 2005).  
2.3.2  Introduction to Measurement of IFR Success  
The assessment and measurement of alliance success is the connector 
between the management fields reviewed above. Section 2.2 summarised the 
fundamentals of inter-firm relations, the motivations to IFR formation, and its 
determinants of success. Section 2.3.1 presented the fundamentals of 
performance management as the driver of strategic execution. This section 
connects the role of performance measures in evaluating alliance success to 
highlight the knowledge gaps to be address in this doctoral research.  
Evaluating and measuring IFR success has been challenging (Provan and 
Sydow, 2006; Gulati and Nickerson, 2008). Employing different methodologies 
have yielded completely different results depending on their focus (Parkhe, 
1993a; Yeung et al., 2006) The management literature considers two different 
dimensions for measuring alliance success: Success at the alliance level per 
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se, also known as relational-level, and success in terms of the impact of the 
alliance on the results of the member firms, known as firm-level success.  
At the relational level, alliance success is measured in a more operational way, 
especially when assessing the performance of non-equity (contract-based) 
alliances (Ariño, 2003; Geringer and Hebert, 1991).  Generally, relational-level 
metrics of success include variables like contract stability (measured by the 
number of contract renegotiations in the life of the alliance), longevity, assuming 
the relationship is designed to be renewed (Anand and Khanna, 2000), and in 
general alliance continuity or survival, as a binary concept opposite to abrupt 
termination (Kale et al., 2002).  There is an on-going discussion about longevity 
as a measure of success. It is typically regarded as a positive sign but new 
contributions point to deliberate short-term nature of some alliances, as well as 
the fact that greater longevity may relate to inability by the alliance to deliver 
timely results (Rahman and Korn, 2012).  
When measured at the firm-level, success is typically assessed by the level of 
improvement of the financial performance of the participating firm (Palmatier et 
al., 2007), and the overall managers’ perception of the alliance effectiveness. 
Improved financial performance considers impacts on firm’s profitability, growth, 
cost-positioning and economic value derived from the alliance.  Also at the firm-
level, perceptions of operational effectiveness reflect management satisfaction 
with alliance performance, fulfilment of strategic objectives and assessment of 
direct net contributions of alliance performance to the participating firm.  
These dimensions of alliance success (firm-level and relational-level), introduce 
three different performance measurement systems that will interact amongst 
them. One system measures the intra-relational performance (operational 
performance or SLAs); the other two measure member-level performance 
derived from participating in an alliance (one for each member firm but at least 
two) (Poppo and Zenger, 2002).  
So far in the literature review, the role of these three performance measurement 
systems as a determinant of alliance success is absent. Rather, they are 
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introduced merely as a formal governance mechanism mostly in contracting 
theory.  In the corporate accounting literature it is recognised that performance 
of alliances has implications on firm-performance and that it needs to be 
addressed in a more formal way, but the discussion stops there (Dekker, 2003 
and 2004). 
The literature on inter-firm relationships recognises the need to measure all 
levels of performance. However, it does not suggest specifically any guidance 
on how to include inter-firm PMS in the management of the alliance, nor does it 
prescribe the need to seek alignment or congruence amongst inter-firm 
measures (Zajac and Olsen, 1993; Kale et al., 2002; Madhok and Tallman, 
1998).  After reviewing the alliance management literature, and specific 
references on motivations to form alliances, it is evident that determinants of 
alliance success and measurements of alliance success are related.  When a 
firm enters an alliance to fulfil a strategic objective, then the measurement of 
internal alliance success and firm’s success must align at some point.  If 
popular management belief is correct and ‘what gets measured gets done’, then 
the link between determinants and measurements of success (or performance) 
should be clearer in the IFR literature, but it is not.   
An empirical extension of the intra-firm performance measurement paradigm 
outside of the boundaries of the firm will become a contribution to practice. 
Expanding the use of available alignment measurement methods to sets of 
inter-firm performance indicators will be a contribution to methods in 
management research. 
The strategic goals of contractual alliances are very specific in the literature and 
need to be assessed with a unique performance measurement system; the key 
objectives of CAs as a governance mechanisms are to gain access to critical 
resources (Gulati, 1998), acquire competitive advantage (Dyer and Singh, 
1998), create economic value (Chan et al., 1997) and minimise transaction 
costs (Williamson, 1985) amongst others. However, this alliance formation 
activity has yielded mixed business results with almost equal probability of 
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success or failure (Das and Teng, 2000). The management literature presents 
compelling cases for participating in alliances and report great numbers of 
alliance formation in past years (Anand and Khanna, 2000).  The purpose of 
this research is to understand the role that aligned performance measurements 
play in predicting the continuation of the contractual alliance. This correlation 
should also predict the firm’s return on relational capital and alliance 
investments.   
 
Figure 6 Summary Review of Measuring Alliance Performance 
The initial scoping of the literature explored the link between contractual 
alliances and performance, and identified enough links between these topics to 
justify a more detailed look into their synergies.  A more systematic review of 
the literature summarised the key determinants of alliance success based on 
different theoretical explanations of alliance formation but failed to find an 
explicit explanation of the use of performance measurement systems to drive 
alliance success.  The current IFR management literature presents performance 
metrics as potential governance mechanisms in certain types of relations. 
However, it does not say anything about the role of metrics on creating 
relational capital and how aligned performance measures could contribute to 
alliance success.  
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Measuring IFR success becomes a priority for alliance managers as the 
mechanism to track progress towards achieving the strategic goals that 
motivated the alliance in the first place. Figure 6 above summarises the two 
dimensions of current contributions.  However the performance measurement 
systems employed to monitor intra-firm performance may not suffice for the 
monitoring of contractual alliances and IFRs.  
2.3.3 Firm-Level Measures of Alliance Performance 
Key authors and contributors agree that measurement is an important capability 
in managing alliances. When firms decide to participate in an alliance it is a 
conscious managerial decision that has different motivations and seeks specific 
results. Given that, measuring the outcome of that decision is a clear need for 
decision-makers and managers.  
Measuring alliance success adds a new level of analysis, or a new domain of 
measurement, for a given performance measuring system6. If the modern 
definition of the firm is a nexus of contracts and relationships with different 
stakeholders (Aoki et al., 1990; Atkinson et al., 1997), then the PMS of the firm 
must include the primary objectives of external stakeholders.  In consequence 
the measurement system of the alliance needs to measure in a coherent 
manner its internal efficiencies and the effectiveness of its impact on the 
member firms.  
(Hammer, 2001) initiated an interesting discussion urging managers to apply 
the same principles of intra-firm efficiency and effectiveness to the processes 
they share with other companies. As these inter-firm processes move from 
mere coordination to co-operation and collaboration efforts they should use 
proven intra-firm management tools to enhance their performance. One of these 
tools is definitely a performance measurement framework that helps alliances 
                                            
6
 Performance measurement is defined as the business effort to “develop indicators and collect 
data to describe, report on and analyse performance” (Neely, 2005); and a performance 
measurement system “enables informed decisions to be made and actions to be taken because 
it quantifies the efficiency and effectiveness of past actions through acquisition, collation, 
sorting, analysis, interpretation and dissemination of appropriate data” (Neely, 1999). 
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“define a set of measures that reflects their objectives and assesses their 
performance appropriately” (Franco-Santos et al., 2012; Suwignjo et al., 2000). 
In the case of alliances, their objectives and their impact go beyond the 
boundaries of the relationship. Thus, the inter-firm performance measurement 
system needs to include metrics the relational-level and the firm-level.   
This section goes back to the fundamental assertion that firms’ desirable 
outcome is success.  Success is achievable when firms meet stakeholders’ 
expectations (effectiveness) and maximise the utilisation of their available 
resources (efficiency) (Neely et al., 2005).  When managers form or join an 
alliance, they need to meet the expectations of their stakeholders (including the 
alliance partner) and acquire or maximise available resources7, including those 
from the network.  Then measuring alliance performance is really a task of 
measuring and predicting success. In consequence, it is important to define, 
from the literature, what alliance success is, and what measures and metrics 
have been proposed and operationalised to measure it.  
Alliance success can be defined as the ability of the relationship to deliver 
effective results to its partners, and to be efficient in the management of its 
internal shared resources. This will fulfil the ultimate goal that drove the alliance 
creation in the first place (Neely et al., 2005; Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 
1986).  This definition implies two levels in the performance measurement 
system of an alliance: one that addresses the alliance impact on its partners, 
labelled “firm-level performance” and another level to address the alliance 
internal performance, labelled “relational-level performance”.  In the reviewed 
literature, there is theoretical and conceptual support for these two levels of 
analysis in alliance performance but no empirical studies addressing both levels 
or stressing the importance of alignment amongst them.  
                                            
7
 This assertion follows the rationale for alliance formation based on the resource dependency 
theory. See the discussions about this theoretical lens and others that explain alliance formation 
in Section 3. 
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2.3.4 Measurement of Alliance Success and Firm Performance 
The literature on inter-firm relationship performance devotes extensive 
considerations to measuring alliance impact at the firm-level. The subject has 
been researched since the early 90s, with considerable cohesion.  Cohesion 
meaning that most authors build on previous arguments and existing theories of 
the firm to derive or complement new constructs in their analyses.  The firm-
level performance measures that are described below match the particular 
theoretical lens that was used to explain alliance formation. 
The main contributions on firm-level performance can be mapped along three 
moments in time: classic contemporaries (from 1990 to 1999); established 
contemporaries (from 2000 to 2005); and contemporary innovators (from 2006 
to 2008).  This classification includes contributions for measuring alliance 
performances as a financial impact on the partner and the overall effectiveness 
of the structure.  Some authors have been active contributors in all three 
periods. Dyer, Gulati, Singh, Kale and Khanna are examples, whom also 
contribute to discussions about relational-level performance measurement, 
coming next.   
Table 7 lists key authors, prevalent definitions of alliance impact on the firm-
level performance and examples of metrics used to quantify such impact. It also 
summarises the main contributions and limitations of the academic views in all 
three periods with a time span of 18 years. A more detailed narrative follows the 
table.  
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Table 7 Summary of Academic Contributions to Firm-Level Alliance Performance Models 
PERIOD KEY AUTHORS 
FIRM-LEVEL IMPACT 
FROM ALLIANCES 
OPERATIONALISATION 
OF METRICS 
MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS 
AND LIMITATIONS 
Classic 
Contemporary 
(1990-1999) 
Geringer 
Parkhe 
Zajac & Olsen 
Dyer & Singh 
Khanna 
Madhok & Tallman 
Das & Teng 
Chan, et al 
Gulati 
 
 
Firm-level impact was measured at the 
stockholder level 
Stock price appreciation after alliance 
announcement (Chan, et al, 1997) 
Value from alliance vs. value from 
alternative governance mechanisms 
(Madhok & Tallman, 1998) 
Madhok and Tallman (1998) make a 
distinction between firm-specific quasi-
rents, transaction-specific quasi-rents 
and inter-firm quasi-rents. 
 
Joint Value Maximisation  
Zajac & Olsen (1993) 
Total Transaction Value = 
Production Cost + Alliance Set-
up Cost + Alliance Transaction 
Cost (Dyer, 1997) 
Alliance Quasi Rents = 
V’ifc > V’alt  
where V’=R’-C;  
V’ is potential economic value, 
and  
R’ is potential rents and C’ is 
relational costs (Madhok & 
Tallman, 1998) 
Common Benefits = equivalent 
to inter-firm quasi-rents 
(Khanna, 1997) 
Early discussions on issues of joint value 
creation and rent distribution amongst 
alliance partners (Zajac & Olsen, 1993). 
Extrapolation of discussion from 
performance measurements in joint 
ventures to other types of IFRs. 
Gulati (1998) differentiates two levels of 
performance measurement and Madhok & 
Tallman (1998) identify three levels. 
No metrics beyond financial impact at 
member firms.  
Little operationalisation of quasi-rent 
metrics  
Dyer (1997) demonstrated that relation-
specific asset investments do not always 
increase transaction costs. 
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Established 
Contemporary 
(2000-2005) 
Anand & Khanna 
Tomkins 
Zollo, Reuer, Singh 
Kale, Dyer & Singh 
Lambe, Spekman & 
Hunt 
Ariño 
Dussauge, et al 
Coletti  
White 
Same as Chan, et al, 1997, but 
determined by cumulative experience 
in alliance management (Anand & 
Khanna, 2000) 
Performance at one firm-level (self-
assessment measurement) (Zollo, et 
al 2002; Lambe, et al 2002) 
Combination of abnormal stock-market 
gains following alliance announcement 
plus managerial self-assessments on 
long-term alliance performance (Kale, 
Dyer & Singh, 2002) 
Measurement of “buyer’s satisfaction” 
in the case of IT outsourcing alliances, 
to approximate for alliance 
performance (Poppo, Zenger 2002) 
 
Alliance Performance = f( Goal 
Fulfilment; Growth; Meeting 
Initial Objectives)  Zollo, et al 
2002 
Joint Profits = (three-item 
reflective measure) high-level of 
joint  profits generated between 
the partners; a lot of profits 
together and increase of profits 
shared (Lambe, et al, 2002) 
Long-Term Alliance Success = 
f(harmony between alliance 
partners; firm meets alliance 
objectives; alliance enhancing 
competitive position; acquisition 
of critical skills from partner) 
(Kale, et al 2002) 
Drop in Relative Market Share 
Position = f(Inter-rival link 
alliances) (Dussauge et al, 
2004) 
Accounting analyses related to alliances 
involves at least two firms (i.e. inter-firm 
budgets; joint cost of capital analyses) 
Positive correlation between stock market-
based measures of alliance success and 
managerial assessments (Kale, et al 2002) 
Evolution of alliance research from set-up 
measurements to post-formation dynamic 
measurement.  
Validity of measurements for equity and 
non-equity alliances 
Measurements of alliance success from 
one partner responses.  
Little focus on service contracts, except 
Poppo and Zenger, 2002), mostly on co- 
developments  
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Contemporary 
Innovators 
(2006-2012) 
Rothaermel et al 
Kale & Singh 
Cousins, et al 
Palmatier, et al 
Lavie (2006, 2007) 
Lunnan & Haugland 
Koka & Prescott 
 
Increase competitiveness by balancing 
external outsourcing (contractual 
alliance) with internal vertical 
integration (Rothaermel, et al 2006) 
 Lavie, 2006 builds on the concept of 
relational rents (value created) from 
network resources. The analysis is 
similar to Madhok and Tallman  
Improved Supplier Performance 
Outcomes (improved product design; 
process design; increased sales) 
(Originally used by Kotabe, et al 2003) 
Inclusion of non-accounting metrics to 
account for alliance impact on firm 
performance: Market Performance 
Measure (Lavie, 2007) 
Firm-level financial impact of alliance 
performance is over measured and 
typically from short-term financial stock 
market differentials. (Lunnan Haugland 
2008) 
Evolution to measure firm performance 
relative to the firm’s position in an 
alliance network with independent 
variables such as size of network and 
degree of centrality of the firm in the 
network. (Koka & Prescott, 2008)  
Size of New Product Portfolio 
(Rothaermel, et al 2006) 
New Product Success = expert 
ratings; incremental 
participation in sales portfolio. 
Value Created from Network 
Resources = Internal Rents + 
Appropriation Rents + Net Spill-
Over Rents (Inbound – 
Outbound) (Lavie, 2006) 
Annual Change in Market 
Performance Measure = 
Adjusted (by S&P 500) market 
performance measures based 
on investors' expectation about 
the future performance of the 
firm (Lavie, 2007) 
Sales Performance per 
Employee = Used as a 
dependent variable in the 
analysis of impact of firm’s 
position in a network in the 
global steel industry. It focuses 
strongly on productivity. 
(Tonnage per person was 
considered an ideal metric but 
global data was not available)  
(Koka, Prescott, 2008) 
Analyses focusing on alliance success 
performance on the partner firm, not the 
focal firm. 
Operationalisation of difficult constructs like 
relational rents and quasi-rents. 
Testable measurements of conceptualised 
determinants of alliance success impact on 
partner like “reputation” in institutional 
theory. Lavie (2007) shows that firm 
performance improves by the amount of 
marketing resources in the network. 
Also from Lavie (2007), impact on firm 
performance from relative financial 
performance of partners in an alliance 
portfolio. 
Links between alliance-level performance 
and firm-level performance, not only 
financials but productivity metrics.  
Different perspectives on which level is over 
or under researched. (Lavie vs. Lunnan 
Haugland)  
Most of the constructs for perceived 
alliance performance and contribution to 
firm have been developed 10-15 years ago. 
(See Appendix in Lunnan & Haugland 
2008)  
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2.3.4.1 Classic Contemporary Contributions on Firm-level Impact from 
Alliance Performance 
The authors of the 90s, from the Classic Contemporary period, evolved the 
research on inter-firm relationships from the discussions of the 80s about 
typology. The new conversation was about more ‘managerial’ concerns 
regarding these organisational forms.  Authors also conducted empirical 
research about different types of IFRs. And they moved from joint ventures and 
equity IFRs, to contractual non-equity IFRs, such as alliances.  A good example 
of this transition is Jeffrey Dyer’s studies, on buyer-supplier relationships in the 
U.S. and Japan’s automotive sector (Dyer, 1996, 1997; Dyer and Singh, 1998).   
The Classic Contemporary contributions also displayed a new set of theoretical 
lenses8.  In the 80’s and early 90’s most of the academic work on alliance had a 
strong ‘transaction cost economics’ view. In the second part of the decade 
authors explored other theoretical paradigms, such as the resource-based view 
of the firm, which influenced perspectives on measurements of success.  
The classic contemporary discussions on alliance performance are centred in 
the financial impact of the alliance on the member firm (Gulati and Singh, 1998; 
Dyer and Singh, 1998; Gulati, 1998; Dyer, 1997; Madhok and Tallman, 1998; 
Chan et al., 1997; Dyer, 1996).  There was a strong drive to ‘convince’ firms that 
joining inter-firm structures was good for them, both from a shareholder value 
creation (Chan et al., 1997) and from a financial performance impact on 
different indicators of the firm, such as sourcing administration costs (Dyer, 
1997).   One exception is presented in Parkhe (1993), where, as part of his 
definition of alliance performance, he included questions in his survey to 
alliance managers regarding their level of “perceived satisfaction with the 
alliance” as a vehicle to meet their strategic objectives.  
Some authors warned about the difficulty in isolating the impact of the alliance 
from other influencers of firm’s financial performance (Zajac and Olsen, 1993; 
                                            
8
 Section 2.2.4 has a more detailed review on theoretical lenses informing alliance formation 
and determinants of success 
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Gulati, 1998; Zajac et al., 2000). However, through the use of specialised 
questionnaires targeting qualified informants, researchers were able to 
complement their quantitative analyses (Gulati and Singh, 1998; Dyer, 1997; 
Parkhe, 1993). 
Theoretical contributions from the Classic Contemporary period propose 
interesting constructs for measuring alliance impact on member firms (Dyer and 
Singh, 1998; Madhok and Tallman, 1998). This includes evolving the concept of 
quasi-rents from the RBV literature, and identifying three types of quasi-rents 
associated to alliance formation. These quasi-rents are classified as: firm-
specific; transaction-specific and inter-firm-specific, and all three are generated 
at different points in the relationship and with different potential for accrual.  The 
concept of quasi-rents is equivalent to the concept of ‘common benefits’ from 
alliances in Khanna (1998). 
Progress, in the field of alliance performance measurement came in the way of 
considering ‘joint benefits’ for alliance partners.  Zajac and Olsen (1993) urged 
academics to stop focusing on transaction cost reduction and to move onto 
‘joint transaction value’ creation. In that way, they would begin a conversation 
later tested empirically by Anand and Khanna (2000) and Dyer (1996, 2001). 
Dyer demonstrated how automakers could create value for their suppliers and 
for themselves, through high relation-specific asset investments, but without 
increasing transaction costs, as predicated in the transaction-cost economics 
literature (Williamson, 1985).   Some of the conditions for this benefit involved 
the development of trust, long-term commitments, complementary assets, and 
open knowledge-sharing routines between buyer and supplier. These 
determinants were explored in section 2.2.4.  
2.3.4.2 Established Contemporary Contributions on Firm-level Impact of 
Alliance Performance 
In the first years of the new century, management researchers became 
‘balanced’ on measuring the firm-level performance of alliance activity.  
Balanced meant complementing financial implications of alliance formation with 
additional metrics. Typically new metrics fell into the category of alliance 
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effectiveness, which was defined as the alliance’s ability to meet expected goals 
(Ariño, 2003).   
Key contributors to the alliance formation literature continued using financial 
impact from alliance announcements (Anand and Khanna, 2000) to 
demonstrate value creation from alliance formation. Others included measures 
of the firm’s perceived overall alliance effectiveness (Kale et al., 2002; Kale et 
al., 2001).  As an example of these measures, Kale (2002) proved that positive 
correlations existed between two metrics of alliance formation success: stock-
market gains and perceived alliance performance.  It was said that some of the 
measurements, based on self-assessments from respondents, tend to have a 
response skew towards score inflation. However, most empirical studies 
reviewed tend to correct this trend, disregard it, or justify the validity of the 
collected survey data.  Unfortunately objective metrics or data on alliance 
performance are rarely available considering the private nature of these 
arrangements (Zollo et al., 2002).   
When looking at alliance success as the impact on alliance partners, measures 
are created as multi-constructs of different factors related to the fulfilment of 
strategic goals (Ariño, 2003).  Zollo et al (2002) tested alliance success (the 
dependent variable) as determined by the routinisation of relational patterns 
(independent variable). Here, the researchers created a multi-construct 
composite of self-ratings, including goal fulfilment, opportunities for growth 
derived from alliance activity, and the degree by which initial objectives had 
been met. With this construct they were able to carry on the needed empirical 
tests.  
Other measurements of alliance success at the firm-level include:  
 Measurement of “buyer’s satisfaction” in the case of IT outsourcing 
alliances, as an approximate of alliance performance (Poppo and 
Zenger, 2002). Here, satisfaction was defined as quality of the services, 
responsiveness and cost.  
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 Joint Profits, measured as a three-item reflective measure, asking one 
partner about: the level of joint profits generated between the partners; 
the amount of profits generated together, and the overall trend of profits 
to be shared. This measurement of alliance success was used by 
(Lambe et al., 2002) as the dependent variable of alliance management 
competencies in the firm.  
 Relative Market Share Position as a negative outcome of participating in 
inter-rival link alliances. Metrics used in an empirical study on the global 
automotive sector (Dussauge et al., 2004) 
 Long-term Alliance Success, defined as:  harmony between alliance 
partners; firm meeting alliance objectives; alliance enhancing competitive 
position; and acquisition of critical skills from partner (Kale et al., 2002) 
Notwithstanding the major contributions of the established contemporary 
authors during 2000-2005, firm-level performance measures of alliance success 
still face challenges.  All empirical studies reviewed use data from one of the 
members of the alliances, rather than linking both partners. The justification for 
this tends to be limitations of time and cost. However it is difficult to argue joint 
benefits when only one side of the equation gets a say.  
The second challenge is that most metrics refer to the initial stages of alliance 
formation or to alliance outcomes. Few introduce alliance process-oriented 
metrics or the issues alliances face during the post-formation dynamics.  
In terms of types of IFRs being measured, most of the empirical results are 
obtained from or for equity-based IFRs.  Some studies analyse non-equity 
alliances with strategic mandates of product co-developments, distribution 
agreements, licensing and other forms of IFRs. Additionally, there is one 
empirical study from Poppo and Zenger (2002) that deals with IT outsourcing 
service contracts.  
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2.3.4.3 Contemporary Innovators on Firm-level Impact of Alliance 
Performance 
The set of contributions portrayed in this section speaks of the high interest in 
alliance performance measurement issues and the resourcefulness of 
researchers in building new indices and metrics to test their theories on 
determinants of alliance success. 
The reviewed studies from 2006-2008 include a recent one demonstrating the 
impact of synergistic integration of external outsourcing alliances and internal 
vertical integration strategies.  The study demonstrates that ‘synergistic taper 
integration’, as the name of this strategic choice has been coined, could yield 
positive results in the rate and success of new product introductions 
(Rothaermel et al., 2006).  In order to test their hypotheses, the researchers 
contributed a new performance measurement construct to calculate at the 
individual product-level the degree of innovation success.  This measure 
becomes thus a connection of alliance performance measurement with a 
specific strategic goal.  
In the view of some researchers, the issue of firm-level performance has been 
thoroughly researched from strategic and financial perspectives. For some, now 
is the time to focus on alliance performance per se (Lunnan and Haugland, 
2008), although Lavie (2006 and 2007) argues that there is too much emphasis 
on alliance success per se.  He ascribes to the view that determinants of 
alliance success have been researched extensively whereas the impact of 
alliance success on partners still has areas of concern and subject to scientific 
inquiry. 
Lavie (2007) makes a significant contribution to the measurement of alliance 
activity on firm performance. His research has conceptualised a new construct 
to measure firm benefits from alliance activity. The construct is called adjusted 
market value performance, and is based on measurements from stock price 
impact starting at alliance announcement with continuous measurements during 
the life of the alliance. The second major contribution from this research (Lavie, 
2007), is about measuring contribution to firm performance, not just at a dyadic 
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level but for the alliance portfolio as a whole.  This approach allows him to 
measure the impact of the differentiated nature of alliances within a firm’s 
portfolio, to consider the bargaining power of alliance partners when 
appropriating rents, and to test the specific contributions of different network 
resources to firm performance.  
This research (Lavie, 2006) continued a previous discussion on the 
quantification of relational rents, their composition and mechanisms for 
generation and appropriation (Dyer, 1997; Madhok, 2000; Madhok and Tallman, 
1998). Figure 7 presents a graphical perspective on the three components of 
relational rent that a firm may have available as a result of its alliance activity: 
internal rents from non-shared resources, appropriated rent from shared 
resources and a net spill-over rent, measured as the net result of inbound and 
outbound spill-over rents from the alliance. 
 
Figure 7 Firm-Level Performance from Alliance Success 
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2.3.5 Relational-Level Measures of Alliance Performance  
2.3.5.1 Introduction  
The alliance management literature explains at length the determinants of 
alliance success, but there is little discussion on how to operationalise that 
success in quantitative terms. In that sense, what is called relational-level 
alliance performance is relatively free of prescriptions on how to measure the 
internal performance of an inter-firm relationship. As seen the previous section 
on firm-level measurements, most of the academic contribution has been 
devoted to measuring firm-impact of alliance performance.   
Nevertheless in order to assure conditions in which alliances and member firms 
will thrive, there is a need to understand internal (alliance process-based) 
performance metrics and their interrelation with firm-level metrics. More 
importantly, in bilateral contractual alliances, relational-level measures may 
determine formal performance expectations and will be part of contract clauses, 
service level agreements and other formal governance mechanisms.  
Practitioners also agree with these ideas, and with the importance to set the 
right metrics to manage alliances.  One of these simple rules for making 
alliances work, stresses the idea of replacing “ultimate goal metrics by soft 
relationship progress metrics” (Hughes and Weiss, 2007). Well-known business 
consultants in the field suggest that metrics should change as the lifecycle of 
the alliance evolves. Thus, metrics for the start-up stage must be different from 
metrics in the maturing stage. This difference creates two types of metrics: 
development and implementation metrics (Segil, 1998 and 2005) 
2.3.6 Types of relational-level alliance performance  
Relational-level alliance performance metrics can be classified into process 
metrics and alliance outcome efficiency.  Process metrics include all key 
performance indicators that are relevant to the specific scope of activities 
encompassed by the alliance (Ariño, 2003).  These could be the idea-to-market 
cycle time in the case of alliances for new product development; user order 
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cycle-time reduction in a contractual relationship of a shipper and a logistics 
service provider; or user satisfaction index in a co-distribution agreement. 
Figure 8 presents this typology of relational-level alliance performance metrics 
and the key authors contributing to this body of literature.  
Some authors consider contract renegotiations as a sign of performance 
problems in the alliance (Ariño and Reuer, 2004). Misalignment between the 
governance structure and the environment generates some warning signs: slow 
decision making, excessive bureaucracy costs, hold-ups or moral hazards 
(Oxley, 1997). So the number of contract renegotiations could be an indication 
of a governance misfit with the environment. Such a scenario would require 
changes in strategies or the nature of the transaction. (Reuer and Ariño, 2002; 
Reuer et al., 2002) 
In hindsight, contract renegotiations can be seen as the ability of the alliance to 
adapt and transform after the initial formation stage.  Additionally, a high degree 
of contract renegotiation signals that alliance management is not dealing with 
static issues but actively engaged in post-formation dynamics (Reuer et al., 
2002).   
Survival is a deceiving construct to associate to alliance success. Williamson 
(1993) suggested that alliances, as hybrid structures, are transitional 
organisational forms, evolving to become markets or hierarchies.  Others 
consider that alliance survival is not a good measure. Some alliances have long 
life-spans thanks to some sort of inertia, whilst other alliances may be 
terminated as part of a planned decision when the alliance has fulfilled the 
expected goals.  However, abrupt termination as opposite to survival is 
definitely a measure of poor performance. Abrupt termination suggests the 
relationship came to an end before its expected life span, and the natural 
question is why (Ariño, 2003). 
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Figure 8 Internal-level Metrics of Alliance Performance 
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One recent contribution, (Lunnan and Haugland, 2008) presented a longitudinal 
analysis of over 100 alliances in order to test key determinants of alliance 
success.  In the study, alliance performance was assessed as a 
multidimensional construct where different factors are related to short-term and 
long-term performance interplay. Those factors include: abrupt termination, 
long-term performance and short-term performance.  As with previous studies, 
the metrics for alliance short and long term performance come from self-
assessed surveys using Likert scales.   
Very few times in the literature even in papers using the transaction cost 
economics lens, researchers ventured to measure transaction costs.  In Dyer 
(1997) there is a specific account of Transaction Costs in the context of a 
Procurement Department. In that study, procurement costs were proxy to 
transaction costs, and included the costs of finding, selecting, monitoring and 
communicating with suppliers.   
Transaction costs were measured as the total procured value divided by the 
number of people in the procurement departments of the five automakers in his 
study (Dyer, 1997). Considering the proposed classification of firm-level 
performance and alliance-level performance, this study calculates both. Even 
more, it includes a financial measure for the second partner’s performance and 
an estimation of a relational level (appropriation rents in Lavie’s view) value 
created through a successful alliance.  
Table 8 Performance Measurement in Inter-Firm Relationships 
Total Transaction Value = Production Cost     + Alliance Set-up Cost    + Alliance Transaction Cost 
Relational-Level Partner 1 Level Relational-Level Partner 2 Level 
2.3.7 Relational Rents 
In early definitions of alliance-level performance it was acknowledge that the 
alliances were designed to generate supernormal profits in an exchange 
relationship. These supernormal profits are called relational rents, cannot be 
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generated by either firm in isolation and can only be created through the joint 
idiosyncratic contributions of the partners (Dyer and Singh, 1998).  
Relational rents may sound like an abstract academic construct with little 
importance to every day management of business relationships. However 
intuitively and proven by empirical research, it is known that the success and 
continuity of relationships depend on the ability of the members to build, sustain 
and share above normal returns (Das and Teng, 2001).  In several references 
we have seen empirical efforts to quantify these rents from the perspective of 
firm performance (Madhok and Tallman, 1998; Madhok, 2000; Lavie, 2006 and 
2007).  
In general, issues of measurement difficulty are acknowledged in the strategic 
alliance literature. The response has been to structure complex governance 
mechanisms, such as contracts, to account for such hazard (Poppo and 
Zenger, 2002).  When quantitative measurement and formal management 
control systems become too difficult to implement, firms move to other types of 
mechanisms. There are two types of governance mechanisms: formal and 
relational mechanisms.  Formal mechanisms rely on contracts, service level 
agreements, metrics, and formal performance reviews. Relational mechanisms 
are based on relational norms. Trust is an example of a relational mechanism 
that is developed by continuous personal interaction, joint communication, 
shared informal reviews and other mechanisms based on the social nature of 
inter-firm relationships (Uzzi, 1997).  New streams of literature propose that 
both types of governance mechanisms are not exclusive but complementary 
(Poppo and Zenger, 2002). It is in that light, that this research will look at 
performance measurement systems as both formal and relational governance 
mechanism for hybrid governance structures.  
2.4 Strategic Alignment  
Strategic coalignment (also known as fit, or congruence, or internal coherence) 
is a widely conceptualised subject in strategic management (Venkatraman and 
Camillus, 1984).  The academic literature has demonstrated, conceptually and 
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empirically, the correlation between high degrees of coalignment and 
performance. There are references regarding improvements in firm 
performance due to participation in inter-firm relationships, but nothing about 
required degrees of alignment between alliance strategy and partners’ strategy 
to determine alliance success (Venkatraman and Prescott, 1990; Venkatraman, 
1990; Ittner et al., 2003). 
In the context of performance measurement systems, alignment means that 
relational-level measures must cascade down from firm-level metrics to local 
metrics, and then reinforce the firm’s strategy (Kaplan and Norton, 2006; Kaplan 
and Norton, 2006).  This alignment integrates vertically functional level metrics 
with financial level metrics and goals (Neely et al., 2005). The alignment 
requirement, between the mission of the firm and its performance measurement 
architecture (Eccles, 1991), needs to be extrapolated from the measurements of 
internal alliance success to the measurements of alliance impact on the 
partners’ performance.  If at the firm-level a key proposition for designing 
performance measurement models is that metrics must align with strategy and 
objectives to drive consistency of action (Kaplan and Norton, 1992 and 1996), 
why not across alliance-level and firm-level metrics. 
The ‘strategic fit’ literature demonstrated that internal coherence, or 
‘coalignment’, of business strategies and the environment is positively related to 
firm performance (Venkatraman and Prescott, 1990). However, there is a gap in 
the management literature due to the lack of empirical or theoretical studies to 
test if strategic coalignment of firm-level performance measurement systems 
and alliance-level performance measurement systems is positively related to 
alliance success.  
The need for aligned alliance performance measures (partner and internal) 
arises naturally from the concepts of assessing alignment at the intra-firm level 
(process level metrics with top management metrics).  The concept of alignment 
(or strategic fit) has also been explored in the context of a firm’s strategy and its 
environment.  According to the strategic fit paradigm, a high degree of 
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alignment amongst constructs deemed critical to achieve a strategic goal 
enhances performance.  Typically, the strategic fit paradigm explores fit 
between local strategies and corporate strategy, or between a strategy and the 
environment. In both cases it has demonstrated a high degree of positive 
correlation with firm performance.   
The most known case of strategic alignment is Venkatraman’s IT-Strategy 
alignment model. The model proposes local IT strategies that “fit” the existing 
business strategy and the organisation’s infrastructure and processes. The 
result of the alignment exercise is an information system infrastructure that is 
aligned with the business and its current capabilities (Venkatraman, 1990).  
Minimisation of Euclidean distances is was the methodology employed to 
assess, or design, such congruence (Venkatraman and Camillus, 1984). The 
same method will be applied in this research for assessing alignment between 
performance measurement systems.  
 
Figure 9 Venkatraman's IT Strategic Alignment Model 
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The literature establishes that alliance success may be measured internally in a 
more operational way, especially in the case of non-equity (contract-based) 
alliances. Thus, alliance-level measures of success include stability (measured 
by the number of contract renegotiations in the life of the alliance), longevity 
(assuming the relationship is designed to be renewed), formality (measured by 
the availability of a signed contract), relative profitability, and avoidance of 
abrupt termination.  
The two dimensions of contractual alliance success (firm-level and alliance-
level), generate in dyadic contractual alliances, three different performance 
measurement systems (PMS) that will interplay with each other. One system 
measures the intra-alliance performance (operational performance by 
comparing agreed upon SLAs with actual values). Two more measure member-
level performance improvements derived from participating in an alliance (one 
for each member firm in the dyad).  
The literature on inter-firm relationships recognises the need to measure all 
levels of performance but does not suggest specifically any guidance on how to 
include them in the management of the alliance. Nor does it prescribe the need 
to seek alignment or congruence amongst them. The ‘strategic fit’ literature has 
demonstrated that internal coherence or ‘coalignment’ of business strategies 
and the environment is positively related to firm performance (Venkatraman and 
Prescott, 1990). However there is a gap in the management literature due to the 
lack of empirical or theoretical studies to test if strategic coalignment of firm-
level performance measurement systems and alliance-level performance 
measurement systems is positively related to alliance success.  
2.5 Research Questions 
The previous sections in this Chapter summarised three domains of the 
management literature that inform the main research question: How does 
alignment of inter-firm performance measures impact contractual alliance 
success. From the literature review on inter-firm relationship management, 
performance measurement systems and strategic alignment it is clear that the 
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concepts should be interconnected but they are currently not. If a firm enters an 
alliance to fulfil a strategic objective, the measurement of internal alliance 
success and firm’s success must align at some point.  If popular management 
belief is correct and ‘what gets measured gets done’, then the link between 
determinants and measurements of success (or performance) should be explicit 
in the IFR literature.   
The fundamental requirement of alignment between the mission of the firm and 
its performance measurement system (Eccles, 1991) needs to be extrapolated 
from the measurements of internal alliance performance to the measurements 
of alliance impact on partners’ performance.  At the firm-level a key proposition 
for designing performance measurement models is that metrics must align with 
strategy and objectives to drive consistency of action. If that is the case, why 
not across alliance-level and firm-level metrics? 
The initial review of the literature explored the link between contractual alliances 
and performance, and identified enough links between these topics to justify a 
more detailed look into their relationships.  A systematic review of the literature 
summarised the key determinants of alliance success based on different 
theoretical explanations of alliance formation. However, it failed to find an 
explicit explanation of the utilisation of performance measurement systems to 
drive alliance success.  The current management literature merely presents 
performance metrics as potential governance mechanisms in certain types of 
IFRs but it does not say anything about the role of metrics and their contribution 
to alliance success.  
More important, current contributions in the alliance management literature 
identify two levels of measures in an IFR: a) the firm-level measurement of IFR 
impact, and, b) the relational-level measurement of IFR efficiency. There is no 
discussion about the importance or the need to align those two levels of 
measurements in order to enhance the probability of IFR success.  Considering 
the high levels of contractual alliance failure reported in the business and 
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academic literature, it seems worthy to explore one more determinant of 
alliance success that is missing in the current state of thinking in the field.  
The need of alignment of alliance performance measures (partner and internal 
levels) arises naturally from the concepts of measurement alignment at the 
intra-firm level (process level metrics with top management metrics).  The 
concept of alignment (or strategic fit) has also been explored in the context of a 
firm’s strategy and its environment.  According to the strategic fit paradigm, a 
high degree of alignment amongst constructs is deemed critical in order to 
achieve a strategic goal enhances performance.  Typically, the strategic fit 
paradigm explores congruence between functional, local strategies and 
corporate strategy, or between a strategy and the environment. In both cases it 
has demonstrated a high degree of positive correlation with firm performance.   
Strategic coalignment (also known as fit, or congruence, or internal coherence) 
is a widely conceptualised subject in strategic management (Venkatraman and 
Camillus, 1984). There are references around improvements in firm 
performance, but no connections that suggest using degrees of alignment of 
partners’ performance objectives as a determinant of alliance success.  
Clearly today’s measurements of alliance success are not enough to either 
explain or justify alliance formation or alliance dissolution (Lavie, 2007; Parise 
and Casher, 2003; Hoffmann, 2007). As a formal management research 
question, it would be interesting to know about the role of aligned inter-firm 
performance measurements as predictor of contractual alliance success. The 
challenge would be to apply the ‘strategic fit paradigm’ to the fields of alliance 
management and inter-firm performance (Joshi and Campbell, 2003; Murray 
and Kotabe, 2005; Koza and Lewin, 1998). This is under the assumption that 
alliance formation strategies should improve firm performance for both partners 
in order for the alliance to be sustainable.  
Figure 9 presents graphically the key research questions that have arisen for 
the systematic literature review. Answers to these questions are the objective of 
this doctoral research.  
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Figure 10 Research Questions from Literature Review 
The main question is to understand the correlation between alignment of inter-
firm performance measures and contractual alliance success.  If greater 
alignment between the contract’s internal measures (SLAs) and the partners’ 
financial objectives contributes to alliance success then a new determinant has 
been found.  
In order to answer the main question, the research needs to address several 
methodological and conceptual issues.  The first one is the issue of measuring 
inter-firm performance alignment. It is known that alignment means greater 
congruence between local objectives, so the research will use methods from the 
strategic alignment literature and will apply them to performance measurement 
systems. The second issue is how to measure contractual alliance success 
using the current measures from the literature. Considering the available data at 
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the contract level, this analysis will use information on longevity of the 
relationship, degree of formality, stability, and relative profitability, as elements 
of the contracts.  
In conclusion from the literature review of the three management domains we 
know that: 
a. The extant literature is non-explicit on how to extrapolate intra-firm 
metrics to an inter-firm context.  
b. The extant academic literature does not offer a practical method to 
quantify the degree of alignment for inter-firm performance measurement 
systems.  
c. Aligned performance measurement systems are not considered 
determinants of contractual alliance success.  
Having documented these knowledge gaps, the aim of the study is to correlate 
alignment of inter-firm performance measures with the success of contractual 
alliances. If alignment of inter-firm performance measures matters to contractual 
alliance success it will help explaining why some contractual alliances may be 
terminated even though internal goals are being achieved. The coefficient of 
inter-firm performance alignment (IFA) will become a predictor of contractual 
alliance success (CAS).  
The doctoral research will answer the following questions: 
RQ1: How can inter-firm performance alignment be measured, 
considering contractual SLAs and the alliance members’ performance 
objectives?    
RQ2: How can contractual alliance success be measured, using known 
determinants of that success such as longevity, formality and stability?  
RQ3: How much does inter-firm alignment (IFA) contribute to 
contractual alliance success (CAS)?  
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
96 
 
These research questions will be translated into research hypotheses grounded 
in the literature and informed by Transaction Cost Economics as the theoretical 
lens. Research methods will follow a post-positivist philosophical view of 
knowledge creation. Chapter 3 next will address these topics.  
 
CHAPTER 3 THEORETICAL MODEL AND HYPOTHESES 
97 
 
3 THEORETICAL MODEL AND HYPOTHESES  
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter reviewed relevant management literature and identified 
the research questions to be addressed in this thesis. From the gaps in the 
literature, this chapter presents a theoretical model for gap and develops the 
research hypotheses to be tested. The proposed research model uses 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) as the theoretical lens that will inform the 
location of the results within the management literature. The research methods 
proposed here triangulate quantitative and qualitative techniques, and are 
consistent with a post-positivist epistemology.  
This chapter introduces the key variables and constructs that capture the 
phenomena of interest and that will be operationalised in the measurement 
model in the following chapter. Variables and constructs are a function of the 
proposed hypotheses derived from the literature review.  
The proposed theoretical model and hypotheses determined the appropriate 
research methods consonant with the adopted theoretical and philosophical 
positions described in sections 3.2 and 3.3 respectively.  
Additionally, the theoretical model guides  
- The feasibility of the research design by taking into consideration the 
required data collection strategies, proposed research methods and 
analytical techniques 
- The operationalisation and quantification of all research variables  
- The selected research methods that will validate further conclusions from 
the primary research method. 
- The ability to replicate the study in a different context or with a new data 
set   
The focus of the research is to predict contractual alliance success by 
measuring the degree of alignment of inter-firm performance indicators. The 
research is conducted in the context of contractual relationships in the logistics 
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outsourcing sector.  Contractual alliances, or non-equity IFRs, are interesting 
when studying the alignment of objectives. Contractual alliances usually exhibit 
conflicting objectives in their contracts. The goal there is to maximise individual 
firm’s benefits without the ‘balancing’ mechanism of the joint equity in the 
relationship. In CA the design of the contract and the definition of the internal 
SLAs must take into account the scope of the alliance and the need to align 
conflicting objectives.  
Alignment of inter-firm performance measurement systems will be assessed by 
testing the congruence between i) the contract’s SLAs and the actual 
performance values; ii) the contract’s SLAs and the provider’s financial 
objectives; and iii) the contract’s SLAs and the user’s financial objectives. The 
general argument of this research is that better alignment of inter-firm 
performance measures has a positive correlation with contractual alliance 
success. A successful contractual alliance is defined as an active relationship 
that is formally acknowledged by the firms involved (with a contract or formal 
agreement). It also, has longevity, and the terms of the agreement (and/or 
SLAs) are stable over time. These characteristics are known as measurements 
of CAS.  
The following sections explain the rationale behind TCE as the theoretical lens 
for the research and post-positivism as the chosen philosophical position. The 
end of the chapter presents how the research questions, identified during the 
literature review, became researchable hypotheses, grounded in theory.  
3.2 Transaction Cost Economics as the Theoretical Lens 
 ‘Inter-organisational relationships are institutions charged with generating rents 
from interdependencies between organisations’ (Hennart, 2006).  Transaction 
cost economics (TCE), as a general approach to the study of institutions and 
governance structures, has framed major contributions to the analysis of inter-
firm relationships (Hennart and Zeng, 2005; Hennart, 1988).  
TCE supports the idea that firms seek to economise with the costs involved in 
transacting internally or externally; that economisation takes place by firms 
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selecting the most appropriate governance structure for different types of 
economic transactions. Optimal governance structures minimise transaction 
costs and protect the firm against unavoidable factors in business (Williamson, 
1979; Williamson, 1981) such as bounded rationality and opportunistic 
behaviour.  
In the words of Oliver Williamson (1981) ‘asset specificity is the most important 
dimension for describing transactions’. When studying the success of 
contractual alliances from a TCE perspective, this dimension becomes a critical 
factor of aligned objectives between two firms.  In TCE terms, success of an 
IFR can be maximised if there is great asset specificity (site, physical and 
human); relation-specific assets lock partners in the relationship.  As an 
example in logistics outsourcing providers want to leverage their initial 
investment, and users would like to maintain the favourable initial conditions for 
accessing assets and services. For both parties, predicting the continuity and 
success of the relationship is desirable so managers can adjust their actions 
accordingly.  
As asset specificity increases so does the complexity of transactional 
governance costs (i.e. more complex contracts). This complexity may translate 
into higher transaction costs and a potential change of initial negotiated 
conditions. However effective inter-firm collaboration may avoid this seemingly 
unavoidable result. An empirical example from the automotive sector in the U.S. 
and Japan (Dyer and Chu, 2003; Dyer, 1996) demonstrated that effective inter-
firm alignment of objectives in the value chain prevented this effect and firms 
enjoyed the benefits of both high asset specificity and low transaction costs. 
Japanese automakers have lower transaction cost than their American 
counterparts primarily due to: repeated transactions with a small set of 
suppliers, economies of scale and scope with high volume of transactions within 
a small group, extensive inter-firm information sharing which avoids “guessing 
games” amongst partners, use of non-contractual governance mechanisms with 
an indefinite time horizon, and investment in co-specialised assets (Dyer, 1996).  
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Economic theory acknowledges that resource owners achieve greater 
productivity through collaboration and specialization. The literature and 
empirical studies correlate positively a firm’s performance in inter-firm 
relationships if there is a previous investment in relational-specific investments 
or assets (Dyer, 1997; Parkhe, 1993).  Many contributions in the space of IFRs 
and TCE are noteworthy. Grover and Malhotra (2003) developed an 
experimental model to explain transaction costs of long term buyer-supplier 
relationships. This model operationalised four dimensions of transaction cost 
as: a) effort to develop the relationship, b) effort to monitor supplier’s 
performance, c) effort to address identified issues with supplier, and d) 
likelihood of supplier’s opportunistic behaviour. The study presents some 
measurements of the cost of doing business in managing purchasing relations 
as an approximation to transaction costs in supply chain relationships. 
However, the dimensions from Grover and Malhotra suffer because they only 
consider a one-sided view of performance: purely from the perspective of the 
buyer. This has raised criticism in the literature about strategic alliance 
outcomes, and challenges the TCE’s logic of correlation between co-investment 
in relation-specific assets and opportunistic behaviour. 
Williamson insisted in the importance of describing the critical dimensions of 
inter-firm transactions. The dimensions that condition transaction costs and 
governance structures are: uncertainty, frequency of transaction and the need 
to invest in relation-specific assets. Governance structures need to be in place 
(such as contracts and letters of agreement) to compensate for two facts 
present in the organisation man: bounded rationality and opportunistic 
behaviour (Williamson, 1981), which, left uncontrolled, will translate in greater 
transaction costs.  
As mentioned above, the by-products of increased asset specificity and 
relationship-specific governance structures are increased complexity and cost 
of relational governance (i.e. more complex contracts) (Alchian and Woodward, 
1988) (Williamson, 1985).  These by-products are evident in logistics 
outsourcing as the context of this research and in contractual alliances as the 
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most prevalent governance mechanism. The investment in relationship-specific 
assets in logistics outsourcing is a requirement in order to play in the industry. 
Buyer bargaining power is high and investments are usually enforced in the 
contract’s service level agreements (Halldórsson and Skjøtt-Larsen, 2006; 
Jharkharia and Shankar, 2007).   
In an empirical study conducted in the U.S’ health care industry (Judge and 
Dooley, 2006), the correlation between relation-specific assets and protection 
against opportunistic behaviour failed. This study challenged the TCE’s 
correlation between co-investment in relation-specific assets and protection 
against opportunistic behaviour. Other results of the Judge and Dooley (2006) 
study, such as inter-firm relations’ outcomes and determinants of the 
transactions, met the TCE theoretical assumptions.  
The transaction cost economics lens brings to the table a multidisciplinary 
approach when looking at inter-firm relationships. Transaction cost economics 
is founded on the principles of economics, contractual law and organisational 
studies. Other contributors to the TCE perspective applied to IFR formation 
include academics that see them as possibilities to reduce cost of managing 
employees, avoid opportunism costs due to an arm’s length relationship, reduce 
monitoring cost by sharing assets with the partner and overall minimise costs of 
doing business together (Barringer and Harrison, 2000; Hennart, 1988; Inkpen, 
2000).  
3.3 Philosophical Position  
3.3.1 Introduction 
The theoretical model proposed in this Chapter and the corresponding research 
methods are informed by a particular philosophical stance about what can be 
known and the nature of the answers derived from research. Full disclosure of 
such philosophical positions grants that transparency that management 
research requires. This transparency grants validity to the final results and 
claims, so the management community understands the underlying 
assumptions that animated the research (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). 
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Philosophical positions also inform how knowledge can be acquired and 
through which methods.  A valid research design and outcome are derived from 
a particular ontology of reality, and an epistemology of knowledge suggested by 
the nature of the research question and a theoretical lens that fits both 
philosophies.   
This section presents the philosophical positions about the phenomenon under 
study and the assumptions on the nature of reality, and the context of what is 
being studied. The following paragraphs explain the rationale behind selecting a 
representationalist ontology accompanied by a positivist epistemology to inquire 
about the impact of performance measures alignment on contractual alliance 
success. The philosophical position disclosed in the section should also justify 
the section of transaction cost theory as the theoretical lens for the research.   
3.3.2 Ontology 
Ontology is defined as the philosophical assumption about the nature of reality.  
Ontological positions in the social sciences are closely matched to the ontology 
continuum in the natural sciences: from realism to relativism.  This continuum 
shifts from the assumption that reality exists and can be apprehended to the 
conjecture that reality is subjective and can only be interpreted and constructed 
from a personal perspective.  In the social sciences the ontology continuum can 
be mapped into three main positions: representationalism, relativism, and 
nominalism (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008).  Where the representationalist and 
realist stances are based on the presumption that the object of analysis exists, 
that is objective and its behaviour is independent of the observant.  
Clarke and Dawson (1999) state that given the appropriate methodology, it 
should be possible to describe and explain this reality independently of the 
researcher.  Under the representationalist position, social sciences can 
progress, as natural sciences, through observations that have a direct 
correspondence to the problem being investigated. This includes specifically the 
evaluation of their performance (Provan and Sydow, 2006). 
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The history of research on performance measures and evaluation of 
performance began with a representationalist tradition in its three phases known 
as the three generations of evaluation.  These generations dealt with 
measurement, description and judgment of performance, where the outcome is 
a set of conclusions, recommendations and decisions based on the assessed 
performance (Guba and Lincoln, 1993).   
Using relativism as ontology, evaluation in the fourth generation is constructed 
as a joint agenda for negotiation of claims, concerns and issues (Guba and 
Lincoln, 1993).  In Provan and Sydow’s words (2008) fourth generation 
evaluation ‘adopts a more relativistic view of the evaluation function and deals 
with uncertain data with multiple and contested purposes and advanced to the 
benefit of key stakeholders’. To date there are not any empirical studies in the 
field of inter-organisational relationships that evaluate a contractual alliance 
from a fourth generation perspective.  
In the case of contractual alliances, an objective evaluation of the contract, as a 
unit of analysis, is feasible. There is a clear ex ante understanding of what 
constitutes a successful contract.  The contract itself can be defined as an 
objective reality that exists and represents a particular view in time of 
expectations by the parties from the relationship (Reuer and Ariño, 2002 and 
2007).  Under the agreement that a contract and an inter-firm relationship are 
objective realities that exists and can be conceptualised, an evaluation can be 
done independently of the analyst and the unit of analysis itself (Easterby-Smith 
et al., 2008)   
3.3.3 Epistemology 
Epistemology is the branch of philosophy that investigates the origin, nature, 
methods, and limits of human knowledge.  It also refers to a general set of 
assumptions about the best way to inquire on the nature of the world, or the 
behaviour of organisations.  This specific management research is based on the 
belief that the unit of analysis (the world) “exists” independently of its observant 
(per above ontology). Thus, the epistemology should assume appropriate 
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objective methods to discover the connections that predict the behaviour of that 
unit of analysis.  
 “The key idea of positivism is that the social world exists externally and that its 
properties should be measured through objective methods, rather than being 
inferred subjectively through sensation, reflection or intuition” (Easterby-Smith 
et al., 2008). In the positivistic epistemology the overall aim of research is to 
discover causality amongst different constructs, with a starting point of 
hypotheses to be verified or falsified.  Common research methods are based on 
experiments using quantitative measures to establish causality and 
prove/disprove the stated hypotheses.  
For evaluating IFRs in general and contractual alliance specifically, the positivist 
view is best illustrated by the abundant structural and quantitative approaches 
that focus on objectively detecting patterns and connections between 
characteristics of the dyad and the outcomes of the IFR.  These patterns and 
connections have measurable behavioural and economic consequences 
(Provan and Sydow, 2006). Table 9 below translates the philosophical 
assumptions of positivism applied to the specific research questions, presented 
in Chapter 2, and the Theoretical Model and Hypotheses presented further in 
this chapter. 
Table 9 Applied Philosophical Assumptions of Positivism  
ASSUMPTIONS OF POSITIVISM 
INDEPENDENCE 
In the case of the proposed research, the researcher is independent from what is being evaluated, namely 
a set of contracts and a set of performance indicators.  
VALUE FREEDOM 
The issue of “alignment” as a construct to be studied and measured amongst contracts has been 
determined using objective criteria such as the geometrical measure of “distance” amongst sets of 
performance measures.  Distance is a quantitative measure that is independent of human beliefs and 
interests.  
CAUSALITY 
The purpose of this research is to identify an additional explanation to contractual alliance success.   
CHAPTER 3 THEORETICAL MODEL AND HYPOTHESES 
105 
 
ASSUMPTIONS OF POSITIVISM 
HYPOTHESIS AND DEDUCTION 
In the research, the researcher hypothesises that high levels of alignment amongst performance indicators 
are correlated to success in contractual alliances.  In order to deduct these conclusions the research 
method requires a representative number of contracts from both successful and unsuccessful contractual 
alliances and measure the level of alignment across their performance indicators.  
REDUCTIONISM 
It is understood (see Literature Review) that there are many drivers of contractual alliances.  This research 
is concerned with only one of those, which is the level of alignment in performance indicators.  The results 
of this research will contribute to the understanding of the whole problem of managing contractual 
alliances.  I also subscribe to the view that ‘explanations in the social sciences should be organised 
around (partial) mechanisms rather than general theories’ (Elster, 1994) 
GENERALISATION 
To improve generalization of the conclusions of this research, there will be a representative sample of 
contracts with inferential power onto the wider population.  
CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS 
This research can be replicated across multiple samples of contracts, in different industries, countries and 
types of contractual alliances.  
Considering the use of qualitative research methods via interviews there may 
be questions about the positivist nature of this research. The traditional position 
states that interviews are qualitative techniques and they fight the positivistic 
stand to measure and quantify everything (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2008). 
However there are streams of management research philosophers that 
advocate the triangulation of qualitative methods in quantitative positivistic 
research with the purpose of additional “validation” and “data collection” (Noor, 
2008).  
In this research interviews were used with the purpose of uncovering facts that 
“are out there”. The interview followed a pre-defined specific protocol where all 
questions were asked and processed in the same sequence. Considering that 
particular use of interviews, social philosophers still consider that the use of 
interviews fit in the positivist paradigm (Maseide, 1990). In fact the use of 
qualitative research methods in positivist quantitative research has emerged as 
an epistemological paradigm known as post-positivism (Godfrey and Hill, 2007). 
In summary, post-positivist is the philosophical stance of this research.  
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To proceed forward, this research will answer its main question using 
empirically and theoretically valid constructs such as contractual alliance 
success and performance measures alignment. This philosophical view 
determines how the data is gathered and analysed. This is not to say that a 
pure positivist epistemology would apply to all dimensions of the study of inter-
organisational relationships or contractual alliances specifically.  In fact, issues 
like motivations to enter IFRs, managerial responses to IFR performance, and 
other aspects to be studied are mostly related to understanding and interpreting 
human behaviour in the context of organisational social systems. For the 
specific research question posed here, the representationalist ontology with a 
post-positivist epistemology appear to be optimal. It is also worth noticing that 
selection of transaction cost theory as the theoretical lens is congruent with both 
the representational ontology and a post-positivist epistemology. 
Based on the philosophical position stated above, the research design 
presented in this paper is congruent with its tenets. The ideal research design 
for an empirical study on evaluation is the experimental study with random 
assignment of subjects to an experimental or a control groups. This is 
considered ideal because it ensures internal validity and allows causal 
inferences (Provan and Sydow, 2006; Easterby-Smith et al., 2008; Clarke and 
Dawson, 1999; Rossi et al., 2004).  
However in management research and in the study of organisations and 
alliances it is difficult to conduct truly random experiments. The particularities in 
organisations, people, contexts and circumstances involving the research 
question make complex to create experiments from scratch or in this case to 
form new IFRs - for the purpose of research. This research has proposed to 
work with a universe of contracts between one provider and multiple users 
already engaged in a contractual alliance. The contracts belong to two 
distinctive groups: successful alliances and failed alliances. Considering this 
fundamental distinction, the research will seek differences in the way their 
performance measures are aligned, and will correlate that alignment with the 
theory-based measures for success in contractual alliances.   
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3.4 Hypotheses Development 
By stating the theoretical and philosophical frames of the research, it is possible 
to transform the identified knowledge gaps in the literature review into 
researchable hypotheses. The hypotheses will be examined and tested through 
quantitative and qualitative methods consonant with the philosophical positions 
about knowledge creation, and with transaction cost economics as the 
overarching management theory.  
This section summarises eight researchable hypotheses based on the literature 
review presented in Chapter 2. The hypotheses state a series of expected 
correlations between the key constructs of this research: success of contractual 
alliances and alignment of inter-firm performance measures. Each one of these 
constructs will be calculated from different variables drawn from the literature 
and deemed important to measure success and alignment.  
3.4.1 The Relation between Alignment and Success 
The management literature affirms that strategic alignment is critical in order to 
promote sustainable firms and sustainable inter-firm relationships (Parung and 
Bititci, 2008; Lavie, 2006; Lavie, 2007; Bititci and El Mokadem, 2009; Bititci et 
al., 2004). It is also known that strategic alignment can be designed, maintained 
and improved using known performance indicators. The literature indicates that 
firms benefit more from an alliance portfolio when their partners share their 
strategic objectives and there is “alignment” of objectives, resources, and 
outcomes (Parise and Casher, 2003; Verweire and Van den Berghe, 2003).  
Current measures of alliance success are merely operational and are not 
sufficient to either explain or justify alliance formation or dissolution (Lavie, 
2007; Parise and Casher, 2003; Hoffmann, 2007). In the case of the inter-firm 
relationship, however, the ‘strategic fit’ literature has demonstrated that internal 
coherence or ‘coalignment’ of business strategies and the environment, is 
positively related to firm performance, or the contractual alliance performance 
for the purpose of this research (Verweire and Van den Berghe, 2003; 
Venkatraman and Prescott, 1990). 
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The literature on alliance success has identified specific determinants as the 
conditions or mediators to this outcome. The determinants can be generated by 
specific conditions originating from the participant firms and/or generated within 
the scope of the IFR (Wittmann et al., 2009; Lambe et al., 2002; Hughes and 
Weiss, 2007; Cravens et al., 2000/10).  
This research considers alignment of inter-firm performance both a member-
provided determinant and a dynamic determinant based on the scope of the 
inter-firm relationship (Gulati and Kletter, 2005). And as a member-provided 
determinant of contractual alliance success, aligned inter-firm performance 
measures could:  
a. Improve management competencies to manage IFRs (Anand and 
Khanna, 2000), 
b. Pool the optimal mix of resources from partners to create value and 
sustainable competitive advantage (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Hamel et al., 
1989; Spanos and Lioukas, 2001)  
c. Help build relation-specific assets that lock partners in a successful IFR 
(Dyer, 1997; Parkhe, 1993a; Williamson, 2005), and finally,  
d. Build partner reputation that can attenuate fears of opportunism by other 
partners and provide legitimacy as a member of contractual alliances 
(Dacin et al., 2007; Levitas et al., 1997).  
These member-provided reasons support the hypothesis that high levels of 
alignment of inter-firm performance measures could contribute to contractual 
alliance success. The conclusion will be that alignment of inter-firm performance 
measures is one of the determinants and predictors of contractual alliance 
success. 
Dynamic determinants of contractual alliance success are those conditions 
generated from within the new governance structure, as opposed to being 
brought from the member partners as discussed above. As a dynamic 
determinant of CAS, greater alignment of inter-firm performance measures 
could improve the following conditions:  
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a. More formal governance frameworks that minimise relational risk and 
compensate for bounded rationality and opportunism (Williamson, 
1993; Williamson, 1981; Nooteboom et al., 1997; Nooteboom, 1996);  
b. Improved relational capabilities considering that performance 
measurement systems are tools for learning, communication (Neely 
and Najjar, 2006; Adams and Neely, 2000),  
c. Increased trustworthiness as a mechanism to reduce transaction 
costs and improve alliance performance via aligned performance 
goals (Dyer and Chu, 2003); and finally  
d. Alignment of inter-firm performance measures as a dynamic 
determinant of contractual alliance success is achieved and boosted 
by knowledge sharing routines (Zollo et al., 2002; Reuer et al., 2002). 
Alignment of objectives is achieved by frequent interactions that in 
turn reduce the fear of opportunism in the contractual alliance.  
Keeping in mind the two types of determinants of contractual alliance success, 
and the connection between those determinants and aligned inter-firm 
performance measures, a first hypothesis is proposed:  
Hypothesis 1. The degree of alignment amongst inter-firm performance measures is positively correlated 
with contractual alliance success 
3.4.2 Contractual SLAs, Financial Objectives and Alignment  
There must be quantitative measures of both constructs in order to assess the 
contribution of alignment of inter-firm performance measures to success in 
contractual alliances. This section discusses the hypotheses that lead the 
formation of a coefficient that measures inter-firm alignment.  
It is known from the literature review that alignment means internal coherence 
of local goals with superior general goals (Venkatraman and Prescott, 1990; 
Venkatraman, 1990). In the context of contractual alliances there will be 
alignment of inter-firm measures if the service level agreements (SLAs) of the 
contract are congruent with the actual SLA values (Gulati and Singh, 1998; 
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Madhok, 2000; Madhok and Tallman, 1998) and with the performance 
objectives of the partners.   
Initially, the contractual alliance contributes to the general goals of the partners 
if it delivers the results for which the alliance was formed (Ariño, 2003). 
Relational-level performance goals will be determined based on the scope of 
activities of the IFR and these target performance measures are the service 
level agreements (SLAs). Based on the above, hypothesis 2 is postulated as: 
Hypothesis 2. The measurement of alignment between the contract’s service level agreements and the 
actual performance values contributes significantly to the measurement of inter-firm alignment 
Alignment also means that the inter-firm relationship - contractual alliance in this 
case - contributes to members’ performance. Initially the firm-level impact from 
alliance activity was measured through changes in stock price as a 
demonstration of alliance-driven value creation (Anand and Khanna, 2000; Lavie, 
2007; Suarez and Garcia-Canal, 2002). This approach was popular given the 
lack of availability of objective data of companies’ financial performance in 
connection with alliance activity.  
However it is expected that successful alliance activity delivers specific firm-
level results, such as performance improvements in cost, responsiveness and 
quality (Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Poppo and Zenger, 1998); increased 
profitability (Lambe et al., 2002; Taylor and Plambeck, 2003); and improved 
market share position and revenues (Gulati et al., 2009; Dussauge et al., 2004; 
Smith, 2003). Considering these expectations it can be stated that for an 
alliance to be aligned with partner’s objectives, the goals of the alliance must fit 
with the specific objectives of the firm (s). Firm’s objectives will be equalised to 
financial objectives for both provider and users involved in a contractual alliance 
(Neely et al., 2005; Bititci, 1994).  
Based on the above discussion and considering previously tested concepts 
from the management literature, the following hypotheses propose that 
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alignment of the contract’s internal goals (SLAs) and the financial objectives of 
the partners, contributes to the overall measure of inter-firm alignment.   
Hypothesis 3. The measurement of alignment between the contract’s service level agreements 
(SLA) and the provider’s financial objectives contributes significantly to the measurement of inter-
firm alignment. 
and; 
Hypothesis 4. The measurement of alignment between the contract’s service level agreements 
(SLA) and the user’s financial objectives contributes significantly to the measurement of inter-firm 
alignment. 
3.4.3 Measurement of Contractual Alliance Success 
To achieve the research’s goal, - testing the contribution of alignment of inter-
firm performance measures and contractual alliance success -, it is critical to 
understand and measure success in contractual alliances. The development of 
these hypotheses is based on the concepts of alliance efficiency by Gulati 
(1998) and Madhok and Tallman (1998). These authors first articulated 
relational-level measurements from the perspective of the external effectiveness 
of inter-firm organisations. 
Alliance effectiveness can be measured based on some external measures 
defined in the academic literature. The first measure is that the relationship is 
active and has a formal governance mechanism. In other words, the contractual 
alliance has avoided ‘abrupt termination’ (Das and Teng, 2001; Das and Teng, 
2000), assuming that there was not a pre-agreed termination date. Based on 
the available data for this research, the successful contracts are those that are 
active and have a formal contract or process to govern the relation (Poppo and 
Zenger, 2002; Lunnan and Haugland, 2008).  
The research model will test this hypothesis, derived from the literature and 
using the available data from contractual alliances between one logistics 
provider and 149 users: 
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Hypothesis 5. An active inter-firm relationship governed by a formal mechanism is significantly and 
positively correlated to contractual alliance success 
The duration of the inter-firm relation also reflects of the degree of success of 
the alliance (Goerzen and Beamish, 2005) (Parkhe, 1993). Long-term alliances 
have a higher likelihood to meet alliance objectives enhancing the competitive 
position of the member firms, and acquiring critical skills from the partners (Kale 
and Singh, 2007; Kale et al., 2002). In this view longevity creates harmony 
between alliance partners, so the following hypothesis is generated: 
Hypothesis 6. The length of the inter-firm relationship is significantly and positively correlated to 
contractual alliance success 
Contract stability has been identified as a pre-condition to contractual alliance 
success. Lack of stability is considered a sign of performance problems in the 
alliance (Ariño and Reuer, 2004). Poorly designed inter-firm governance 
structures present signals of operational issues: delayed decision-making, 
excessive complexity and bureaucracy costs, hold-ups and moral hazards 
between partners (Oxley, 1997). Given those signals, renegotiations of the 
contract’s terms are required. So, the number of contract renegotiations is 
perceived as an indication of misfit of the alliance with the needs of its members 
calling for changing strategies in the nature of the relationship (Reuer and Ariño, 
2002). In light of this evidence there is a hypothesis to be tested as: 
Hypothesis 7. The number of renegotiations of the terms of the inter-firm relationship is significantly and 
negatively correlated to contractual alliance success 
The final measure of contractual alliance success has been described in the 
management literature as relative profitability. This concept is rooted in the 
framework of game theory, where parties are balancing the cost-benefit of 
cooperation versus pursuing individual objectives. The concept is also rooted in 
the assumption of ‘opportunism’ from TCE.  In the words of Parkhe (1993) “if 
the payoff resulting from both parties' reneging on a contract is sufficiently high 
relative to the payoff from cooperation, the arrangement would be jeopardized 
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because whether or not firm B cooperates, firm A can still count on a sizable 
return”. For the purpose of this research, relative profitability is filtered by the 
relative importance of the relationship to each one of the members of the inter-
firm relation. This importance relates to the size of the “shadow of the future” 
cast by the relationship and measured as the relative risk that both parties 
assume by engaging in the alliance. How much of the provider’s revenue is tied 
in the alliance and how much of the user’s costs depend on the relationship. 
Drawing from theory, it is proposed that: 
Hypothesis 8. The relative profitability of the inter-firm relationship is significantly and positively 
correlated to contractual alliance success 
These measurements or conditions of alliance success are research 
hypotheses that will be tested individually to understand their singular 
contribution to contractual alliance success. From the literature hypotheses 5 to 
8 have isolated each measurement of contractual alliance success and have 
proposed a significant correlation to the overall CAS index.  
3.5 Research Model 
The research model is a full architecture of the research. It includes the 
hypotheses derived from theory, explicitly framed by the theoretical lens and the 
philosophical position stated above. The research model ties all these elements 
together. The model evolves a series of hypotheses to be tested initially, as 
propositions through the pilot studies, and later as quantifiable hypotheses 
through the full quantitative analysis.  
Figure 10 below depicts the main hypothesis of a causal relationship between 
the degree of alignment of inter-firm performance measures and the success of 
a contractual alliance.  The research begins with the proper operationalisation 
of the variables by adapting of a known method for measuring alignment 
(Venkatraman, 1989) across a set of performance indicators. The 
operationalisation methods are presented in Chapter 4. 
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The results of testing the principal Hypothesis 1 contribute to the theory of inter-
firm management by including a new determinant and predictor of contractual 
alliance.  Hypothesis 1 is proposed under the assumption of 
interconnectedness. This assures that the contractual alliance must not only 
deliver results according to the scope of the contract, but should improve overall 
firm performance for both members of the relationship.  This research objective 
is properly rooted in the academic literature as seen in Chapter 2.  
Table 10 presents a summary of research hypotheses and the corresponding 
variables that operationalise the hypotheses’ constructs. Based on theory, the 
hypotheses proposed a type of relation that is expected amongst variables. 
Answers to the main research question will come from hypotheses testing 
during the full quantitative study using structural equation models (SEM). These 
hypotheses are considered as propositions (without statistical validity) during 
the quantitative pilot study in Chapter 5.  
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Figure 11 Research Model and Hypotheses  
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Table 10 Research Hypotheses and Variables 
RESEARCH HYPOTHESES VARIABLES 
TYPE OF 
RELATIONSHIP 
H1 
The degree of alignment amongst inter-firm 
performance measures is positively correlated with 
contractual alliance success 
Inter-firm alignment  
Contractual alliance 
success 
Positive and 
significant causal 
relation 
H2 
The measure of alignment between the contract’s 
service level agreements and the actual performance 
values contributes significantly to the measure of 
inter-firm alignment 
Actual-SLA 
alignment  
Inter-firm alignment  
Significantly positive 
contribution 
H3 
The measure of alignment between the contract’s 
service level agreements (SLA) and the provider’s 
financial objectives contributes significantly to the 
measure of inter-firm alignment. 
Provider-SLA 
alignment 
Inter-firm alignment  
Significantly positive 
contribution 
H4 
The measure of alignment between the contract’s 
service level agreements (SLA) and the user’s 
financial objectives contributes significantly to the 
measure of inter-firm alignment 
User-SLA alignment 
Inter-firm alignment 
Significantly positive 
contribution 
H5 
An active inter-firm relationship governed by a formal 
mechanism is significantly and positively correlated 
to contractual alliance success  
Formality 
Contractual alliance 
success index (CAS) 
Significantly positive 
contribution 
H6 
The length of the inter-firm relationship is 
significantly and positively correlated to contractual 
alliance success 
Longevity 
Contractual alliance 
success 
Significantly positive 
contribution 
H7 
The number of renegotiations of the terms of the 
inter-firm relationship is significantly and negatively 
correlated to contractual alliance success 
Renegotiations 
Contractual alliance 
success 
Significantly negative 
contribution 
H8 
The relative profitability of the inter-firm relationship 
is significantly and positively correlated to contractual 
alliance success 
Relative profitability 
Contractual alliance 
success  
Significantly positive 
contribution 
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4 RESEARCH METHODS AND DATA COLLECTION 
4.1 Introduction 
This section describes a combination of research techniques applied to study 
alignment of inter-firm performance indicators as predictors of contractual 
alliance success.  The multi-method approach combines quantitative and 
qualitative methods to gather additional explanatory information for the 
quantitative information. It will be referred to as the QUAN-Qual9 method.    
The research design, based on the research model and data availability, was 
executed with one participating logistics service provider (LSP) and users of its 
contract logistics services. The execution of the research considered an initial 
pilot study, a qualitative analysis and the full quantitative analysis. Data for 
these three components was available from the provider. This logistics service 
provider made 11 contracts available for the pilot phase, and later a sample of 
138 contracts for the full study. Additionally, the provider allowed the 
programme managers of the pilot contracts to be interviewed. The in-depth 
interviews contributed to the validation of the pilot analysis and better sense-
making of the results.  The provider, a global leader in the outsourcing logistics 
industry, sees the potential in the answers to the research questions as means 
to improve its capabilities in managing inter-organisational relationships and to 
be able to predict the likelihood of continuation of critical contracts.  
The rationale for using a multi-method approach is founded in the fact that the 
research aims to answer a question never tested before. It is therefore argued 
theoretically but not tested empirically. The pilot study began with a quantitative 
effort to measure alignment amongst a set of performance measures and 
operationalising variables of contractual alliance success.  This was done using 
11 contracts made available by the provider.  The quantitative results of the pilot 
                                            
9
 The term in capital block letters describes the most prevalent of the methods. In this research the most 
prevalent methods are quantitative ones, with qualitative methods being auxiliary. 
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study for measuring alignment are summarised in Chapter 5 of the dissertation. 
The results of the full quantitative study are described in Chapter 6.   
Once the quantitative results were available, interviews were scheduled with 
current programme managers responsible for handling user relationships.  The 
interviews complemented the pilot quantitative results with the explanations of 
the current situation of each one of the relationships represented in the sample 
contracts.  Details of the qualitative data collection follow in this section.  An 
analysis of the qualitative results after finalising the pilot phase is documented 
in Chapter 5 as well right after the results of the pilot quantitative analysis.  
The unit of analysis for this research is the contract, which is the instrument that 
governs the contractual alliance between the Provider and the User. Currently, 
the Provider has over multiple global contracts with different Users in selected 
industries. From this pool a sample of 11 contracts was selected for the pilot 
study, and from that pool a larger statistically significant sample of contracts 
was drawn for the full study.  
In management research the use of multi-method research designs contributes 
to the understanding a managerial issue from different perspectives. This pilot 
study opted for a QUAN-Qual analysis that allows the researcher to obtain 
qualitative explanatory data to enhance understanding of previously conducted 
quantitative analysis and its results.  The QUAN-Qual model, is also called the 
explanatory method (as oppose to exploratory) where quantitative data are 
collected prior to qualitative data and for this pilot study both results are 
weighted equally.  
The qualitative analysis shows where the quantitative analysis is valid and 
where it falls short. This enhances predictability of the method.   The qualitative 
analysis of the pilot study is based on the results of several interviews 
conducted with the business owners of the eleven contracts involved in the 
quantitative analysis.  These interviewees are relevant to the research problem 
and the data collection techniques employed assured the validity of their 
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responses. The qualitative data sources were presented under the Data 
Collection heading at the beginning of this section. 
These methods are coherent with the philosophical position and theoretical lens 
described in Chapter 3 before, and are in line with the research questions 
stated in Chapter 1 and the hypotheses derived from the review of the literature 
in Chapter 2.  
4.2 Quantitative Method  
4.2.1 Data Collection: Primary Sources  
The primary data source for the pilot study was a sample of 11 contracts 
received from the Provider. These contracts represent active users of logistics 
services. The scope of the contracts covers a varied portfolio of logistics 
services such as warehousing, transportation, distribution and inventory 
management. 
The Users are all publicly traded firms in different industries with available 
financial performance information. After the pilot study was finalised the 
Provider made available additional 138 contracts, contracts with the same 
characteristics as those in the pilot sample, for a total sample size of 149. This 
data set represents a representative portion of the signed long-term agreements 
between the LSP and its users.  
Each contract had available the following data elements (data presented in 
Table 10 below and described in detail in the Appendices): 
 Operational performance indicators (based on the scope of services) 
 Service level agreements (SLAs) per operational performance indicator 
 Actual performance value by indicator over time (2 year horizon) 
 Contract profile (signing date, active or not, with or without a programme 
manager, etc.) 
In the SLAs both parties agree on the operational indicators that will govern and 
track the overall performance of the Provider, whilst also executing the 
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contracted services.  SLAs also state the performance goals for each indicator. 
Operational indicators are limited to the scope of contracted services for a 
specific User and timeframe.  Some contracts have one key operational 
performance indicator. This is especially true in cases where services are fairly 
simple or limited to just one activity. Other contracts may have many indicators 
when the scope of services is complex and when the User prefers multiple 
indicators to track performance of different dimensions of the operation. 
Invariably, all the indicators contained in the studied contracts are operational in 
nature, and their performance goals are often stated in the contract or in 
another legally binding document.  
Columns three to five of Table 11 show the main operational performance 
indicators in the 11 contracts of the sample for the pilot study.  Contracts with 
Users are identified with letters, from A to K. So, Contract A is signed between 
User A, and the Provider.  The operational performance indicators are related to 
logistics services offered by the Service Provider.  For each performance 
indicator stated in the contract there is information on the SLA (required 
performance target value) at the starting time or renegotiation point. 
Additionally, the Provider delivered information on the actual performance value 
per indicator for the years 2010 and 2011.   
The decision to maintain, renegotiate or decommission the outsourcing contract 
is typically based on the latest information from a set of variables from the 
User’s perspective. Presumably it is decided based on the actual performance 
measures versus the SLAs. However the purpose of this research is to explore 
additional criteria mainly the contribution of the contract to the user’s financial 
objectives.  
Columns six to eight present contract profile data that may represent the 
success of the contractual alliance as stated by key academics in the field 
(Ariño, 2003; Zollo et al., 2002; Reuer and Zollo, 2005; Reuer and Ariño, 2007). 
These indicators of success include the status of the contract (1 for active 
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contracts; 0 for non-active contracts); the longevity of the contract (number of 
years since signing); and the number of renegotiations of the contract’s terms. 
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Contract Period of Analysis Longevity Stability Customer Status Industry
Contract ID End Q1 Year 2009 KPI1 KPI2 KPI3 (in years) (Renegotiations)
(Active = 1; 
Abruptly Terminated = 0)
(as reported by provider)
Contract Metrics Order Accuracy Logistics Cost Reduction Obsolete Inventory Reduction
Stated Contract SLA 100.0% 5% 100%
Current Performance 98.0% 4.45% 100%
Contract Metrics Fill Rate Next Day Air Performance Order Pick Accuracy
Stated Contract SLA 98.0% 100% 100%
Current Performance 96.0% 95% 99.70%
Contract Metrics On-Time In-Full Dock-to-Stock Inventory Accuracy
Stated Contract SLA 90% filled in 2 hours 4.0 hours 98%
Current Performance 88% filled in 2 hours 4.2 hours 97%
Contract Metrics Order Fulfillment Dock-to-Stock Inventory Accuracy
Stated Contract SLA 99.70% 100% in 420 minutes 99%
Current Performance 94.72% 95% in 420 minutes 98%
Contract Metrics On-Time Performance
Stated Contract SLA 98.0%
Current Performance 96.0%
Contract Metrics Delivery Performance Claims Ratio Aged Receivables
Stated Contract SLA 96.0% 1 claim in 700 shipments 80% in less than 90 days
Current Performance 94.0% 5 claims in 700 shipments 80% in less than 90 days
Contract Metrics Delivery Performance Plant Disruptions Aged Receivables
Stated Contract SLA 96.0% 0.0 80% in less than 90 days
Current Performance 94.0% 0.0 70% in less than 90 days
Contract Metrics Delivery Performance Plant Disruptions Aged Receivables
Stated Contract SLA 96.0% 0.00 80% in less than 90 days
Current Performance 88.0% 0.18 80% in less than 90 days
Contract Metrics Delivery Performance
Stated Contract SLA 96.0%
Current Performance 95.7%
Contract Metrics Delivery EDI Compliance Aged Receivables
Stated Contract SLA 97.00% 80.0% 90%  in less than 45 Days
Current Performance 95.06% 71.2% 90%  in less than 45 Days
Contract Metrics Time of Arrival of Available Freight Total Transit Time
Stated Contract SLA 95.00% 4
Current Performance 90.25% 5
Automotive Distributor
Consumer Electronics
1
9.00 3.00 1
Telecommunications 
Equipment
Manufacturing 
Equipment
Manufacturing
Consumer Electronics
Consumer Electronics
Auto Parts
Auto Assembly
Auto Assembly
Auto Parts
3.00 1.00 1
12.00 3.00 1
8.00 3.00 1
2.00 1.00 1
5.00 1.00 1
6.00 4.00 1
3.00 1.00 1
Key Contract Performance Indicators
A
B
C
D
J
K
E
F
G
H
I
2.00 2.00 1
2.00 0.00 1
2.00 0.00
Table 11  Operational and contract success performance indicators from contracts in pilot study 
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4.2.2 Data Collection: Secondary Sources 
Secondary data from external sources was needed to build the financial 
indicators of the provider and users involved in the 11 contracts. Financial 
indicators will be used to calculate the alignment of the contract’s SLAs with the 
financial objectives of the participating firms.   
From the myriad of financial indicators that are reported and tracked in publicly 
quoted firms, four indicators were selected for the study: revenue growth, 
profitability, cash operating cycle, and fixed asset utilisation. All are key 
objectives of sustainable organisations (Kaplan and Norton, 1996; Eccles, 1991; 
Collins and Porras, 2000) and closely connected with decisions to outsource 
logistics operations and the financial impact of logistics performance (Timme, 
2004; D’Avanzo et al., 2003; Lambert and Burduroglu, 2000).   
Public reports of financial statements for Users A to K show the values of 
financial performance indicators such as:  
- Revenue growth percentage  
- EBITDA10 as a percentage of sales 
- Days in working capital (accounts payables, inventory and accounts 
receivables)  
- Revenue over Fixed Assets  
These indicators track financial performance and are close related to logistics 
performance and to outsourcing decisions as well (Lambert and Burduroglu, 
2000).  Table 12 presents reported values of each financial indicator for the end 
of Q1 2009 by User.  
The financial objective for in each one of the indicators was estimated using as 
benchmark, the performance of the first quartile of firms in the same SIC code 
                                            
10
 EBITDA stands for earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation and amortisation and reflect 
the true operational margins for a firm  
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of the User11.  For example, User D is in the SIC code 3724, currently the best 
performance in revenue growth for firms in the top quartile of its industry is 
21.1% annual growth, thus it becomes the target performance in that indicator, 
where current performance by User D in revenue growth is 6.6%.  From an 
investor’s perspective, it will be a goal for User D to close the gap from its 
baseline to the industry’s first quartile performance.  Later in the document it will 
be discussed the implications of operational performance from an outsourcing 
contract on financial performance of the Provider and User.  Table 13 
summarises this example with detailed financial data from User D.  
Table 12  Financial Indicators of Users in Pilot Study 
Contract 
Party 
SIC 
Code 
KEY CORPORATE FINANCIAL INDICATORS  
  
LSP 
  
  
4215 
  
Financial                
Indicators 
Revenue               
Growth 
% EBITDA / Sales    
Days Sales 
Outstanding 
Stated Goal Y2009 8.50% 13.60% 32 
Current Performance 
(End Q4 2009) 
3.60% 15.20% 39 
  
USER A 
  
  
3571 
  
Financial                
Indicators 
Revenue               
Growth 
% EBITDA /Sales Days in Inventory 
Stated Goal Y2009 14.70% 9.80% 21 
Current Performance 
(End Q4 2009) 
-3.60% 13.30% 26 
  
USER B 
  
  
3651 
  
Financial                
Indicators 
Revenue               
Growth 
% EBITDA /Sales Days in Inventory 
Stated Goal Y2009 0.20% 13.10% 52 
Current Performance 
(End Q4 2009) 
-1.50% 7.80% 75 
  
USER C 
  
  
7373 
  
Financial                
Indicators 
Revenue               
Growth 
% EBITDA /Sales Days in Inventory 
Stated Goal Y2009 26.20% 12.10% 0 
Current Performance 
(End Q4 2009) 
6.90% 8.60% 63 
  
USER D 
  
  
3724 
  
Financial                
Indicators 
Revenue               
Growth 
% EBITDA /Sales Days in Inventory 
Stated Goal Y2009 21.10% 16.40% 79 
                                            
11
 Source: Finlistics, Value Manager, December 2009 www.finlistics-vm.com from Thompson 
Financials data. SIC stands for standard industry codes, a global industry classification of 
companies.  
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Current Performance 
(End Q4 2009) 
6.60% 30.90% 69 
  
USER E 
  
  
3663 
  
Financial                
Indicators 
Revenue               
Growth 
% EBITDA /Sales Days in Inventory 
Stated Goal Y2009 11.00% 13.60% 31 
Current Performance 
(End Q4 2009) 
-0.70% 14.90% 28 
  
USER F 
  
  
3714 
  
Financial                
Indicators 
Revenue               
Growth 
% EBITDA /Sales 
Days Sales 
Outstanding 
Stated Goal Y2009 0.00% 11.20% 35 
Current Performance 
(End Q4 2009) 
-19.00% -2.60% 48 
  
USER G 
  
  
3711 
  
Financial                
Indicators 
Revenue Growth 
Goal 
% EBITDA /Sales 
Days Sales 
Outstanding 
Stated Goal Y2009 22.70% 13.80% 22 
Current Performance 
(End Q4 2009) 
-15.20% 11.20% 161 
  
USER H 
  
  
3711 
  
Financial                
Indicators 
Revenue               
Growth 
% EBITDA /Sales Days in Inventory 
Stated Goal Y2009 22.70% 13.80% 22 
Current Performance 
(End Q4 2009) 
-17.70% -9.80% 19 
  
USER I 
  
  
3714 
  
Financial                
Indicators 
Revenue               
Growth 
% EBITDA /Sales Days in Inventory 
Stated Goal Y2009 0.00% 11.20% 33 
Current Performance 
(End Q4 2009) 
-15.30% 4.60% 16 
  
USER J 
  
  
3713 
  
Financial                
Indicators 
Revenue               
Growth 
% EBITDA /Sales 
Days Sales 
Outstanding 
Stated Goal Y2009 7.30% 10.60% 41 
Current Performance 
(End Q4 2009) 
6.40% 9.80% 94 
  
USER K 
  
  
5085 
  
Financial                
Indicators 
Revenue               
Growth 
% EBITDA /Sales Days in Inventory 
Stated Goal Y2009 32.20% 14.70% 24 
Current Performance 
(End Q4 2009) 
25.30% 3.30% 20 
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Table 13 Example of Financial Benchmarks of Users by Industry 
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4.2.3 Generalities of Measuring Alignment  
Given the goal of correlating alignment of inter-firm performance measures with 
contractual alliance success, it is required to measure ‘alignment’ amongst all 
performance indicators in the inter-firm relation. This section presents how the 
construct of inter-firm alignment and its components were transformed into a 
measurable variable that will be called the inter-firm alignment coefficient (IFA). 
This coefficient will become the independent variable in the full quantitative 
study.     
The quantitative method for measuring alignment is based on earlier studies to 
measure ‘fit’ between a firm’s strategy and its environment.  The measurement 
of the IFA coefficient is in fact assessed as the alignment or distance between 
two variables (Venkatraman and Camillus, 1984). In the literature where the 
method was applied before the greater the distance the more misaligned the 
variables are.   In this methodology, all distances are turned into Euclidean 
distances and this generates the alignment coefficient (Venkatraman, 1989).  
When the distance is very small the coefficient is closer to zero and there is 
more alignment. Having said so, the goal is to have IFA as close to zero as 
possible.    
An example of measuring alignment between two constructs is presented in 
Table 14 below (Kathuria et al., 2007).  In this example two managers rank their 
view on competitive priorities for their company.  The example shows the poor 
alignment of the marketing manager’s view compared to the general manager’s 
view; the greater the number the less alignment between their views.  In this 
example if the marketing manager had a complete opposite opinion to the 
general manager’s the maximum coefficient of alignment will be 8.  If they held 
the same views, the coefficient of alignment will be zero.  
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Table 14 Example of Alignment Calculations  
COMPETITIVE PRIORITIES VIEWS  
(Rank 1-5) General Manager Marketing Manager Squared Differences 
Quality 4.0 4.5 0.25 
Flexibility 3.3 5.0 3.06 
Delivery 2.8 3.5 0.56 
Price 3.5 3.0 0.25 
  Euclidean Distance  2.03  
Based on applied methodology by Kathuria, Joshi and Port (2007) 
4.2.4 Measuring Alignment of User’s Financial Objectives and 
Contract SLAs  
The purpose of the alignment test between a User’s financial performance 
indicators and the contract’s SLAs is to check the degree of fit between the 
contract’s objectives and the objectives of the user in the relationship.  As 
mentioned in the data collection section, SLAs from contracts were submitted 
by the Provider.  Users’ financial performance measures were extracted from 
public sources considering that all firms are publicly-quoted.   
The first step was to identify the firms’ financial objectives. Three key financial 
performance indicators of public companies were selected to represent the 
financial objectives of Users of contracted logistics services:  revenue growth, 
profitability measured as % EBITDA/Revenue, and capital utilisation measured 
as the number of days in working capital (either number of days in inventory or 
days sales outstanding).   Then, from secondary sources of financial data, it 
was extracted the current performance of the financial indicator and the stated 
goal for the current fiscal year12.  The difference between those two values 
(actuals vs. benchmarks) created a performance gap that the contractual 
alliance’s SLAs should contribute to closing.  
The next step is to assess if the SLAs of the contract are aligned with the 
financial objectives of the firms, measured as described above.  The research is 
                                            
12
 See the section on secondary data sources and how the financial benchmark was calculated 
for each contract and each corporate performance indicator.  
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using known concepts of alignment of supply chain metrics to financial 
objectives. The AMR Hierarchy of Supply Chain Metrics presented in Figure 11 
below, show the contribution of operational metrics (as those used in the 
outsourcing contracts) to financial performance objectives.  
 
Figure 12 Hierarchy of Supply Chain Metrics  
Before describing the calculation of the inter-firm alignment coefficient it is 
important to recall the concepts of alignment and when an indicator is aligned 
with other.  Two performance indicators are aligned if achieving the goal of one 
contributes simultaneously to achieving to goal of the second. The logic is to 
make sure that both indicators have the same ‘priorities’ and they are not 
pursuing conflicting objectives. These ideas were formally introduced in section 
2.4 of the literature review.  
Achieving two goals simultaneously occurs when three conditions are shared 
amongst financial and operational indicators:   
a) Inclusion: The operational indicator is aligned with the financial indicator 
if the operational indicator is a sub-component of the financial one. They 
are not identical because the operational indicator may be measured in a 
different unit of analysis or with a different level of aggregation.  For 
example:  days in inventory (operational) and working capital (financial) 
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are aligned by inclusion because days-in-inventory is one of the 
components of cash-to-cash cycles that measure working capital 
utilisation. 
b)  Simultaneity: The operational indicator is aligned with the financial 
indicator if by achieving the goal of the operational indicator is translated 
immediately in improving the financial indicator. An example is fill-rate, 
an operational indicator that measures the percentage of orders filled 
completely. When fill rates improve, revenue growth (financial indicator) 
improves immediately.   
c) Impact: The operational indicator is aligned with the financial indicator if 
by achieving the operational indicator’s goal, the impact on the financial 
indicator’s goal is roughly in the same order of magnitude. For example:  
reducing days in inventory at the warehouse level has an immediate and 
immediate impact on reducing the days in inventory and improving 
working capital as a financial indicator.  
Table 15 offers an example of the initial calculation of the alignment coefficient 
between financial performance indicators, and operational indicators. 
Operational indicators were summarised in the SLAs of each contract between 
provider and user.  
Table 15 Example of Calculations - Financial and Operational Indicator Alignment 
ALIGNMENT 
FINANCIAL 
INDICATOR  
OPERATIONAL 
INDICATOR 
DISTANCES 
1.00 = High 
0.66 = Medium 
0.33 = Low 
0.00 = None 
Revenue Growth 
Objective 
Shipping Accuracy SLA 
Target 
Squared Differences 
Goal 5% 100% 
 
Inclusion 1.00  1.00  0.00  
Simultaneity 1.00  0.33  0.45  
Impact 1.00  0.33  0.45  
     Euclidean Distance  0.95  
Alignment improvement occurs when: 
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a) One operational indicator is included as the component of the financial 
indicator, from the example on Table 14, shipping accuracy (operational) is 
part of the calculations of revenue growth (financial). Better accuracy in 
shipping translates in more accurate revenue accounting (quantity * price), 
which allows for greater revenue. In this case the inclusion score = 0.00 
b) The directionality of the indicators’ goals is the same (i.e. shipping accuracy 
grows and revenue grow occurs). However, if shipping accuracy is 
improved by let’s say 25%, it does not mean that revenue will grow by the 
same ratio. This means low simultaneity of objectives.  In the example of 
Table 14, a score of 0.33 was assigned due to same directionality but lower 
simultaneity  
c) The impact of achieving an operational goal has a significant impact on the 
performance of the financial indicator. Again using the previous example, 
improving shipping accuracy improves revenue growth and both indicators 
move in the same direction, however to grow revenue much more is 
needed than merely improving shipping accuracy. Therefore the impact is 
low for a score of 0.33.  
This was the pilot methodology to quantify the alignment between operational 
SLAs stated in the contracts, and financial indicators at User firms.  The 
sources of data were described above.  These measurements created one 
coefficient of alignment for each contract:   
USER-SLA = Coefficient of alignment between contract SLAs (operational indicators) and User’s financial 
indicators 
Table 16 below shows another example of how to calculate the coefficient of 
alignment between User’s financial indicators and contractual SLAs (USER-
SLA).  The first row shows selected financial indicators with their stated goal in 
the second row, the current performance on the indicator in the third row and 
the resulting performance gap in the fourth row. The size of the performance 
gap is important to know when assessing the impact of the operational indicator 
on the gap.  Then we equate each performance gap to “1” so to normalize the 
calculations irrespective of the type of indicator (days, money or percentages).  
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The alignment matrix shows how of each SLA (to the left in the sixth, seventh 
and eighth rows) aligns with each financial indicator to each financial objective 
(from the top on second, third, and fourth column).  Partial Euclidean distances 
are calculated by subtracting the average of the contributions from the 
normalised alignment = 1.  Values of [0, 0.33, 0.66, and 0.99] are assigned 
based on the three conditions of indicator alignment mentioned before: 
inclusion, simultaneity and impact.  
Table 16 Calculation of USER-SLA Coefficients for Contract A 
User A  
FINANCIAL INDICATORS 
Revenue 
Growth 
% EBITDA /Sales Days in Inventory 
Stated Goal Y2009 (from benchmarks) 14.70% 9.80% 21 
Current Performance (from statements) -3.60% 13.30% 26 
Performance Gap 18.30% -3.50% (5.00) 
Normalised Gap 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Order Accuracy 0.66 0.66 0.66 
Logistics Cost Reduction 0 0.99 0 
Obsolete Inventory Reduction 0 0.33 0.99 
Partial Euclidean Distance -  Contract A 0.61 0.12 0.20 
Value of USER-SLA Alignment  
for Contract A 
0.96     
Then USER-SLA is generated as the square root of the sum of the squared 
distances against each financial indicator from the User’s financial objectives.  
In Table 16 considering Contract A between User A and Provider the value of 
USER-SLA = 0.96   
Below it is the general formula to calculate Euclidean distances between two 
values: 
Equation 1 Calculation of Euclidean Distances 
 
CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH METHODS AND DATA COLLECTION 
133 
 
The final step is to calculate USER-SLA values for each one of the 11 contracts 
in the pilot study. This becomes the first input to the inter-firm alignment 
coefficient (IFA). The other two are the alignment of contract SLAs and 
provider’s financial objectives (PROVIDER-SLA), and the alignment of 
contract’s SLAs with actual values of the operational indicators (ACTUALS-
SLA).  
4.2.5 Measuring Alignment of Provider’s Financial Objectives and 
Contract SLAs  
Next is the calculation of the second coefficient of alignment between the 
Provider’s financial objectives and the contract SLAs (operational indicators).  
The reasoning behind this second coefficient is that if the contractual alliance is 
to succeed and last, it has to deliver benefits for both parties in the contract.  
Provider’s financial indicators and objectives were obtained from secondary 
sources using publicly available financial data and industry benchmarks or the 
sector SIC Scheduled Freight Services and Warehousing Services. 
The calculation of the PROVIDER-SLA values of alignment follows exactly the 
same method than for the USER-SLA alignment values in previous section.  
Once the values have been estimated for each one of the 11 contracts the data 
set is the second input to the general inter-firm alignment coefficient (IFA) is 
becomes the second coefficient of alignment between two sets of performance 
indicators in the contractual alliance.  
PROVIDER-SLA = Coefficient of alignment between contract SLAs (operational indicators) and 
Provider’s financial indicators 
The process for assigning the alignment values is presented in Table 16 using 
three SLA indicators and their alignment with one financial objective.  
The values are assigned assuming that if the contract performs properly in all 
SLAs it would have an impact on the Provider’s financial goals. For example if 
the Provider’s execution meets the requirements of obsolete inventory reduction 
stated in the contract, the Provider would receive additional revenue and 
greater chances for contract renewal.  
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Table 17 Process of Assessing Alignment between SLAs and Financial Indicators 
CONTRACT’S SERVICE                         
LEVEL AGREEMENT  
RATIONAL OF ASSESSING ALIGNMENT BETWEEN CONTRACT’S SLAS AND PROVIDER’S FINANCIAL OBJECTIVES 
Alignment of Order                    
Accuracy with                           
Revenue Growth 
The Provider wants to improve its Revenue Growth by 4.9%13  
Order Accuracy is one of the SLAs in the contract with User A 
Is Order Accuracy included as a driver to generate more 
revenue to the Provider?  
Answer: Yes 
Therefore Revenue Growth by Order Accuracy = 0.33 
Do Order Accuracy improvements simultaneously increase 
revenues for the Service Provider? 
Answer: Yes                                                                                  
Therefore Revenue Growth x Order Accuracy = 0.33 
Does improving Order Accuracy have a major impact on 
revenue growth?  
Answer: Yes 
Therefore Revenue Growth x Order Accuracy = 0.33 
Alignment of Logistics                 
Cost Reduction with               
Revenue Growth 
The Provider wants to improve its Revenue Growth by 4.9%  
Logistics Cost Reduction is one of the SLAs in the contract with User A 
Is Logistics Cost Reduction included as a driver to generate 
more revenue to the Service Provider?  
Answer: Yes (according to contract’s variable fees) 
Therefore Revenue Growth x Logistics Cost Reduction = 0.33  
Do Logistics Cost Reduction improvements simultaneously 
increase revenues for the Service Provider? 
Answer: Yes (according to contract’s variable fees) 
Therefore Revenue Growth x Logistics Cost Reduction = 0.33  
Does reducing Logistics Cost have a major impact on 
revenue growth?  
 Answer: Yes  
Therefore Revenue Growth x Logistics Cost Reduction  = 0.33 
Total = 0.99 
                                            
13
 This improvement goal is the difference between actual performance and industry benchmarks for the sector 
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Alignment of Obsolete 
Inventory Reduction                     
with Revenue Growth 
Consider the need of the Provider to improve its Revenue Growth by 4.9%  
Consider Obsolete Inventory Reduction as one of the indicators of the contract with User A 
Is Obsolete Inventory Reduction included as a driver to generate 
more revenue to the Service Provider?  
Answer: YES. Therefore Revenue Growth x Obsolete 
Inventory  Reduction = 0.33 + 
Do Obsolete Inventory Reductions simultaneously increase 
revenues for the Service Provider? 
Answer: NO. Therefore Revenue Growth x Obsolete 
Inventory  Reduction + 0.00 + 
Does reducing Obsolete Inventory have a major impact on 
revenue growth?  
Answer: NO. Therefore Revenue Growth x Obsolete 
Inventory  Reduction  + 0.00 = 0.33 
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Table 18 below presents the calculations of the alignment values PROVIDER-
SLA for Contract A.  See Equation 1 for the calculation of Euclidean distances. 
Values of [0, 0.33, 0.66, or 0.99] are assigned based on the three conditions of 
the indicator:  inclusion, simultaneity and impact (as exemplified in Table 16).  
Table 18 Calculation of PROVIDER-SLA for Contract A 
PROVIDER Financial Indicators 
REVENUE 
GROWTH 
% EBITDA /SALES 
DAYS SALES 
OUTSTANDING 
Stated Goal Y2009 8.50% 13.60% 32 
Current Performance 3.60% 15.20% 39 
Performance Gap 4.90% -1.60%  (7.00) 
Normalised Gap 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Order Accuracy 0 0.66 0.99 
Logistics Cost Reduction 0.99 0.99 0.33 
Obsolete Inventory Reduction 0.33 0 0 
Euclidean Distance Contract A 0.31 0.20 0.31 
Value of PROVIDER-SLA  
Alignment for Contract A 
0.91     
The value of PROVIDER-SLA alignment for Contract A is generated using 
Equation 1 for Euclidean distances.   
4.2.6 Measuring Alignment of Actual Performance and Target SLAs  
Hypotheses H2, H3 and H4 state that inter-firm alignment (IFA) is a function of 
the alignment amongst three different dimensions of performance: i) contract’s 
SLAs and actual performance, ii) contract’s SLAs and provider’s performance 
objectives, and iii) contract’s SLAs and user’s performance objectives. The last 
two have been operationalised as the USER-SLA alignment and the 
PROVIDER-SLA alignment. The attention will be turned now to the calculation 
of alignment between the actual values of all operational indicators included in 
contract and the target values of those indicators, known as service level 
agreements (SLA). The name of this last variable will be ACTUAL-SLA 
alignment. 
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Equation 2 IFA Coefficient Formulation 
IFA = f (USER-SLA; PROVIDER-SLA; ACTUAL-SLA) 
The calculation of the ACTUAL-SLA alignment values is less complex 
considering the basic arithmetic difference of two numbers with the same unit of 
measure. One number is the target value of the indicator and the second is the 
actual value of the indicator at the time of the analysis.  
Given the fact that some indicators are reported as percentages, others as days 
or costs, a normalisation of all of the values to the same scale was required. For 
this data transformation the decision was to make (1) the target value of the 
SLA in the contract.  Considering the actual value of the indicators the 
coefficients followed the same methodology for calculating Euclidean distances 
as used for USER-SLA and PROVIDER-SLA.  Using again data from Contract 
A. Table 19 presents the calculation of the value of ACTUAL-SLA alignment. 
The same procedure was applied later to the remaining contracts in the pilot 
study.  
Table 19 Calculation of ACTUAL-SLA for Contract A 
OPERATIONAL INDICATORS 
Contract A 
CONTRACT SLA 
TARGET 
ACTUAL 
PERFORMANCE 
SQUARED 
DIFFERENCES 
Order Accuracy 100% 98% 
 
conversion 1.00 0.98 0.00 
Logistics Cost Reduction 5.00% 4.45% 
 
conversion 1.00 0.89 0.01 
Obsolete Inventory Reduction 100% 100% 
 
conversion 1.00 1.00 0.00 
 
Value of Coefficient ACTUAL-SLA 0.11 
The definition of the third input for the IFA calculation can be generalised as:  
ACTUAL-SLA = Represents the coefficient of alignment between contract SLAs (operational indicators) 
and the actual values of the operational indicators in the period of time considered. 
 
CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH METHODS AND DATA COLLECTION 
138 
 
4.2.7 Operationalisation of Contractual Alliance Success 
Hypothesis H1 proposes a causal direct positive relation between the alignment 
of inter-firm performance measures and contractual alliance success. Sections 
4.2.4 to 4.2.6 dealt with the operationalisation of the inter-firm alignment 
coefficient, as the independent variable of this research. Now it is time to turn 
the attention to the operationalisation of contractual alliance success (CAS), the 
dependent variable, and the determinants that are part of the calculation. All of 
these concepts were discussed in detail in the literature review, Chapter 2.  
The literature review on determinants of contract success identified four 
variables that may indicate the degree of success of the 11 contracts in the pilot 
study.  These determinants are formality, longevity, stability, and relative 
profitability (Ariño, 2003; Reuer and Ariño, 2002; Parkhe, 1993a). For the pilot 
study data were available on the first three. Relative profitability was later 
processed in the full quantitative study as the provider made more information 
available for the full set of contracts.  
Formality is defined as a combined measure of an active contract that has a 
signed contract or agreement in writing. An active relationship with a signed 
contract takes the value of ‘1’ (one).  ‘0’ (zero) indicates the contract has been 
decommissioned (abrupt termination) prior to its expected end-of-lifecycle (Das 
and Teng, 2001; Kale et al., 2001/10; Cravens et al., 2000/10).  For the purpose 
of the pilot study all contracts had a value of ‘1’ meaning the contract is still 
active and valid and has a signed contract. This will change for the full study 
that was a sample of active and decommissioned contracts.  
Longevity represents the number of years the relationship between provider 
and user has been active.  From the perspective of the user and the provider 
long-term agreements are preferable to short term ones. That reduces 
uncertainty, reduces switching costs (for both parties) and in general it 
promotes trust amongst the parties (Reuer and Zollo, 2005; Parkhe, 1993b; 
Rahman and Korn, 2012).  
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Stability deals with the level of change that the relationship experiences. 
Stability means unchanged contractual terms, performance expectations, 
compensation, etc. For the purpose of the pilot study the provider shared 
information regarding the number of contract renegotiations that have occurred 
during the lifespan of the contractual relationship (Reuer and Ariño, 2002; 
Bolton, 1990).  
Relative Profitability defined in Parkhe’s (2003) terms means the relative 
benefit that both user and provider derive from participating in the inter-firm 
relationship. In the pilot study there was no data available to make inferences in 
terms of relative profitability. However for the full quantitative study, the provider 
shared the value of the contract, in terms of the dollar value of the relationship. 
This figure later enabled the calculation of the relative profitability variable using 
the contract value as a % of the provider’s revenues, and contract value as a % 
of the user’s SGA expenses. Chapter 6 will cover in detail the final refinement in 
variable operationalisation prior to loading the SEM model.  
Considering that this is the pilot study with a small sample that does not allow a 
statistical analysis, there was a manual calculation of contractual alliance 
success. This was done merely to create some scenarios of successful versus 
non-successful alliances and the behaviour of the alignment coefficient.  
During the pilot study, a contractual alliance was deemed successful if the 
relationship was a long-term, active, formal and stable agreement between a 
provider and a user. Since decommissioned relations will void all other 
characteristics of the contractual alliance, during the pilot study the assessment 
of success was measure as seen in Equation 3. In the full quantitative study, 
the SEM model will estimate the regression weights of each determinant and 
the appropriate sign that describe the type of relation between success and its 
determinants. 
Equation 3 Contractual Alliance Success Calculation 
CAS = [FORMALITY * (LONGEVITY – RENEGOTIATIONS)] 
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4.3 Qualitative Methods 
For the purpose of this research design, the qualitative results are ancillary to 
the pilot and full quantitative analysis. They complement the understanding of 
critical the issues around alignment of inter-firm performance indicators and the 
definition of contractual alliance success.  In terms of sequence, the quantitative 
analysis was conducted after the pilot study. The results of the pilot analysis 
were presented to the Programme Managers that were interviewed in the 
qualitative phase. The pilot quantitative results in conjunction with specific 
relationship information from the PMs were used to create the cross-case 
analysis described below. 
4.3.1 Qualitative Data Collection  
For better interpretation of the pilot quantitative results, it was required 
additional information on each contractual alliance. This qualitative data was 
collected through interviews with current Programme Managers. PMs are 
employees of the provider and are in charge of managing the day-to-day details 
of the relationship with Users, including the tracking of the contract’s SLAs. PMs 
are also in charge of discussing new services in the scope of the contract, 
decommissioned contracts and renegotiations of the terms.   
The interviewees were highly familiar with the details of each one of the 
contracts, and were instructed by their supervisors to speak freely about all the 
stages of the contractual alliance.  They were aware of the confidentiality of the 
provider and users’ names and possible identification. The interviews were 
conducted over the telephone and all were recorded and transcribed verbatim.  
Electronic sound files are available for additional analysis if required.  Table 20 
presents the interview protocol that was used to guide the interviews with the 
Provider’s Programme Managers.  The topics of conversation in the interview 
protocol are closely linked to the main issues determining the potential answers 
to the research questions and to clarify the quantitative results obtained from 
the 11 contracts in the pilot study.  
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Table 20 Interview Protocol Provider’s Programme Managers 
GENERAL LINE OF INQUIRY TIME PURPOSE OF THE INQUIRY 
Would you explain how these outsourcing 
contracts work? 
What is the scope of activities in the 
relationship that you manage? 
1 min 
Establishes the role of the person being 
interviewed and the activities the 
relationship/contract governs. 
Who are your counterparts in the User site? 1 min 
Identify the network of people that manages the 
relationship 
What is the role indicators play in managing 
the outsourcing relationship? 
5 min 
Introduces the topic of managing contract 
performance through the use of indicators 
How were the contract-operational indicators 
negotiated between Provider and the User? 
5 min 
Produces a historical background of how current 
SLAs (operational indicators) came to exist  
Do you think current SLAs are aligned 
(coherent) with the User’s financial goals? 
5 min 
Presents the concept of alignment. Gathers the 
managers’ perspective on the importance of 
alignment of indicators. 
Do you think current SLAs are aligned 
(coherent) the Provider’ financial goals? 
5 min 
Introduces the concept of 3-way alignment: SLAs 
(target vs. actual), SLAs-User, and SLAs-Provider.  
Is alignment (coherence) between contract’s 
SLAs and financial indicators important?  
10 min 
Discussion based on managers’ experience in 
different contractual relationships and explores the 
research main premise. 
Let me share the results of the alignment 
calculations of some sample contracts. 
5 min 
Presents the basics of the alignment test and the 
results of the specific results for the manager’s 
contracts in the sample 
Do the results of alignment make sense in 
the context of the relationship you manage? 
5 min 
Explores the manager’s reaction to the results of 
the test and his/her sense-making of the results in 
the context of the actual relationship 
Has high/low alignment have any relation 
with high/low longevity of the relationship? 
5 min 
Introduces the element of predictability from the 
level of alignment and the success of the 
relationship defined as longevity. 
Has high/low alignment have any relation 
with high/low stability of the relationship? 
5 min 
Continues the predictability analysis from levels of 
alignment and the success of the relationship 
defined as stability. 
Do you have another question or comment 
that you would like to discuss? 
3 min 
Prompts for additional elements that may have 
been missing from the conversation. 
In addition to individual interviews with the programme managers, two meetings 
were held key executives at the Provider. The participants in these meetings 
are the sponsors of the research and they are in charge of relationship 
management and structuring contracts with different Users for the provision of 
outsourcing services. The meetings helped with an additional layer of validation 
and insights into the research questions and their possible answers.  
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All interviews and management meetings were recorded, transcribed and 
coded. The results were processed in a cross-case analysis around key issues 
arising from the interviews, and the analysis of the quantitative results in context 
of the actual details of the relationship and the companies that are into it. 
Chapter 5 presents the results in detail.     
4.3.2 Coding 
Coding is an analytical technique employed to identify and summarise key 
constructs from a set of content, in this case from interviews and minutes of 
meetings with PMs from the Provider. The codes used for the transcription did 
not emerged from the conversation with the interviewees but rather mirror very 
closely the operationalised variables in the quantitative analysis that is aiming to 
complement. Those variables were translated initially into the interview protocol 
already introduced in the data collection section above.  
Table 21 below shows the general codes used to analyse each one of the 
topics of discussion during the interviews and meetings with the representatives 
of the Provider.  
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Table 21 Coding Constructs for Qualitative Analysis of Interviews 
CODING CONSTRUCTS FOR 
INTERVIEW ANALYSIS 
DESCRIPTION 
Role of Indicators 
Strategic use of performance indicators in managing contractual 
relationships 
Definition of Indicators 
Describes how current indicators (SLAs) were adopted and selected 
to govern the relationship 
Setting Targets For Indicators  
Describes how both partners in the contract defined a specific value to 
become the target performance of the SLA 
Definitions of Alignment 
Explores the individual perceptions of what alignment is, why is 
important and how can it be measured or its presence verified 
Operational Alignment 
Explores personal explanations of what operational alignment is and 
why is important 
User Alignment 
Introduces the concept of contractual SLAs aligned with user’s 
financial targets and explores the perceived importance of such 
concept.  
Provider Alignment 
Introduces the concept of contractual indicators aligned with the 
Provider’s financial objectives and explores the perceived importance 
of such concept. 
Contract Success 
Records personal perceptions on what can be defined as a successful 
contract and how this concept can be measured 
Drivers of Contract  Success 
Introduces the concept of contractual indicators aligned with user’s 
financial objectives and explores the perceived importance of such 
concept. 
Measurements of  Alignment 
After being presented with the results of alignment measures, this 
coding node registers the reactions of the interviewees to the 
coefficients 
Alignment Matters? 
Summarises general reactions to the research question if contractual 
success can be predicted by the alignment of goals across the 
contract and its two partners 
4.3.3 Cross-Case Analysis 
After a detailed documentation of each one of the eleven cases, a cross-case 
analysis was conducted. The cross-case analysis began with a map of the 
quantitative pilot results across two axes: inter-firm alignment coefficient (IFA) 
and the contractual alliance success (CAS).  The map is organised along three 
segments for each variable:  High, Medium and Low. The boundary of each 
segment was determined using the median of the data in each variable and 
finding the values for splitting the series in four quartiles.  Table 22 presents the 
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statistics for all dependent and independent variables calculated from the 
eleven contracts in the pilot study.  It is important to reiterate that this analysis 
has no predictive capabilities since the sample is not randomised and not 
representative of the universe. The descriptive statistics is merely an exercise to 
understand the potential values that these variables (IFA, CAS, USER-SLA, 
PROVIDER-SLA, ACTUAL-SLA) can take and to test the feasibility of 
operationalising the constructs in the main study.  
After the segments were defined, each contract was placed in the appropriate 
quadrant based on its specific values of IFA and CAS.  This action allowed 
cross-case analysis for contractual alliances with similar behaviours and in the 
same scenario of performance.    
Table 22 Descriptive Statistics for all Variables - Pilot Study Sample Data 
Descriptive 
Statistics 
ACTUAL-
SLA 
Alignment 
USER- 
SLA 
Alignment 
PROVIDER-
SLA 
Alignment 
Inter-Firm 
Alignment  
(IFA)  
Longevity Renegotiations Formality 
Contractual 
Alliance 
Success 
(CAS) 
Median 0.11 0.94 0.70 1.78 3.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 
Average 0.46 0.94 0.76 2.16 4.91 1.73 1.00 3.27 
Standard  
Deviation 
1.18 0.18 0.23 1.11 3.45 1.35 0.00 2.49 
First Quartile 0.05 0.78 0.65 1.63 2.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 
Second Quartile 0.11 0.94 0.70 1.78 3.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 
Third Quartile 0.16 1.05 0.78 2.03 7.00 3.00 1.00 4.50 
Fourth Quartile 4.00 1.25 1.38 5.30 12.00 4.00 1.00 9.00 
The qualitative analysis validated the results of the quantitative pilot and the 
scenarios created reflect such outcome.  Based on the mapping of the contracts 
in the matrix, the correlation between alignment and success could be 
construed as ‘predicted’, ‘conflictive’ or ‘inconclusive’.  Table 23 suggests the 
boundaries for each segment in the matrix and the definition of the scenarios.    
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Table 23 Map of CAS by IFA – Results from Pilot Study 
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 High  Low  
  
 Inter-Firm Alignment 
(IFA) Coefficient 
The Predicted Scenario shows contracts where the results of the calculations 
in the independent and dependent variables match the propositions in the 
research hypothesis H1. In other words, there is a direct relation between 
contractual alliance success (CAS) and the inter-firm alignment (IFA) 
coefficient.    
The Conflictive Scenario has contracts where the quantitative results conflict 
with the causal relation stated in the initial propositions.  The Inconclusive 
Scenario groups contracts where the results do not confirm or reject the initial 
propositions and thus the qualitative explanations of the contract managers 
matters most.  
                                            
14
 Recall that in the context of the misalignment coefficients, a high coefficient is not desirable 
as it indicates more distance between the two measured constructs.  
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4.4 Implications for Full Quantitative Study 
4.4.1 Structural Equation Model as Statistical Method 
The pilot quantitative study and the in-depth interviews provided insights into 
the research methods, the operationalisation of the variables and the general 
interpretation of the results. The following step was to prepare for the full 
quantitative study using a new sample of 149 contracts from the Provider. The 
full study will test the eight hypotheses presented in Chapter 3 and test the 
proposed research model.  
Considering the theoretical lens of TCE and the philosophical position for the 
research, structural equation modelling (SEM) was selected as the ideal 
statistical method for building the research model (see Figure 10) and to test the 
proposed hypotheses (Shook et al., 2004). A SEM consists of a set of linear 
equations that simultaneously test two or more relationships amongst 
observable and unobservable (manifest and latent) variables. SEM has the 
unique ability to examine a series of inter-dependent relationships (where an 
endogenous variable becomes exogenous and predicts another endogenous 
within the same analysis), whilst also analysis multiple dependent variables.  
Structural equation modelling is a popular and mature statistical method 
(Mueller, 1997) for data analysis to investigate theory-derived causal 
hypotheses. It is also known as analysis of covariance structures or causal 
modelling.  The SEM method is suited for confirmatory purposes of cause-and-
effect models by assessing in a quantitative way relationships amongst 
variables.  SEM is also used in the prediction of latent variables.  
The origins of SEM can be traced to path analysis and confirmatory factor 
analysis. In management sciences is considered the preeminent multivariate 
method of data analysis (Marcoulides and Hershberger, 1997; Mulaik, 1990) as 
it incorporates a set of data analysis tools that allow testing theoretically derived 
and a priori specified causal hypotheses.  
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Any research study using SEM should address four specific stages in the 
preparation of the full quantitative study (Mueller, 1997) 
a. Initial Model Conceptualisation or Specification;  
b. Parameter Identification and Estimation;  
c. Data-Model Fit Assessment or Validation; and  
d. Potential Model Modification and Improvements.   
The results of a research study using SEM as a confirmatory statistical 
technique will be judged based on the following aspects that will be properly 
defined and reported in Chapter 6 (Shook et al., 2004).  
i. Theoretical foundation for the postulated relations 
ii. Accuracy in the description of the specified model 
iii. Accurate description of applied estimation methods 
iv. Reports on scale properties 
v. Reporting on sample properties including size and data availability 
4.4.2 Enhanced Primary Data for Full Study 
For the full quantitative study the primary data source was the Provider 
sponsoring the study. As mentioned before the Provider is a world-wide leader 
in contract logistics services and maintains a selected group of users under a 
group called Programme Management Group. In this group each user is 
assigned a Programme Manager or PM, to manage the relationship with key 
users. All contract data comes from this group and represents about 50% of the 
managed contracts. The sample is 149 relationships between active and 
decommissioned contractual alliances.  The Provider’s customers will be 
referred to as Users during this research.   
The database received from the Provider includes critical information for each of 
the contractual alliance that reflects data for the years 2010 and 2011.  Table 24 
below describes the fields in the Provider’s database, the type of data and a 
brief description of the content.  
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Table 24 Field Description of Contract Database from Provider 
FIELD TYPE DESCRIPTION 
ID Categorical Provider ’s internal code for user identification  
Customer Categorical Name of User company to be kept confidential  
SLA Description Categorical 
Description of each one of the operational performance 
indicator included in the contract in the service level 
agreement (SLA) 
 Goal  Continuous 
Quantitative value expected for each one of the 
operational performance indicators in the SLAs 
 Diff  Continuous 
Calculation of the difference between the indicator’s 
goal and the actual average performance 
 Ave  Continuous 
Quantitative value of the actual performance for each 
of the operational performance indicators in the SLAs 
High/Low Binary 
Guideline to assess the performance indicator. Some 
indicators are better when they are HIGH (like on-time 
arrival), and some are better when they are LOW (time 
between arrival and shipping) 
Contractual Binary 
Registers if the relationship has a signed contract or 
not 
Year Nominal Specific year for performance reporting 
Account Vertical Categorical 
Describes one of five industry verticals that applies to a 
particular USER 
Director Name(Owner) Text 
Name of the specific Programme manager that is the 
owner of the contractual relationship 
Report to Name 
(Owner) 
Text Name of the Programme manager’s supervisor 
Yearly Measured 
SLA's 
Continuous 
Number of measures taken in a given calendar year for 
a maximum of 12 observations 
YTD SLA's Met Continuous Number of observations where the SLAs were met 
Average Performance Continuous 
Average value of the operational performance indicator 
for the given year of measurement 
In order to complete the profiling of each one of the contractual alliances and to 
operationalise the constructs required for the analysis, the Provider submitted 
additional information by user contract in a second database with information 
detailed in Table 25 below. Appendices A and B present the files for both 
databases received from the Provider.  
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Table 25 Additional Primary Data Related to Contractual Success 
FIELD TYPE DESCRIPTION 
ID Categorical 
Provider ’s internal code for user identification and 
the common field  across databases 
Longevity Continuous 
Number of years the User has been a user of the 
PROVIDER  
Renegotiations Continuous 
(Azorín and Cameron, 2010; Molina-Azorin, 2012) 
Number of renegotiations  on the conditions of the 
contractual relationship between User and 
PROVIDER 
Value  Continuous 
Annual value of the relationship in terms of the 
value of the contract 
Active  Binary Status of the relationship as active or non-active.  
4.5 Summary 
As presented throughout the chapter, the pilot study in all its dimensions is 
consonant with the philosophical position and the theoretical lens chosen to 
study inter-firm performance alignment.  The research design, data collection 
methods and mixed analytical techniques to measure and analyse alignment, 
are congruent with the requirements of a QUAN-Qual research design (Azorín 
and Cameron, 2010; Molina-Azorin, 2012).   
The operationalisation of variables such as inter-firm alignment and contractual 
alliance success has been properly demonstrated. These quantitative methods 
were supplemented by a qualitative validation from the actual relationship 
managers of the pilot contracts. Overall, the presented methods provided some 
initial answers to the stated research questions from the literature review. 
Statistical analysis to test correlation between degrees of alignment and 
contract success was not performed due to sample size, and considering that 
for the pilot study all contracts were active.  The statistical analysis has been 
deferred for the main study with a larger data set of both types of contracts: 
active and decommissioned.  The hypotheses will be tested during the full 
quantitative study.  Chapters 5 and 6 summarise the results of the quantitative 
pilot study and the full qualitative analysis. Chapter 7 will provide a discussion of 
the results in light of the proposed hypotheses.  
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5 RESULTS FROM PILOT STUDIES  
5.1 Introduction 
The conducted pilot study demonstrated the feasibility of the proposed research 
model to measure inter-firm performance alignment (IFA) and contractual 
alliance success (CAS).  This Chapter presents the results of a pilot quantitative 
analysis and a qualitative study conducted prior to the full quantitative analysis 
and the full set of contracts.  The pilot quantitative study was conducted with a 
small sample of eleven logistics outsourcing contracts between one provider 
and 11 users. The contracts received from the Provider were not randomly 
selected. Rather, they were provided solely to test the viability of the proposed 
research methods.  
The aim of the quantitative pilot study was to operationalise the constructs for 
contractual alliance success, alignment of inter-firm performance measures, a 
user’s financial objectives, a provider’s financial objectives, and what predicts 
contractual alliance success. The qualitative study was made up of in-depth 
interviews with the Programme Managers in charge of managing specific users 
in the sample contracts. 
Firstly, the pilot study succeeded operationalising IFA as the result of three 
alignment variables named ACTUAL-SLA, USER-SLA and PROVIDER-SLA. 
These variables measure the alignment between actual performance values 
against the contract’s SLAs, alignment between the user’s financial objectives 
and contract SLA’s, and alignment between the provider’s financial objectives 
and contract SLAs, respectively. Secondly, the pilot study used profile 
information of the contracts to operationalise CAS as the result of the 
contractual alliance being active with a formal agreement (formality), for an 
extended period of time (longevity), and with a minimum number of 
renegotiations (stability). The concept of relative profitability will be tested in the 
main quantitative study.  
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In the qualitative portion of the pilot, Programme Managers provided additional 
contextual data and facts that complemented the interpretation of the results on 
contractual alliance success and inter-firm alignment.  
It is useful to restate that the unit of analysis for this research is the signed 
contract between a Provider of logistics services and a User of such services. 
Each contract contains specific performance measures to govern the 
relationship known as service level agreements or SLAs. SLAs are both the set 
indicators selected to track the fulfilment of services under contract, as well as 
the numerical performance targets of each indicator. These indicators are also 
known as internal or operational performance measures. 
Actual financial indicators and benchmarks were used in order to measure the 
alignment between the contract’s SLAs and the performance objectives of 
provider and users. With that consideration in mind, the participating firms in the 
study, both users and provider, are publicly quoted firms. So their financial 
information is available from secondary, yet reliable sources.  
The remainder of the Chapter analyses in detail the results from construct 
operationalisation, pilot alignment measures, success measures, and the 
scenarios that describe the situation of each of the 11 contracts. Additionally 
there is a section that describes in detail the content analysis from the 
interviews and the summary of their perspectives. 
5.2 Quantitative Results  
The quantitative pilot study demonstrated the feasibility to conceptualise, 
operationalise and calculate measures of alignment amongst the three sets of 
alignment measures.  These results answer the first research question stated 
from the literature review.  If inter-firm performance alignment is measureable 
then the full study can proceed to measure the correlation of IFA and 
contractual alliance success.   
This section presents the quantitative results of the calculations and the 
analysis of each one of the results in the context of the pilot contracts.  Chapter 
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4 described primary data sources and the calculations used to arrive at each 
one of the coefficients of alignment by contract as well as the operationalised 
variables for contractual alliance success, following constructs from the 
literature.   
5.2.1 Measurement of Alignment Variables   
5.2.1.1 ACTUAL-SLA   
As described thoroughly in the Chapter on Research Methods, this coefficient of 
alignment measures the distance between the stated targets of the contract’s 
SLA and the actual reported value of the indicator.   
The SLAs tracked in the eleven contracts should be considered standard 
examples in the outsourcing logistics industry. They closely represent the scope 
of logistics services under contract between User and Provider (Krauth et al., 
2005; Boyson et al., 1999).  Most SLAs track the quality and response time of 
the logistics services performed by the Provider. It is interesting to notice, 
though, that within this particular sample of SLAs there were no cost or 
productivity indicators. The consequence of this is that many SLAs will not be 
aligned with the Provider’s need to gain efficiencies in resource utilisation, 
which ultimately improves financial performance.   
There is a significant interest on the role of logistics to reduce working capital.  
There were multiple SLAs related to shorter collection cycles, fewer days in 
accounts receivables and/or reducing the number of days in inventory.  This is 
evident by the fact that four of the eleven contracts track indicators on ‘aged 
receivables’ clearly associated with the speed of goods delivery.   The most 
popular indicators are those related to delivery performance, transportation and 
shipping accuracy and on-time arrivals.   
The contract sample includes SLAs related to the consequences of sub-
standard logistics performance, such as ‘plant disruptions’ and ‘claims’.  There 
are few references to financial or cost indicators, as these typically are reported 
in the pricing section of the contract. However, two contracts monitor the 
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reduction in logistics cost enabled by the Service Provider, and the overall 
reduction in inventory investment due to the outsourcing efforts.  Table 26 
presents the list of the SLAs from the eleven contracts, their type and frequency 
of use.  
Table 26 Sample of Operational Performance Indicators 
MENTIONS 
SERVICE LEVEL AGREEMENTS       INDICATOR 
DEFINITION 
TYPE 
5 Delivery Performance Quality 
4 Aged Receivables Velocity 
2 Inventory Accuracy Quality 
2 Plant Disruptions Quality 
2 Dock-to-Stock Velocity 
1 Logistics Cost Reduction  Cost 
1 Obsolete Inventory Reduction  Cost 
1 Order Accuracy Quality 
1 Fill Rate Quality 
1 Next Day Air Performance Quality 
1 Order Pick Accuracy Quality 
1 On-Time In-Full Quality 
1 Order Fulfilment Quality 
1 On-Time Performance Quality 
1 Claims Ratio Quality 
1 EDI Compliance Quality 
1 Time on Arrival of Available Freight Velocity 
1 Total Transit Time Velocity 
The coefficient of alignment between the target value of an SLA and the actual 
value of that SLA is an important input to the overall inter-firm alignment 
measure.  Given that the contracts in the pilot study are still active and were 
hand-picked by the Provider’s personnel it is expected that the alignment 
between target and actual be high.  In other words, the value of the coefficient 
ACTUAL-SLA should be relatively close to zero, indicating a small distance 
between target and actual values.   
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Regardless of the lack of random sampling, it was expected to see a high 
degree of alignment between target SLAs and actual values, given that the 
definition of success of contractual alliances have always been related to 
fulfilling contractual obligations (Kale et al., 2001; Kale and Singh, 2007; 
Wittmann et al., 2009; Lambe et al., 2002; Segil; Stuart, 1997).  
Table 27 below presents the calculated values of ACTUAL-SLA for each 
contract in the sample.  The smallest value is zero (in the case of Contract I, 
where one operational performance indicator was tracked, and its actual 
performance was practically identical to the SLA.  The indicator is ‘Delivery 
Performance’ and the target is 96% with an actual performance of 95.7%). It is 
important to remember that ACTUAL-SLA values closer than zero show more 
alignment, or less distance from target SLA vs. actual values of the SLA 
indicators. 
Table 27 Values of ACTUAL-SLA Alignment for Pilot Contracts 
CONTRACT ACTUAL-SLA Alignment Coefficient 
A 0.11 
B 0.05 
C 0.06 
D 0.07 
E 0.02 
F 4.00 
G 0.13 
H 0.20 
I 0.00 
J 0.11 
K 0.25 
Average 0.46 
The contract with the highest ACTUAL-SLA value is Contract F. This one has 3 
operational indicators; one of its ‘Claims’ has an actual performance that is 
much worse than the target.  The target for claims is 1/700, while the actual 
performance is 5/700. This difference generates a large distance between 
target SLA and actual value which adds up to the general coefficient of 
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ACTUAL-SLA.  The rest of the contracts sit comfortably in the [0.05 – 0.25] 
interval that represents a high degree of alignment, as shown by the close 
distance between the contracts’ SLAs and the actual performance values.   
5.2.1.2 USER-SLA 
The USER-SLA coefficient measures the alignment between the contract’s 
SLAs and the financial objectives of the User. This coefficient represents the 
second dimension of overall inter-firm alignment of performance measurement 
systems. 
Calculating the USER-SLA alignment for each one of the eleven contracts 
meant measuring the contribution of the contract’s SLAs to the User’s financial 
objectives.  As defined in the research methods section, this contribution was 
codified for the pilot study as [HIGH, MEDIUM, LOW, NONE].  For the 
calculations, the codes have been translated to the values of [0.99, 0.66, 0.33, 
0]. These represent nominal values for each of the codes. The rational for 
assigning one of these values to an operational indicator is based on the nature 
of the improvement of the SLA on the financial objective of the user. High 
contribution is assigned to those SLAs that are included in the calculations of 
financial indicators and that have a major and simultaneous impact on the 
financial objective when the SLA is met. Chapter 4, section 4.2.4 has detailed 
examples on the assignment of these codes by SLA and the logic followed to 
consider inclusion, impact and simultaneity.  
Table 28 shows a general matrix of alignment between contractual SLAs and 
user’s financial objectives.  In this case the closer the number is to 1 (or 0.99) 
the operational indicator contributes more to a selected financial measure. Note 
that each operational indicator is assessed against the three financial indicators, 
and the alignment is different depending on the inclusion, simultaneity and 
impact of the SLA indicator on the financial one.  
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Table 28 General Contribution Matrix USER-SLA  
USER´S FINANCIAL INDICATORS REVENUE GROWTH % EBITDA / SALES 
DAYS IN WORKING 
CAPITAL 
USER-SLA 
Benchmark of Contribution 1 1 1 0.00 
Inventory Accuracy 0.66 0.66 0.99 0.48 
Order Pick Accuracy 0.66 0.99 0.66 0.48 
Aged Receivables 0.66 0.33 0.99 0.75 
Claims Ratio 0.66 0.99 0.33 0.75 
Delivery Performance 0.99 0.33 0.66 0.75 
Dock-to-Stock 0.66 0.33 0.99 0.75 
Logistics Cost Reduction 0.33 0.99 0.66 0.75 
Order Accuracy 0.99 0.66 0.33 0.75 
Plant Disruption 0.66 0.99 0.33 0.75 
Next Day Air Performance 0.66 0.33 0.66 0.82 
On-Time Performance 0.66 0.66 0.33 0.82 
EDI Compliance 0.33 0.99 0.33 0.95 
Fill Rate  0.99 0.33 0.33 0.95 
On-Time In-Full 0.99 0.33 0.33 0.95 
Order Fulfilment 0.99 0.33 0.33 0.95 
Total Transit Time 0.33 0.33 0.66 1.01 
Obsolete Inventory Reduction 0.00 0.33 0.99 1.20 
Time on Arrival of Available Freight 0.66 0.00 0.33 1.21 
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After estimating the directional alignment between operational indicators and 
financial indicators, a USER-SLA coefficient by contract was then calculated.  
The matrix shows an order of magnitude of contribution of operational indicators 
to key financial indicators. These are not the real values of the variable USER-
SLA for the 11 contracts in the pilot.   
One can deduce from Table 28 that the SLA that contributes the most to User’s 
financial objectives is ‘inventory accuracy’.  Inventory accuracy contributes 
highly [0.99] to reducing days in working capital. It does so by lowering the 
number of days in inventory due to higher accuracy in the counts. Inventory 
accuracy also contributes to revenue growth [0.66], since it permits selling 
products that were not available or visible before. It should be noted, however, 
that the impact here may be limited.  Improving inventory accuracy contributes 
to improving profitability by increasing EBITDA as a per cent of sales by 
eliminating/reducing costs associated with inventory write-offs due to miscounts 
or misplacing.  Another SLA with similar behaviour is ‘order pick accuracy’. This 
shows more impact on profitability than on reduction of working capital, but also 
shows high impact on revenue growth, by reducing the amount of picking errors 
in final customer orders.   
The contract’s SLAs that have lowest levels of contribution with user’s financial 
objectives are: ‘time of arrival of available freight’ and ‘obsolete inventory 
reduction’. Reducing obsolete inventories does not help revenue growth. It 
does, however, help profitability tangentially and contributes to reducing working 
capital.  Yet the 0.00 value or no contribution in revenue growth reduces the 
total contribution of this indicator to user’s financial objectives and ultimately to 
the level of alignment.  Time of arrival of available freight, contributes to 
increasing sales [0.66] but it is not the major driver.  It contributes to some 
extent in the reduction of days in inventory by shortening transit times. This 
contribution is again tangential so the assigned value was 0.33. As far as the 
contribution to profitability, this is very low, considering that fast 
shipping/delivery modes are more expensive and drive higher SGA costs.  
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After clarifying the operational-financial connection, the next step was to 
calculate the specific values of USER-SLA for each contract in the pilot sample.  
For the estimation of the alignment coefficients, the size of the financial 
performance gap that the User was trying to close was also taken into account.  
The actual financial indicators of some User firms are very close to the 
performance of the industry benchmark.  The results show that when the 
financial gap is small (actual financial indicators vs. benchmark) the contribution 
of contract’s SLAs is lower.  When the user has a major financial gap, thus an 
aggressive financial objective, (see Contract H with a 40.4% performance gap 
in revenue growth to be closed), it is expected more contribution of the 
contractual alliance, or more alignment of the contract’s SLAs and User’s 
financial objectives.  
During the discussion of the cases each one of the contracts will be reviewed in 
the context of their particular conditions. The Programme Managers have 
confirmed the validity of the approach taken here.  
Table 29 Values of USER-SLA Alignment for Contracts in Pilot Study 
CONTRACT USER-SLA 
A 0.94 
B 0.96 
C 0.75 
D 0.75 
E 1.25 
F 0.76 
G 0.98 
H 0.85 
I 1.11 
J 0.79 
K 1.23 
Average 0.94 
Table 29 above summarises the values of USER-SLA alignment for the 11 
contracts in the pilot study.  Evident here is the larger distance between this set 
of values and the ACTUAL-SLA coefficients (Table 26).  This is expected as the 
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considerations of alignment between contracts’ SLAs and Users’ financial 
objectives are new and not yet managed explicitly. This research should create 
the required awareness so managers seek this alignment by designing the right 
SLAs in their contractual alliances.  
Nevertheless, the alignment behaviour is not homogeneous across the 
contracts in the pilot study. The contracts with the smallest alignment are 
Contract E and K. Contract E has only one indicator in its SLA: ‘delivery 
performance’ which contributes to some degree to revenue growth, but little 
contribution to profitability or improved capital utilisation. In the case of Contract 
K, the two SLAs in the contract are two of the indicators with less alignment with 
financial objectives (See Table 28): ‘Time of Arrival of Available Freight’ and 
‘Total Transit Time’.  These two SLA’s may be useful for tracking the internal 
performance of the contract but have limited contribution to advance the 
strategic objectives of User K.  
A potential conclusion to be drawn from the operationalisation of the USER-SLA 
coefficient relates to the number of indicators in the contract’s SLAs. A single 
indicator or a small number of operational indicators miss the opportunity to find 
contribute to the User’s financial objectives, and thus to increase alignment. A 
smaller number of SLAs could be easier to manage and improve ACTUAL-SLA 
alignment but shows limited strategic potential. 
5.2.1.3 PROVIDER-SLA 
The PROVIDER-SLA coefficient measures the alignment between the 
contract’s SLAs and the financial objectives of the Provider. The provider is the 
firm that offers contract logistics services to Users under the structure of a 
contractual alliance governed by specific service level agreements or SLAs.  
The PROVIDER-SLA coefficient is the input of alignment amongst inter-firm 
indicators. It will be used to calculate total the inter-firm alignment coefficient 
(IFA). IFA will be used as a predictor of contractual alliance success (CAS). 
The calculation method for the PROVIDER-SLA coefficient follows exactly the 
same method as the USER-SLA coefficient. A contribution matrix is presented 
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that states the inclusion, simultaneity, and impact of each SLA to the financial 
objectives of the provider. In this case the method is the same but from an 
opposing perspective. The overarching question to ask is if the contract’s SLAs 
are met what the contribution to the provider’s financial objectives is. In some 
cases the answers may be completely opposite to the impact of SLAs on the 
User’ financial objectives!  
Table 30 presents the current values of the provider’s financial indicators by the 
end of Q4 2009, and the financial objectives based on the industry’s 
benchmarks. For logistics service providers the benchmark is the SIC code 
4215.  
In broader terms the Provider wants to more than double its rate of revenue 
growth, keep profitability as is (above the benchmark), and improve its ability to 
collect A/R faster from users.  Knowing the Provider’s financial objectives, the 
question is if the contracts’ SLAs are contributing to those objectives.  
Table 30 General Alignment Matrix PROVIDER-SLA 
LSP 
CORPORATE INDICATORS 
REVENUE 
GROWTH 
% 
EBITDA /SALES 
Days Sales 
Outstanding 
PROVIDER-SLA 
Stated Goal Y2009 8.50% 13.60% 32 
Current Performance                       
(End Q4 2009) 
3.60% 15.20% 39 
Performance Gap 4.90% -1.60% (7.00) 
Normalised Gap 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Logistics Cost Reduction 0.99 0.33 0 1.20 
Obsolete Inventory Reduction 0.33 0 0 1.56 
Delivery Performance 0.99 0.33 0.33 0.95 
Inventory Accuracy 0.33 0.66 0.66 0.82 
Plant Disruptions 0.33 0.99 0.33 0.95 
Order Accuracy 0.99 0.66 0.66 0.48 
Fill Rate  0.99 0.33 0.33 0.95 
Next Day Air Performance 0.66 0.33 0.99 0.75 
Order Pick Accuracy 0.99 0.66 0.66 0.48 
On-Time In-Full 0.99 0.33 0.66 0.75 
Order Fulfilment 0.99 0.33 0.66 0.75 
On-Time Performance 0.66 0.33 0.99 0.75 
Claims Ratio 0.33 0.99 0.66 0.75 
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EDI Compliance 0.33 0.99 0.66 0.75 
Aged Receivables  0.66 0.33 0.99 0.75 
Dock-to-Stock 0.33 0.99 0.66 0.75 
Time of Arrival of Available Freight 0.99 0.33 0.66 0.75 
Total Transit Time 0.99 0.99 0.33 0.67 
If the performance gap is normalised to 1.00 for every financial objective, then 
how much the SLA contributes (via inclusion, simultaneity and impact) to the 
goal must be considered. The same scale of [0.99; 0.66; 0.33; 0] will be used to 
determine a HIGH | MEDIUM | LOW | NO | contribution.  From the matrix in 
Table 29 it is noteworthy that quality indicators such as ‘order pick accuracy’ 
and ‘order accuracy’ have the most contribution to the Provider’s financial 
objectives, and thus the greatest alignment. This means a small distance 
between provider’s financial objectives and contract’s SLA, or low PROVIDER-
SLA coefficients.  
Comparing both matrices of contribution in tables 28 and 30, it is noticeable that 
the SLA ‘logistics cost reduction’ has the greatest contribution to financial 
objectives of both Users and Provider.  The USER-SLA coefficient was 0.75 
and the PROVIDER-SLA coefficient was estimated in 1.20.  Other SLAs 
delivered equally to the objectives of Users and Providers, and should be 
preferred over those that are skewed towards one party or another.  
To calculate the PROVIDER-SLA alignment coefficient by contract, the analysis 
considered SLAs present and the contribution of each indicator to the financial 
objectives of the Provider.  Table 31 shows the results.   
Table 31 Values of PROVIDER-SLA for Contracts in Pilot Study 
CONTRACT ACTUALS-SLA 
A 0.57 
B 0.82 
C 0.75 
D 0.82 
E 0.75 
F 0.54 
G 0.70 
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H 0.70 
I 0.67 
J 0.63 
K 1.83 
Average 0.76 
The calculations of PROVIDER-SLA coefficients complete the final set of 
variables required to estimate the total inter-firm alignment coefficient (IFA).  
IFA measures the alignment of a contractual alliance’s SLAs with the objectives 
of its partners and the fulfilment of its operational objectives.  
Following the definition on Equation 2, all components of IFA are known and the 
operationalisation has been fully tested in anticipation to the full quantitative 
study. In the full study, IFA will be a dependent variable, estimated from USER-
SLA, PROVIDER-SLA, and ACTUAL-SLA as independent variables. 
Simultaneously IFA will be the independent variable used to estimated 
contractual alliance success (CAS).  
The use of structural equation modelling allows for a single variable such as IFA 
to operate as dependent and independent in the same model.  
Equation 4 IFA Coefficient Formulation 
IFA = f (USER-SLA; PROVIDER-SLA; ACTUAL-SLA) 
5.2.2 Measurement of Success Variables   
In this research design, the main dependent variable is contractual alliance 
success (CAS). The main research hypothesis states that aligned inter-firm 
performance is a determinant of CAS. This section explores the 
operationalisation of CAS using information on determinants of IFR success 
drawn from management literature.  
Most definitions of successful contractual alliances consider at least four 
determinants, or markers of success:   
- Relationship formality continuity 
- Relationship longevity 
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- Relationship stability 
- Relationship relative profitability 
A contractual alliance is deemed successful if its continuity has been 
guaranteed (no abrupt termination); if the relationship has longevity and if 
during the course of the relationship lifecycle it has been stable (subject to 
fewer renegotiations).   Additionally, and building on game theory and switching 
costs, many consider that the success of a CA is based on the relative 
profitability of staying in the relationship. For the pilot study, the first three 
variables were combined into an overall index of contractual alliance success. 
Information on relative profitability was not available at the time of the pilot study 
but made available later for the full quantitative study.  
The CAS index combines formality, longevity and renegotiations using the index 
formula from Equation 3. The larger the index, the more successful the 
contractual alliance.  Formality (1 for all 11 cases of active and formal contracts) 
* the longevity in years (-) minus the number of renegotiations create an index 
of contractual alliance success.   
Equation 5 Contractual Alliance Success - Pilot Study Calculation 
CAS = [FORMALITY * (LONGEVITY – RENEGOTIATIONS)] 
Table 32 below present the calculations for contractual alliance success for 
each one of the 11 contracts in the pilot study.  
Table 32 Summary of Dependent Variables for Contract Success 
CONTRACT LONGEVITY STABILITY FORMALITY 
CONTRACT 
SUCCESS 
 Years 
Number of 
Renegotiations 
Active and Signed = 1 
Decommissioned = 0 
Formality *  
[Longevity -
Renegotiations]  
A 9.00 3.00 1 6 
B 3.00 1.00 1 2 
C 12.00 3.00 1 9 
D 5.00 1.00 1 4 
E 6.00 4.00 1 2 
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F 3.00 1.00 1 2 
G 2.00 2.00 1 1 
H 2.00 0.00 1 2 
I 2.00 0.00 1 2 
J 2.00 1.00 1 1 
K 8.00 3.00 1 5 
In the main study, the values of the CAS will be correlated to the IFA 
coefficients from Equation 2. The larger sample size will be larger, and the 
presence of active and decommissioned contractual alliances will allow for a 
proper statistical analysis using SEM.  
This limited sample of contracts, all with formality = 1, do not show the upper 
boundary for alignment coefficients or the lower boundary for some of the 
measures of contract success. Additionally it is known that in this set of 
contracts for the pilot study there are special cases of very new relationships 
with at least one negotiation, and some very long relationships with many 
renegotiations in their lifecycles.  Some tests need to be run regarding which 
one of the components may be more appropriate to correlate with individual 
alignment coefficients.  The exploratory cases approach each one of the special 
situations in the sample contracts.  
5.2.3 Pilot Measurement Observations 
From the analysis of the 11 contracts, coefficients of alignment were obtained 
for each one of the three sets of inputs that determine inter-firm alignment in 
contractual alliances.  Not surprisingly, on average the greatest alignment was 
found in the ACTUAL-SLA coefficient of alignment.  Since historically most of 
the focus on contract management has been placed on achieving SLA targets, 
it is expected that those numbers are managed closely. In fact PMs at Provider 
review key SLAs with Users on a quarterly basis and draft action plans that 
bring them to target.  
The lowest degree of alignment was found in the USER-SLA alignment 
coefficient. This is troublesome as this coefficient measures the congruence 
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between the Users’ financial objectives and the contracts’ SLAs.  The distance 
between users’ objectives and SLA’s is double the distance between actual 
operational metrics and SLA targets. These results suggest that contract SLAs 
are valuable for measuring the operational performance of the functions being 
outsourced, but do not contribute to the overall financial objectives of the User 
signing the contract. At this point, the sample is not big enough to draw any 
statistically significant conclusions regarding the USER-SLA coefficient and the 
contractual alliance success (CAS) index. The analysis will be conducted in the 
main study as part of the SEM research model.  
The coefficient PROVIDER-SLA also showed low alignment, though not as poor 
as the values of the USER-SLA alignment. The results suggest that the SLAs in 
the contract do address better the needs of the provider than the needs of the 
users.  As is described above in the methods section, this can be explained by 
the fact that if the contract delivers to its SLAs, the provider will have a financial 
benefit by growing its revenues from that particular user. If the improvement of 
the operational metric creates an additional expense for the provider, then it will 
have a negative contribution to its profitability metrics.  
The main contribution of the pilot quantitative study was its ability to translate 
the measures of inter-firm alignment and the methods for assessing ‘fit’ from the 
strategic management literature to the performance measurement domain and 
apply the to the inter-firm context.  Now when the discussion is centred on 
alignment of performance measurement systems, there is a method that 
assesses alignment beyond words.     
5.3 Qualitative Analysis and Results 
5.3.1 Introduction and Subjects 
The previous section presented the details of the pilot quantitative study with a 
main objective to operationalise the calculation of key constructs in the analysis. 
This section presents the summary of the qualitative analysis regarding the 
results of the pilot study. The analysis was conducted using those interviewing 
techniques described in Chapter 4.  The purpose of the interviews was to 
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complement the pilot study with specific information by contract, and to receive 
feed-back from experts regarding the methodology, the overall aim of the 
research and sense-making of the results to date.  
The interviewees were Programme Managers who work in one of the largest 
companies of the third-party logistics industry. The contracts and the managers 
belong to the contract logistics solutions business unit. The BU focuses on 
designing long-term logistics solutions for their users.  In the last ten years, the 
parent company has acquired four smaller contract logistics providers that 
brought new users with existing contracts and relationships that were not 
negotiated by the Provider from the beginning.   
Before reviewing the results of the qualitative analysis it will be useful to provide 
an organisational context to the Programme Managers.  The Provider is 
organised along four specific areas that cover different aspects of managing 
contractual relationships with users:  
Business Development (BD): They are in charge of scoping new 
solutions for existing or new users. They identify from an early point the 
types of performance measures that users want or need.  
Pricing Group: Once the solution has been scoped by BD, the pricing 
group estimates the required investments and expenses to bring the 
services to life and translates those figures into a pricing structure for the 
user.  
Contracting Group: If scope and price are in line of user needs the 
relationship evolves for contracting and goes to this group. The 
contracting group creates the legal documents that will govern the 
relationship and that includes most of the performance indicators agreed 
upon with the user.  
Programme Management Group (PMG): Charged with managing the 
strategic relationship with the user, the group is responsible for ‘adopting’ 
the user’s voice inside the Provider. Programme Managers working in 
the PMG are the representatives of the user in cases of requiring 
additional resources, requesting explanations for a given event, and 
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measuring and tracking the agreed upon performance indicators from the 
contracts and additional requirements by the user.   
Programme Managers are assigned to large global accounts or to a set 
of accounts typically in the same industry. They have their corresponding 
counterparts in the User side and both meet on a regular basis to discuss 
performance issues or issues related to the contract lifecycle.  
The Programme Managers responsible for the 11 contracts in the quantitative 
pilot were also selected to take part in the qualitative interviews. Given that 
Programme Managers represent the interests of the Users within the Provider, 
their perspectives are invaluable when it comes to understanding and 
explaining the context of specific results from the quantitative pilot.  
In addition to the Programme Managers, four other people participated in two 
meetings that were held to present project progress to the sponsors at the 
Provider. The sponsors and meeting attendees represented the Strategy Group 
within the Provider organisation. Some participants work for the Programme 
Management Group but do not represent users. These last two are responsible 
for managing the contracts’ SLAs and to prepare performance reports for 
scheduled meetings with users.  
5.3.2 Results 
5.3.2.1 Performance indicators are critical tools in managing relationships 
From the interviews it was clear that performance indicators are the core tool for 
managing outsourcing relationships, from the perspective of the Provider and 
the Users.  Operational issues drive the selection of the SLAs that go into the 
contracts. In some instances the indicators come from the user that has already 
decided what needs to be measured. Alternatively, in some cases, indicators 
are picked from a portfolio of indicators relative to the scope of contracted 
services.    
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A senior member of the Strategy Group participating in the project review 
meetings explains the role of performance indicators in the process of 
establishing a new contractual relationship:  
SLAs are important to get agree upon expectations from both sides. 
The main role is expectation management and that’s how we used 
them today. Sometimes users like to throw a big ‘100% completion 
on let’s say… fill rate or something else. SLAs are how we bring 
reality into the mix.  
This is the most common perspective amongst interviewed Programme 
Managers.  Performance indicators are tools to manage expectations from 
users and to communicate them internally. Once performance indicators are 
defined and agreed upon they are tracked and reported based on established 
schedules with the users. Typically there are quarterly reviews of the indicators, 
but in some cases, like with Contract E, the user requests weekly reviews of the 
performance indicators.  
5.3.2.2 Defining operational performance indicators and setting targets  
Most performance indicators are selected when scoping the required services 
by the Business Development Group. In two cases the relationships were 
inherited from an acquisition of another third-party logistics provider by the 
Provider, so the contracts included previously agreed upon measures.  A 
member of the Provider’s business development group offers:  
The way we work in the Supply Chain Group is that there is a 
standard set of key performance indicators, KPIs, and the user will 
pick several that are more important to them. They become the 
SLAs for the contract.  
Also the Programme Manager PMD of the relationship with User D explains that:  
 When the Provider took over the User D relationship from another 
contract, the metrics came with it, from the M&A with 3PL. We’ve 
had to do some stitching…  One of the metrics in the current 
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contract states ‘shipping window of 40 minutes to close the order’. 
That metric used to be 30 minutes we negotiated it and told them 
that we couldn’t do it in that window.  
During the initial phases of establishing the contractual relationship, process 
analysis and quantitative analytical data are used extensively.  The head of the 
PMG shares an instance when defining the indicators and setting their targets 
required more than just a meeting.  In that case the Provider had to send 
consultants to establish a baseline and correct logistics practices that affected 
performance:  
Consultants from the LSP reviewed the company’s overall shipping 
history, including the outbound shipment dates, the modes of 
shipment, and the arrival dates. The data showed that many 
products were traveling by air, the most expensive method, and 
arriving earlier than the required delivery date. Even parcels of 
sample products, sent free to users, were sometimes shipped by air. 
Interviews with company employees revealed that they were 
conditioned to get the products out quickly. They assigned an air 
shipment to many products simply out of habit.  
But not every performance indicator and target setting process is so 
consultative. PMK tells that when User K became a user …  
…they basically said ‘here are the KPIs, if you want this business we 
expect you to accept them and to perform to them. And we said yes.  
The definition and setting of performance indicators and targets are not static. 
During the life of the contract several metrics get added and shredded based on 
the needs of the contract and the users. In some occasions performance 
indicators are added to be reviewed during the quarterly meetings with the PM.  
Technically the new performance indicators are ‘covered’ under the contract 
because of specific wording introduced by the Contracting Group.  
In some instances the contract will only name the indicators to be 
tracked and it reads that “The Provider will meet and review the 
performance indicators periodically”, but it does not establish a 
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specific value to be achieved. That value is agreed and tracked in 
the operational quarterly meetings. The contract may state that any 
new indicator agreed upon both parties becomes an integral part of 
the contract.  
Setting the indicator’s target value is typically done at a later time when the 
operation has already been contracted. The Provider would like to understand 
what is possible in terms of performance improvements before committing to a 
target. The basic definition of the baseline comes first and later the 
commitments for target performance.   
The user can say what numbers they want, but we need to go and 
check if those numbers work for us. That’s done after we start the 
operation.  (PMC) 
In the end, some PMs complain that when negotiating targets and indicators, 
everything seems to boil down to pricing. So the Provider must be careful on the 
overall increase of service cost, given the fact that committing to higher 
performance will require more resources, more facilities, and staff.  
There was another method to select indicators and setting performance targets: 
by inheriting the relationship.  Two of the eleven contracts studied in the pilot 
came into the Provider’s User portfolio with pre-selected performance metrics.  
The contract had to be honoured as part of the commitments due from the 
merger with the original 3PL owner of the relationships.   
It can be summarised, as a general rule, that the financial objectives of the two 
signing parties were not explicitly considered. This was true when selecting 
performance indicators to govern the relationship and when setting up the 
performance targets.  
5.3.2.3 How Alignment of Indicators is Understood 
When prompted on the importance of alignment of sets of performance 
indicators, the Programme Managers were not immediately sure of what the 
concept meant. After some probing, the most obvious interpretation of 
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alignment is the fit between a measurement target and the actual value of the 
measurement.  
Programme Managers agreed that alignment matters and intuitively grasp the 
importance of aligning the contract’s SLAs with the goals of the firms in the 
contract; however they have never been exposed to alignment techniques. In 
the views of the Programme Managers financial performance of Users affect the 
terms of outsourcing relationships, but again they cannot articulate the 
magnitude of the impact or the direction of it. In words of PMD 
Per contract D discussion: perhaps we need to use the financial 
goals of the business unit, not the corporate parent, because that is 
what our counterpart cares about and gets paid to deliver to. When 
the targets get tougher (due to larger performance gaps) should we 
renegotiate the SLAs and the overall contract?  
5.3.2.4 Better Definitions of Contract Success are Needed 
In the PMs’ views contract success is continuity of service and longevity.  The 
ultimate goal is to have the contract renewed after the agreed period and not to 
be subjected to abrupt termination. The drivers for contract success are 
grouped along some subcategories, where most interviewees agreed that the 
first one is good performance in the selected indicators for the service 
agreements. But besides that one, a recurrent them is the concept of 
communications.  
The definition of contract success seems to be an easy one to agree on.   
“We don’t like when a user says ‘We are not using you anymore’, 
and when we ask why, typically their reaction is related to an issue 
when we didn’t react well after recovering from a service failure”. 
Reacting in the event of problems seems to be a critical driver of 
success in contractual alliances for logistics service providing.  
When asked about the current definition of contract success they say about 
renegotiations:  
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Renegotiations are not necessarily a bad sign. Customers like to 
renegotiate. That means you are still in business. Sometime we like 
to renegotiate to adjust pricing or something else. It’s a case of 
renegotiate or terminate because we are losing money and there 
are clauses in the contract that allow us to terminate if we are not 
seeing the volumes we were promised.  
In most cases the reason for renegotiation is pricing rather than operational 
issues or changes in metrics. So as long as the relationship is good, 
renegotiations are not a sign of low stability. Yes, says Doug a PM for User A 
There is the usual tension between provider and users. Providers 
want long term contracts and users want shorter so they can 
change their minds and go whenever they want to go, get better 
rates and things like that. The more stable contracts the better 
because you can plan your space and other things. 
What is missing from the definition of contract success is the monetary aspect 
of the relationship. Profitability.  
At the end of the day, the Provider relies on user satisfaction 
surveys to track the overall success of their relationships and 
correct obvious flaws in the system.  
5.3.2.5 Some Drivers of Contractual Alliance Success 
 Meeting operational targets, except when there is a new C-level 
executive 
 Communications in case of not meeting performance requirements 
5.3.2.6 Alignment is Not How it Looks 
Alignment is higher, conceptually, to users’ needs, not with provider’s needs. 
This is especially true because they cannot have financial statements by user 
yet.  The user drives his/her own metrics but they revolve mostly around 
operational issues.  
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The argument is if it delivers operationally it should deliver financially and 
strategically... If you meet the SLAs for inventory accuracy, and the user 
does better indirectly that also helps us get better and get more business 
from them. The metrics tend to be more aligned with the user needs, I 
don't have any data to back this up, but they are better to the users… and 
that's the way it should be, performance agreement to the users, and then 
you try to protect yourself.  
5.3.2.7 Three-way Alignment 
5.3.2.7.1 Operational Alignment 
The key to long-lasting contractual relationships is operational performance, in 
the experience of Programme Managers. Operational metrics are more 
stringent like in the case of Contract E where they ship medical and health 
products.  
We talk with our counterparts at the client’s side and they only care 
about operational results. If the operational metrics are good they are 
happy or they don’t say anything. If we have problems that’s what they 
care. They do not really share with us the goals of the company but we 
suppose they are measured by those numbers as well. 
5.3.2.7.2 Customer Alignment is in everybody’s mind 
5.3.2.7.3 Provider alignment based on the success of the user 
In the minds of the Programme Managers, the alignment of the contract’s 
indicators with the financial goals of Provider is rarely considered.  They 
mentioned reiteratively that all the alignment that is considered is with users’ 
objectives.  Below are some of the comments expressed by different 
interviewees.  
I have not seen many SLAs that are a direct benefit to the provider, 
except for the volume clauses that gives you protection around certain 
things. I don’t know of anybody at Provider and Business Development 
that checks for the overall alignment of the metrics to our own corporate 
indicators. 
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Programme Managers have rationalised this lack of internal alignment by 
foreseeing scenarios where if the user does well, it will benefit Provider in the 
end. Theoretically.  
If you meet the SLAs for inventory accuracy, and the user does better, 
indirectly that also helps us get better and get more business from 
them… 
... and by establishing that there are other ways to protect the interest of 
the Provider in the relationship that is not necessarily through specific 
performance indicators: minimum volume clauses and financial 
surcharges for missing volumes.  
We put things in the contract like minimum volume requirements but 
that's not really an SLA.  That is how we protect our revenue growth. If 
the volumes don't match, there are going to see some charges. It's a 
financial penalty to make sure they have the volumes to cover the fixed 
cost of the infrastructure and overhead, the equipment you have. You 
have to have guarantees they will cover your fixed costs.  
Interestingly, the quantitative analysis showed different conclusions regarding 
the considerations of alignment of internal contract indicators versus the 
financial objectives of the Service Provider.  The calculations of PROVIDER-
SLA turned out to bring a higher coefficient of alignment than the USER-SLA 
coefficient, indicating better fit of the contracts with Provider’s goals than with 
users’ goals. 
When expressed these results to the Programme Managers, they argued that in 
a way, contract logistics is their business and is a direct reflection into their 
financial statements in terms of revenue, profitability and capital utilisation. 
Therefore it seems more evident that the contracts take care of that first in order 
to assure the sustainability of the Provider’s operations. Yet it was asserted 
before that no one checks proactively for that alignment in the Business 
Development group.  
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5.3.3 Alignment Matters, but Can be Measured? 
After being introduced to the concept of alignment of operational indicators with 
financial indicators most interviewees agree on the potential positive 
implications of alignment.  
“The numbers should deliver results both ways in order to have a more 
stable and longer-time contract. There is a tension in contract 
management; when is overpriced you drive users away or it is under-
priced and we lose money on it.  
You have to take the KPIs individually and see what's going on at the 
user's side and at the provider's side.  
Higher alignment matters but in both ways… but I don't know yet. Sounds 
like it … have you done some correlations? Do they matter?  
We are about to renegotiate with User D and if we can prove them that 
our contract helps with their big numbers on a regular basis we are set. 
We can do this with all healthcare companies on a regular basis. That will 
keep the new CFO happy.”  
However in their daily jobs they do not foresee using this insight. From their 
perspective, the concepts of alignment (or alignment) will be more beneficial 
during the initial scoping, pricing and contracting of the services, and at times of 
renegotiation, when is required to demonstrate value being created by the 
outsourcing relationship for the user.  
5.4 Pilot Results in Context 
From the quantitative analysis of the sample contracts some differences were 
evident in terms of the success index and the values of the alignment 
coefficients. Table 32 maps the results of each one of the eleven contractual 
alliances in a matrix of CAS indices by IFA coefficient.  Certainly with a limited 
sample like this it is impossible to draw statistically significant correlations, but 
in this phase of the research three scenarios are apparent from the pilot cases.  
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There is a predicted scenario that shows contractual alliances with results as 
predicted in the initial hypotheses. It will be the ‘blue’ scenario. The ‘orange’ 
scenario has results that contradict the initial hypotheses and propositions. The 
inconclusive scenario, or ‘grey’ scenario, presents a mix of results with 
behaviours that match the initial hypotheses and others challenge them.  
 
Table 33 Contractual Alliance Placement in a Matrix of Success by Alignment 
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The following section describes in detail the contextual information that provides 
additional explanation of these scenarios.  
5.4.1 The Predicted Scenario 
The predicted scenario considers those contractual alliances with expected 
behaviour according to the propositions (later hypotheses) stated in Chapter 3. 
They were validated limitedly through this pilot study. In the predicted scenario 
there are seven contracts out of eleven, with levels of contract success 
                                            
15
 Recall that in the context of the alignment coefficients, a high coefficient is not desirable as it 
indicates more distance between the two measured constructs.  
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commensurable with their alignment coefficient.  These cases are summarised 
in Table 34.  
From the predictive scenario, three segments can be clearly separated:  
I. Hi-Hi Group: with high indices for contract success (CAS > 4.5 defined 
as the edge of the fourth quartile in the data) and high levels of alignment 
(IFA < 1.63 as the first quartile of the data series). This group has actual 
SLA performance practically identical to the SLA goals thus showing low 
ACTUAL-SLA coefficients (0.11 or less). The contracts in the group are A 
and C. 
II. Mid-Mid Group: with contractual alliance success index in the second 
and third quartile (4.5 < CAS < 2.0) and alignment coefficients in the 
second and third quartile of the data series as well (1.63 < IFA < 2.03) 
Contracts in this sub-group are B, D, E, H, I. 
III. Low-Low Group:  with low indices for contract success (CAS < 2.0) in the 
first quartile of the data series and low levels of alignment (1.63 < IFA < 
5.03) of less than 1.63 as the first quartile of the data series. It is a 
qualitative confirmation on the methodology that this quadrant is empty, 
since decommissioned contracts were not provided for the pilot study.  
Table 34 Quantitative Results of Contracts in the Predicted Scenario 
CONTRACT 
ACTUAL
-SLA 
USER-
SLA 
PROVIDER
-SLA 
IFA 
COEFFI-
CIENT 
LONGE-
VITY 
RENEGO-
TIATIONS 
FORMA-
LITY 
CAS 
INDE
X 
SCENA-
RIO 
C 0.06 0.75 0.75 1.56 12.00 3.00 1 9 Predicted 
A 0.11 0.94 0.57 1.62 9.00 3.00 1 6 Predicted 
D 0.07 0.75 0.82 1.64 5.00 1.00 1 4 Predicted 
H 0.20 0.85 0.70 1.75 2.00 0.00 1 2 Predicted 
I 0.00 1.11 0.67 1.78 2.00 0.00 1 2 Predicted 
B 0.05 0.96 0.82 1.83 3.00 1.00 1 2 Predicted 
E 0.02 1.25 0.75 2.02 6.00 4.00 1 2 Predicted 
Contract C, the highest ranked contract in the pool, is an example of a 
relationship with a loyal user according to the Provider’s records. Inherited from 
an acquisition by the Provider close to eight years ago, the relationship is 
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strong, with predictable contract renewals every four years, and over a decade 
in business with the Provider. The services offered by the Provider are complex 
and the outsourced operation is closely embedded with User C’s manufacturing 
practices. The Programme Manager qualifies the relationship as ‘good’, not 
excellent, but satisfactory for both parties. Excepting opportunities to improve 
inventory turns, User C seems to be performing strongly in revenue generation 
but has some financial gaps to close in terms of profitability. See Table 35 
below. 
Table 35 Contractual SLAs and Financial Objectives for User C 
FINANCIAL INDICATORS                   
User C 
Revenue Growth % EBITDA / SALES 
Days in 
inventory 
Stated Goal Y2009 26.20% 12.10% 0 
Current Performance (End Q4 2009) 6.90% 8.60% 63 
Performance Gap 19.30% 3.50% (63.00) 
Normalised Gap 1.00 1.00 1.00 
On-Time In-Full 0.99 0.33 0.99 
Dock-to-Stock 0.33 0.33 0.99 
Inventory Accuracy 0.33 0.66 0.99 
USER-SLA Coefficient 0.20 0.31 0.05 
User A is the second contractual alliance with best performance in this scenario 
and in the Hi-Hi group. One of the world’s largest technology companies has an 
aim “to simplify the technology experience for consumers and businesses”. 
User A has a portfolio of products that spans printing, personal computing, 
software, services and IT infrastructure.  It is a public company listed in the New 
York Stock Exchange.  
User A has totally outsourced its service parts logistics operations to the 
Provider.  Accordingly with the Programme Manager for this account (PMA)  
Provider offers the “high-speed logistics solutions that high-tech 
companies require. With product obsolescence speed increasing 
each year, there is a much smaller window of time to get 
merchandise to market - or they are risking taking a loss”.  
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Since the beginning, both parties deemed the relationship critical to their 
companies’ operations. User A depends on the Provider’s performance for 
supporting its field operations, manufacturing sites and post-sales user service, 
with components, parts and spares.  The Provider regards User A as a key 
global account with enough visibility to determine most of its strategy for the 
high electronics industry, and with sufficient volume and scale to justify the 
allocation of specialized resources to manage the account.   The contractual 
relationship between User A and Provider has been in place for nine years and 
according to the terms of the contract it is due for renegotiation every three 
years.  
So far, it has been successfully renewed three times. The 
relationship can be described as ‘somehow a manageable 
tension’ with lots of ‘stressful times’. The times we’ve had 
renegotiations are ‘because the CEO and CFO have change the 
targets and now we need to renegotiate our targets… and 
naturally with service up and costs down.  
The challenge in managing this relationship comes from the amount of 
indicators to track in the contract with User A. Indeed, in some cases it looks 
like a mix of targets, processes, recommendations and activity profiles, some 
measured in the field and some at specific distribution centres. Certainly this 
makes it difficult to verify alignment of over 30 critical operational indicators with 
the financial goals of a major corporation.  
User A is noticeably one of the few companies in the sample that has exceeded 
the financial targets of its industry in terms of profitability. This is due to 
excellent attention at controlling logistics costs and providing optimal field 
support (see these indicators as key ones in the analysis).  In terms of revenue 
growth and days in inventory User A has some gaps to close. These last two 
indicators account for poor alignment, so the Provider must ensure that the 
operational indicators do not focus solely on cost reduction as is the case today.  
See Tables 36 and 37 for additional detail on these indicators. 
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Table 36 Contractual SLAs and Financial Objectives for User A 
FINANCIAL INDICATORS                   
User A 
Revenue Growth % EBITDA / SALES 
Days in 
inventory 
Stated Goal Y2009 14.70% 9.80% 21 
Current Performance  -3.60% 13.30% 26 
Performance Gap 18.30% -3.50% (5.00) 
Normalised Gap 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Order Accuracy 0.99 0.66 0.33 
Logistics Cost Reduction 0.00 0.99 0.00 
Obsolete Inventory Reduction 0 0.33 0.99 
USER-SLA Coefficient 0.45 0.12 0.31 
The second group in the Predicted Scenario has five contracts that have 
medium levels of success and medium coefficients of alignment. They are 
considered with the ‘predictable’ scenario given that their success and 
alignment results match the diagonal in the matrix where inter-firm alignment 
predicts contractual alliance success.    
In this group two of the users belong to the automotive sector: User H and User 
I, two operate of the electronics and technology sector (User B and User D) and 
User E is in telecommunications.  
User D is one of the cases of medium alignment and medium level of success. 
It belongs to the Predicted Scenario, with correlation between both variables, 
but it is worth taking a detailed look at this contractual alliance as it informs 
similar situations with the other four relationships.  
User D is a conglomerate and the Health Care Business Units is the Provider’s 
user. Even though the USER-SLA coefficient shows good fit between the 
contract’s SLAs and the User’s financial objectives, the Programme Manager in 
charge of the relationship suggested that alignment should be measured 
against the financial objectives of the business unit in particular and not of the 
conglomerate’s objectives.  This is request is reasonable but perhaps difficult to 
implement since the conglomerate does not reports data at the Business Unit 
level.  
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Contractual alliance with User D is another case of quasi-perfect alignment in 
the ACTUALS-SLA coefficient. In the words of the lead PMD:  
User D is in an industry that tolerates no mistakes, and that is within 
a company that makes very few operational mistakes.  “We are not 
quite six-sigma yet but we have learned with them over the last five 
years and they will renew the contract for other five years. In this 
case the measurement of operational indicators is tight. They are 
tracked weekly and are bundled to a rolling report from the last 11 
weeks.”  
According to the PMD in charge there has been only one week in the last 11 
where performance was lower than target and that was by 0.35%. This is 
consistent with one of the lowest values of ACTUALS-SLA for Contract D = 
0.07. The level of detail in the operational performance indicators is indicative of 
this situation. Table 37 below contains exemplar references to how many 
minutes are allocated to certain activities. The issue in this contractual alliance 
revolves around the contract’s SLAs contribution to the Provider’s financial 
objectives.   
Table 37 Contract’s SLAs with User A  
SPL Receipt of Material 98% X-Dock orders 15 minutes FSL 1 
SPL Receipt of Material 98,00% Air/Unused returns 4 hours FSL 2 
SPL Receipt of Material 98,00% Ground 8 hours FSL 2 
SPL Net inventory accuracy 99,50%   FSL 3 
SPL Cycle Counts 98%   FSL 5 
SPL PRT Receipts 99% 6 hours FSL 6 
SPL PRT Receipts 100% EOB next business day FSL 6 
SPL Pick, Pack and Ship quality 99,50%   FSL 7 
SPL FSL shipments 99,50% 3 day FSL 9 
SPL Delivery/Pick Up performance 98% Mission Critical FSL 10 
SPL Delivery/Pick Up performance 97% Same Day Reactive FSL 10 
SPL FSL shipments 99,50% same day FSL 11 
SPL FG Receipts 98% same day DC 1 
SPL FG PRT receipts 99% same day DC 2 
SPL FG PRT actions 99% EOB next business day DC 3 
SPL Defective PRT receipts 99% same day DC 4 
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SPL Defective PRT actions 99% EOB next business day DC 5 
SPL Blank Blank Blank DC 6 
SPL Repack, re-box, re-label receipts 97% EOB next business day DC 7 
SPL Part conversions hot requests 99% 4 hours DC 8 
SPL Part conversions standard requests 99% EOB next business day DC 9 
SPL Priority Repack, re-box, re-label receipts 99,50% same day DC 10 
SPL FG priority receipts 99,50% 4 hours DC 11 
SPL Order accuracy 99,75% Pick, pack, ship quality DC 12 
SPL Audit findings 0 Major non-conformance DC 13 
SPL UPS SCS caused purge <.5% UPS SCS caused parts to be purged DC 14 
SPL Hold/Purge requests 100% 30 minutes DC 15 
SPL Kitting past due orders <50 Kitting requests >10 business days DC 16 
SPL NDA order fulfilment 99,90% same day DC 17 
SPL Non-NDA order fulfilment 99% same day DC 18 
SPL Defective shipping 99,50% EOB next business day DC 19 
SPL Defective order accuracy 99,75% Pick, pack, ship quality DC 20 
SPL Cross dock 99,50% same day DC 21 
SPL Obsolescence orders 100% 3 weeks DC 22 
SPL Inventory shrinkage 99,70% per year DC 23 
SPL Gross value variance <.75% per quarter DC 24 
SPL Cycle Counts 98% cycle count accuracy DC 25 
Contract D has the third lowest alignment coefficient in the PROVIDER-SLA 
measurement, suggesting that much attention has been placed on meeting the 
user’s required SLAs and the user’s financial objectives but less on checking 
alignment with the Provider’s financial needs.  
“This contract has been in place for five years with one 
renegotiation. The PMD explains the context of some of the 
renegotiations and the future outlook of the relationship. The one 
renegotiation was mostly around pricing because we proposed it.  
We were performing more services that we scoped and we had to 
charge them for it. Needless to say they weren’t happy about it... 
We are up for renegotiation again after a 3 year contract. There are 
some operational issues that we are tidying up but if by April 2010 
they are arranged, User D has committed to 4 more years with us. 
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And, hey, in the next round we will make sure we prove that the 
metrics fit their goals.”  
Table 38 Contract’s SLAs with User D 
SCOPE OF SERVICE                    SLAs SLA Targets COMMENTS 
Distribution  WPS 
100%                                
(End of Day/210 
Minutes) 
Facility has an end of 
day, global is 210 
Distribution  WCP / WDR / WDD 
100%                            
(40 minutes) 
 
Distribution  WEA 
100%                                             
(48 hours / 22 hours) 
 
Distribution  Inventory Accuracy 99%  
Distribution  Order Fulfilment 99.70%  
Distribution  Dock-to-Stock 
100%                                              
(420 minutes) 
 
Distribution  Re-pack 
100%                                           
(840 minutes) 
 
Distribution  Scrap 
100%                                               
(96 hours) 
 
Distribution  Outbound Quality 99.50% 
Audition IB and OB 
quality proper quantity, 
part numbers, manual 
audit 
Distribution  Inbound Quality 99.50%  
The SLAs in Contract D, summarised in Table 38, reflect very accurately the 
context of the quantitative measurements of success and alignment in terms of 
relationship management.  Contracts H, I, B, E, have very similar IFA 
coefficients and all of them have exactly the same contractual alliance success 
index CAS = 2 
5.4.2 The Conflictive Scenario 
The Conflictive Scenario includes the one contractual alliance with a contract 
that does not match the prediction of correlation between alignment (IFA) and 
the contract success index (CAS).  Contract J is the relationship in that 
category.  Contract J is considered an immature relationship by its PMJ. It has 
been active for two years but already has some renegotiation activity recorded.  
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Contract J is a relationship with a high level of alignment (IFA < 1.63) but has 
the lowest index of contractual alliance success in the eleven contracts provided 
for the pilot study, with CAS = 1. The qualitative phase of the analysis allowed 
the collection of additional information from executives familiar with the unique 
circumstances and context of this CA that may explain the reasons for the 
conflict.  
Table 39 Quantitative Results of Contracts in Conflictive Scenario  
CONTRACT 
ACTUAL-
SLA 
USER-
SLA 
PROVIDER-
SLA 
IFA  
COEFFI-
CIENT 
LONGE-
VITY 
RENEGO-
TIATIONS 
FORMA-
LITY 
CAS 
INDE
X 
SCENA-
RIO 
J 0.11 0.63 0.79 1.54 2.00 1.00 1 1 Conflicting 
Programme Manager PMJ for Contract J has some reasonable explanations for 
the renegotiation event in the short life of the contract.  According to PMJ there 
was an acquisition transaction in the near past. User J used to be an 
independent automaker and merged three years ago with another global player.  
The parent company of User J is in difficult financial strides and is trying to 
reduce costs and increase sales at any cost. User J shows a better than 
average financial situation for a company in the automotive sector. So it is 
expected that after the renegotiations are completed and the new spin-off or 
selling of the company happens the terms of the relationship will be more 
stable. That is the expectation from the PMJ: 
 
Right now we are not doing much to support the lack of cash in our 
user’s coffers since we have our own requirements for lower 
accounts receivables. In that sense you could understand the bad 
metrics we got to align with our user’s metrics and with our own 
targets. In fact if you look at the metrics and how operational they 
are, there seems to be an opportunity to have a conversation with 
somebody higher up.  
Table 40 Contractual SLAs and Financial Objectives for User J 
FINANCIAL INDICATORS                   
User J 
REVENUE 
GROWTH 
% EBITDA / SALES 
DAYS IN 
INVENTORY 
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Stated Goal Y2009 7.30% 10.60% 41 
Current Performance                       
(End Q4 2009) 
6.40% 9.80% 94 
Performance Gap 0.90% 0.80% (53.00) 
Normalised Gap 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Delivery 0.66 0.00 0.66 
EDI Compliance 0.66 0.99 0.00 
Aged Receivable 0.66 0.33 0.99 
USER-SLA Coefficient 0.12 0.31 0.20 
 
Table 41 Contract’s SLAs with User J 
USER PROVIDER SERVICE INDICATOR PERFORMANCE TARGET 
User J Forwarding, Freight, Package Delivery 96% 
User J Forwarding, Freight, Package Delivery 98% 
User J Forwarding, Freight, Package Aged Receivables 90%  $$ <45 Days 
User J Forwarding, Freight, Package Claims Ratio 
1/700 claim paid/shipment 
handled 
User J Forwarding, Freight, Package Invoicing Accuracy 95% 
User J Forwarding, Freight, Package EDI Compliance 80% 
User J Forwarding, Freight, Package Operating Ratio Variable 
The analysis of the interviews and the additional data show that User J is 
experiencing business issues that may render it impossible to run the analytical 
tests designed in the quantitative section of this pilot with confidence.  It is 
important, however, to document the results of this contract since it is very likely 
that the full study will encounter users and contracts with similar profiles.  
5.4.3 The Inconclusive Scenario 
The inconclusive scenario includes contractual alliances that do not fit the 
behavioural prediction in terms of contract success and/or coefficients of 
alignment.  In this category, there are three relationships whose contracts 
present inconclusive results from the quantitative section of the pilot study. 
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Table 42 Quantitative Results of Contracts in the Inconclusive Scenario 
CONTRACT 
ACTUAL
-SLA 
USER-
SLA 
PROVIDER
-SLA 
IFA 
COEFFI-
CIENT 
LONGE-
VITY 
RENEGO-
TIATIONS 
FORMA-
LITY 
CAS 
INDEX 
SCENARIO 
K 0.25 1.23 1.38 2.87 8.00 3.00 1 5 Inconclusive 
F 4.00 0.76 0.54 5.30 3.00 1.00 1 2 Inconclusive 
G 0.13 0.98 0.70 1.81 2.00 2.00 1 1 Inconclusive 
  
The relationships in the ‘inconclusive’ scenario need to be singly studied as two 
of the three belong to the same industry.  User F and User G, not only operate 
both in the beleaguered automotive sector but they are also interconnected.  
User F is a spin-off of User G and remains as its main supplier for parts and 
components. Both users manage against the same SLAs in their contracts with 
the Provider; the target SLAs for both users also identical.  
Moreover, relationship management for users in the automotive sector is 
specific that the Provider has a specialised team within the Programme 
Management Group to handle the contractual alliances in the sector. 
Programme Management for Users F and G is led by the same PM supported 
by additional staff.  Some of his comments apply for all the users in the vertical, 
but he made some unique remarks considering the special situation of 
Contracts F and G, in the Inconclusive Scenario.   
Given the critical situation of the automotive sector, sometimes 
users walk into a meeting and simply say ‘I need a 2% cost 
reduction across the board’. This measure is outside the 
contract and outside the agreement, but considering the size 
of the revenue we may accept it and it may have 
consequences for the Provider goals, because we really do 
not check that alignment.  (Programme Manager, Automotive 
Sector) 
Table 43 below shows the specific financial objectives of User F and the 
alignment coefficient with the SLAs in Contract F.  The interviews suggest that it 
is important to consider alignment of contractual SLAs indicators in contracts 
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that are more prevalent in the industry where the users operate.  The 
Programme Manager for Automotive Sector offered his point of view on the 
issue of types of industries and types of logistics outsourcing contracts.  
In the pharmaceutical and electronics industry the outsourcing 
contracts tend to be long-term and exclusive and the scope is 
a set of embedded activities within the user’s manufacturing 
and internal operations.  In the automotive and packaged 
goods sector, the contracts are short-term and non-exclusive 
and the nature of activities under contract are more 
transactional in nature, not embedded in the planning of the 
business.  
One explanation to the unpredictable behaviour of these two contracts is that 
during the life of the relationship some SLAs have been added but not on a 
permanent basis. The new SLAs could be added a shipment-by-shipment basis, 
depending on the particular needs of the User at the time.  With this clarification 
it seems relevant to look at the alignment coefficients, and at the indices of 
contractual alliance success considering the perspective of the industry and the 
nature of the services contracted.  
Table 43 Contractual SLAs and Financial Objectives for User F 
FINANCIAL INDICATORS                   
User F 
REVENUE 
GROWTH 
% EBITDA / SALES 
DAYS IN 
INVENTORY 
Stated Goal Y2009 0.00% 11.20% 35 
Current Performance (End Q4 2009) -19.00% -2.30% 48 
Performance Gap 19.00% 13.80% (13.00) 
Normalised Gap 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Delivery Performance 0.66 0.00 0.66 
Claims Ratio 0.66 0.99 0.99 
Aged Receivables 0.66 0.00 0.99 
USER-SLA Alignment Coefficient  0.12 0.45 0.01 
Table 44 below shows the financial objectives of User G and the specific SLAs 
within the contract. When shown the high alignment ACTUAL-SLA and low 
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alignment USER-SLA and PROVIDER-SLA, the reaction from one of the 
analysts in the Automotive Sector of the PMG was: 
How can you plan any alignment with financial goals when you 
have a company with a goal to grow their top-line by 22% in a 
year, and ended up losing 15% of sales, and yet financing users 
for 136 days. It is a miracle they have enough to pay us at the 
end of the month. I don’t think they are too worried about the 
alignment of the contract’s performance metrics.   
Table 44 Contractual SLAs and Financial Objectives for User G 
FINANCIAL INDICATORS                   
User G 
REVENUE 
GROWTH 
% EBITDA / SALES 
DAYS IN 
INVENTORY 
Stated Goal Y2009 22.70% 13.80% 22 
Current Performance (End Q4 2009) -15.20% 11.20% 161 
Performance Gap 37.90% 2.60% (139.00) 
Normalised Gap 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Delivery Performance 0.66 0.00 0.66 
Plant Disruptions 0.33 0.99 0.00 
Aged Receivables 0.66 0.00 0.66 
USER-SLA alignment coefficient 0.20 0.45 0.31 
The last contract in the Inconclusive Scenario is one signed with User K. It is a 
company with relatively high CAS index (the third highest in the pilot contracts) 
but one that also exhibits very low alignment. The low alignment in this contract 
is generated from the fact that they track only two SLAs that are very narrow in 
scope and with limited direct contribution to the financial objectives of the User 
and the Provider.  Given the User’s focus on consumer electronics, their SLAs 
zeroed in speed and transportation transit times.    
Table 28 in section 5.2 calculated the low alignment levels of these two 
indicators with revenue growth, profitability and capital utilisation.  
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Table 45 Contract’s SLAs with User K 
CLIENT                    SCOPE OF SERVICE                    METRIC GOAL 
Telecommunications International Air Freight 
Actual Time of Arrival to 
Freight Available 
8 hours - DFW                        
12 hours - ORD                                          
95% effectiveness 
Electronics International Air Total Transit Time 4 days; not measured 
However once the Programme Manager explained the issue it seems that 
it is worth revising. This is the way PMK refers to the issue:  
The permanent operational and strategic concern for User K is the 
status of their shipments and issues of transit time by lane. It is a 
very operational relationship, but with a solid argumentation on the 
strategic implications of this focus:  
The only reason why I get a phone call from User K is if they need 
me as an internal liaison between them and someone in the front-
line of Service Provider. It’s just to resolve issues. The issue could 
be related to moving the freight, could be about a bill they received 
or any IT issues. I guess that’s why we’re called Programme 
Management! 
According to PMK User K is not very interested in having the Provider 
participating in discussions on the strategic implications of logistics 
performance.  
They don’t expect us to understand their strategy or have a say 
where they go or what to do. They just want us to perform 
according to the operational indicators. We could use our good 
performance in delivering those results to get more business from 
them.  
It also seems that current good financial performance in User K makes them 
less aware of the need of aligning all operational activities and metrics to the 
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overall goals of the company. This is also the case for Companies F and G in 
the automotive sector.  Table 46 shows a very different picture in terms of 
financial performance from the ones in Tables 43 and 44.   
Table 46 Contractual SLAs and Financial Objectives for User K 
FINANCIAL INDICATORS                   
User K 
REVENUE 
GROWTH 
% EBITDA / SALES 
DAYS IN 
INVENTORY 
Stated Goal Y2009 32.20% 14.70% 24 
Current Performance                     
(End Q4 2009) 
25.30% 3.30% 20 
Performance Gap 6.90% 11.40% 4.00 
Normalised Gap 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Time of Arrival of Available Freight 0.66 0.00 0.00 
Total Transit Time 0.33 0.00 0.00 
USER-SLA Alignment Coefficient 0.26 1.00 0.26 
5.5  Conclusions and Implications for the Full Study  
The quantitative pilot study and the qualitative complement provided critical 
input for the full quantitative study. The calculation of the alignment coefficients 
was refined with the results from the quantitative pilot. The pilot also suggested 
changes in the operationalisation of variables that were implemented in the full 
study. One of the suggested changes was getting more granularities in the 
levels of alignment between contractual SLAs and financial objectives. The 
following Chapter describes the modifications as the operationalisation of 
variables for the SEM is explained.   
The qualitative analysis from the interviews with the Programme Managers 
helped formalise the constructs of contractual alliance success and inter-firm 
alignment. Clearly some measures of success derived from the literature were 
challenged by the PMs’ opinions regarding their importance as a proxy of 
success.  The variable ‘renegotiations’ is one of them. This is where some 
Programme Managers accept that too many renegotiations harm long-term 
partnerships. But most of the PMs consider renegotiation a sign of a healthy 
and active relationship.  One issue that arose from the data on renegotiations 
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was the fact that it does not distinguish who initiated the renegotiation effort. 
That fact could be relevant. 
For this research all contractual alliances are operational in nature, so users or 
providers may not perceive the strategic potential of the relationship. That being 
the case, little effort will be allocated towards managing the contractual alliance 
from a strategic perspective, at least until some alarms go off and there is a 
renewed pressure to perform or to align. The alignment to SLAs may be that 
alarm as the use of contractual SLAs is prevalent throughout the life if the 
contractual alliance. They become a form of communication across all echelons 
of the Provider’s and User’s management pyramid.  
The pilot study encountered a connection between the degree of alignment of 
the USER-SLA coefficient and the User’s financial performance. If the User is in 
financial distress they seem to be more interested in aligning everything to their 
financial objectives.  If the User is in relative good financial health, the focus 
turns to excellence in operational performance. There is a need to revise the 
matrix of contribution from operational indicators to financial indicators. Several 
Programme Managers pointed out connections and impacts not previously 
documented. These will clearly impact the way the alignment coefficients 
USER-SLA and PROVIDER-SLA are estimated.  
The perception of the Programme Managers is that as a rule, the Provider’s top 
management is not aware about the alignment of the contract’s SLAs and their 
own financial objectives. The perception is that they are focused on getting the 
business and the revenues from Users. This is a reality despite the fact that 
within the Strategy Group there is a concern about the contract’s impact on new 
investments and fixed costs.  Programme Managers may not be equipped or 
interested in having a strategic conversation with Users and the Providers top 
management, but they suspect that people in the Business Development group 
are not either.  
The interviews suggested that it is important to consider alignment of 
contractual SLAs based on in two types of services, which are closely related to 
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the industry where the user operates.  Rick, Programme Manager for the whole 
Automotive Sector offered this point of view on the issue of types of industries 
and types of logistics outsourcing contracts.  
In the pharmaceutical and electronics industry the outsourcing 
contracts tend to be long-term and exclusive and the scope is a 
set of embedded activities within the user’s manufacturing and 
internal operations.  In the automotive and packaged goods 
sector, the contracts are short-term and non-exclusive and the 
nature of activities under contract are more transactional in 
nature, not embedded in the planning of the business.  
With this clarification it seems relevant to look at the inter-firm alignment (IFA) 
coefficient and the contractual alliance success indices with a fresh look.  
At the end of the pilot study phase there was a scheduled meeting with the key 
sponsors of the research at the Provider. They not only embraced the initial 
results but also granted access to the requested set of contracts to be used in 
the main quantitative study. The set contains 138 contracts in addition to the 
initial 11. They provide data and contractual SLAs for the years 2010 and 2011 
which becomes the sample size of the full quantitative study.  
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6 QUANTITATIVE RESULTS OF FULL STUDY 
6.1 Structural Equation Modelling  
This Chapter describes the preparation and results of the full quantitative study. 
The full study measures the proposed research model using statistical 
techniques for data analysis and hypotheses testing. The process and results 
summarised in this Chapter have benefited form suggestions derived from the 
pilot study and the qualitative analysis. The data sources for the full study 
include performance indicators and behavioural data from 149 contractual 
alliances between Provider and Users.  
Eight research hypotheses derived from the literature (presented in Chapter 3) 
will be tested simultaneously using structural equation modelling for the 
quantitative analysis. The quantitative model follows the theoretical and 
research models introduced in chapters 3 and 4, respectively. Section 4.4 
discussed the rational for selecting structural equation modelling (SEM) as the 
ideal statistical method to test this particular set of hypotheses. SEM is an ideal 
and mature statistical method (Mueller, 1997) for data analysis. It is also useful 
when investigating theory-derived causal hypotheses, commensurate with a 
post-positivist philosophical stand. 
A structural equation model consists of a set of linear equations that 
simultaneously test two or more relationships amongst observable (manifest) 
and unobservable (latent) variables. SEM has the unique ability to examine a 
series of interdependent relationships (where an endogenous variable becomes 
exogenous and predicts another endogenous variable within the same 
analysis), whilst also analysing multiple dependent variables (Shook et al., 
2004). The SEM method is suited for confirmatory purposes of cause-and-effect 
models by assessing in a quantitative way relationships amongst variables.  
SEM is also known as analysis of covariance structures or causal modelling, 
which permits its use in the prediction of latent variables.   
The co-variance-based SEM is used as a regression model that is more 
suitable for confirmatory and explanatory efforts rather than exploratory 
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modelling16. In management sciences it is considered the preeminent 
multivariate method of data analysis (Marcoulides and Hershberger, 1997; 
Mulaik, 1990). This is because it incorporates a set of data analysis tools to test 
theoretically derived and a priori specified causal hypotheses.  
The full quantitative analysis was conducted using a model of structural 
equations to simultaneously establish bivariate correlations (for individual 
hypotheses) and the overall fit of the estimated model versus existing data.  The 
SEM output calculates the goodness-of-fit of the estimated model to validate the 
theoretical model.  The bivariate correlations in the SEM model estimates the 
regression weights and the appropriate sign for individually theorised 
hypotheses (see them in Table 8).  
The process to conduct the full quantitative study included data preparation, 
specification of the structural and measurement models, final model 
identification and testing of results (Mueller, 1997).  The model testing section 
includes the hypothesised model’s goodness-of-fit indices and the estimated 
parameters with their significance tests. This chapter summarises the output 
results generated from AMOS 19.0, which is the statistical software used to 
create the model and run the SEM analysis17. The structure of this chapter 
strictly follows the guidelines and recommendations for reporting SEM research 
by Schumacker and Lomax (2010).  The discussion of the results in the context 
of the proposed management research will be reported in Chapter 7. 
                                            
16
 SEM as a system of independent and response variables is based on the OLS regression or canonical 
correlation.  An alternative method is the PLS regression that is typically used in exploratory modeling.  
PLS is less than satisfactory as an explanatory technique because it is low in power to filter out variables 
of minor causal importance (Garson, 2012) 
17
 It is the statistical package from IBM-SPSS available by Cranfield School of Management and with 
which the researcher was most experienced. Alternative packages include LISREL, SAS’s Proc Calis, 
SmartPLS, among others.  
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6.2 Data Preparation 
6.2.1  Data Source and Variables 
The results from the quantitative pilot study and qualitative study confirmed the 
feasibility of the calculations of the inter-firm alignment coefficient (IFA) by 
measuring Euclidean distances between two constructs as advocated by 
Venkatraman and Prescott (1990). The pilot study also confirmed the ability to 
operationalise a measurement for contractual alliance success (CAS) based on 
behavioural information from each contract. The results confirmed that the 
theoretical constructs could be operationalised into variables with existing data. 
It should be noted, however, that the results also, indicated the need to refine 
some constructs and to gather additional information about the contracts prior to 
conducting the full quantitative study using structural equation models.  
The hypothesised model states that alignment of three inter-firm performance 
measurement systems at play in a contractual alliance18 is positively correlated 
to contractual alliance success (CAS). Contractual alliance success was defined 
by the formality of an active relationship, its longevity and stability, and the 
relative profitability of the relationship for both user and provider.  The 
theoretical base of the hypothesised causality between alignment and success 
in inter-firm relationships was fully discussed in Chapter 3. The research 
methodology and the operationalisation of constructs were presented in 
Chapter 4. The results of the pilot tests are summarised in Chapter 5.  
As stated in Chapter 4, data for the analysis comes from two sources. The 
primary source is a sample of logistics outsourcing contracts between one 
Provider and its Users. The secondary data for the analysis comes from publicly 
available financial performance indicators of the firms involved in the contracts. 
For the purpose of this research and its hypotheses the unit of analysis is the 
“contract” akin to the relationship.   
                                            
18
 The three systems include 1) the contract’s service level agreements or SLAs; 2) the user’s financial 
objectives; and 3) the provider’s financial objectives 
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Table 47 below presents a description of the variables available for the full 
statistical analysis from the primary data source.  Variables were categorised in 
three groups:  
- The first group contains “raw variables” indicating those that  were used 
as presented by the Provider;  
- The second group contains “calculated variables” which were computed 
through arithmetic manipulation of raw variables;  
- The third group contains “multivariate variables” where new variables 
were generated using inferential statistics processes to determine their 
values. These “multivariate variables” will later become latent or 
unobserved variables in the SEM analysis.  
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Table 47 Variables
19
 Used in Full Quantitative Study 
VARIABLE TYPE SCALE DESCRIPTION 
1. REVENUE Raw variable Numerical  
This variable serves as an input to calculate other variables that will go in the SEM analysis. Revenue will be 
used to measure RELATIVE PROFITABILITY as a determinant of CAS. 
2. SGA-TOTAL  Raw variable Numerical 
This variable serves as an input to calculate other variables that will go in the SEM analysis. SGA will be used 
to measures RELATIVE PROFITABILITY as a determinant of CAS. 
3. CONTRACT- 
VALUE 
Raw variable Numerical  
Reflects the annual amount of services procured by the User from the Provider. In conjunction with 
REVENUE and SGA TOTAL help quantify the RELATIVE PROFITABILITY variable, a determinant of CAS.  
4. KPI-SLA Raw variable Numerical 
Number of key operational performance indicators to govern the scope of the CA between User and Provider. 
Specific KPIs form the SLAs of the contract. 
5. ACTIVE Raw variable Binary  
The 1/0 values reflect the fact that the relationship is active or not. An active relationship is described as one 
where the User has utilised the services of the PROVIDER at least once in the last year.  
6. SIGNED Raw variable Binary 
The 1/0 values reflect the fact that the User-Provider relationship is governed by a written signed contract, 
making the SLAs legally binding.  
7. RENEGOTIATIONS Raw variable Numerical  
This variable represents the stability of the contractual alliance for Users and Provider as the number of 
renegotiations that have taken place during the length of the relationship. 
8. LONGEVITY Raw variable Numerical  
This variable represents the stability of the relationship measured by the number of years the User has been 
in a contractual alliance relationship with the Provider.  
9. REVENUE 
GROWTH 
Raw variable Numerical  
This variable calculates the current revenue growth rate of each one of the firms in the analysis and the gap 
between current growth and expected growth. 
10. PROFITABILITY Raw variable Numerical  
This variable calculates each firm’s current profitability (EBITDA/REVENUE) and the gap between current 
profitability rate and expected profitability. 
                                            
19
 All these variables are theory derived from the literature review on inter-firm relationships, performance measurement systems and strategic alignment.  
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11. WORKING 
CAPITAL 
Raw variable Numerical  
This variable calculates each firm’s current days in cash-to-cash cycles as a measure of working capital 
utilisation) and the gap between current C2C and expected C2C. 
12. FIXED ASSET 
UTILISATION 
Raw variable Numerical  
This variable calculates the current fixed asset utilisation of each one of the firms in the analysis and the gap 
between current growth and expected growth. 
13. ACTUAL-SLA  
Calculated 
variable 
Numerical 
This variable represents the coefficient of alignment between the target levels of the contract’s SLAs and the 
actual values of those SLAs during the year of analysis. The greater the value, the lower the alignment 
between contracted and actual values. Perfect alignment is a perfect match between targets and actuals thus 
ACTUAL-SLA= 0.  
14. USER-SLA 
Calculated 
variable 
Numerical  
This variable represents the coefficient of alignment between the target levels of the contract’s SLAs and the 
User’s financial objectives. The greater the value, the lower the alignment between contracted SLAs and 
User’s financial objectives. Perfect alignment is a perfect match between SLAs and financial objectives thus 
USER-SLA= 0. 
15. PROVIDER-SLA 
Calculated 
variable 
Numerical  
This variable represents the coefficient of alignment between the target levels of the contract’s SLAs and the 
Provider’s financial objectives. The greater the value, the lower the alignment between contracted SLAs and 
Provider’s financial objectives. Perfect alignment is a perfect match between SLAs and financial objectives 
thus PROVIDER-SLA= 0. 
16. FORMALITY 
Calculated 
variable 
Numerical  
This variable is a combination of two determinant of contractual alliance success: active relationship and a 
signed Contract that seals the agreement. 
17. RELATIVE 
PROFITABILITY 
Calculated 
variable 
Numerical Indicates a ratio between the CONTRACT VALUE and Provider’s REVENUE and User’s SGA TOTAL.  
18. INTER-FIRM 
ALIGNMENT 
COEFFICIENT 
(IFA) 
Latent 
Multivariate 
Numerical 
This variable will capture all the contributions to alignment from the three sources of alignment described 
above (ACTUAL-SLA; USER-SLA; PROVIDER-SLA)  
19. CONTRACTUAL 
ALLIANCE 
SUCCESS (CAS) 
Latent 
Multivariate 
Numerical  
This variable will be estimated from the data regarding determinants of contractual alliance success: 
FORMALITY; LONGEVITY; RENEGOTIATIONS; RELATIVE PROFITABILITY. 
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6.2.2  Descriptive Statistics, Missing Data and Sample Size 
Descriptive statistics of the raw and calculated variables provide insight into the 
information they represent. Not every single raw variable was included in the 
analysis as some were compounded into a calculated variable or simply did not 
fit into the hypothesised and later specified model.   
Table 48 below summarises basic descriptive statistics of the variables. This 
includes observations per variable, mean value, range and standard deviation.  
Some missing data was encountered in the CONTRACT-VALUE and SGA-
TOTAL variables. Even though it was not a significant problem in this database, 
one of AMOS 19.0 functionality is to generate additional values for missing data 
using maximum likelihood (ML) estimates and not standard methods such as 
maximum or mean value replacements (Blunch, 2008). 
Regarding outliers, the database contains six atypical points, identified as 
observations farthest from the centroid, calculated using Mahalanobis 
distances.  These points correspond to observations number 23, 25, 37, 40, 82, 
and 112.  In a first model estimation these atypical values were eliminated, for a 
new sample size of 143, and the model was evaluated in terms of fit. However 
when comparing this model with the final measured one, the elimination of 
outliers did not improve the goodness-of-fit indicators. A decision was made to 
maintain all 149 observations in the final estimated model.  
Guidelines recommend (Blunch, 2008; Schumacker and Lomax, 2004) at least 
10 observations for each exogenous variables in the SEM analysis. Based on 
that consideration the sample size of 149 was more than adequate for the SEM 
assumptions, and not so large as to overestimate goodness-of-fit for the model 
(Schermelleh-Engel et al., 2003b).   
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Table 48 Descriptive Statistics for Selected Raw and Calculated Variables 
 Variable obs. Mean Max min s.d. 
R
A
W
  V
A
R
IA
B
LE
S
 
REVENUE 145 40,397,831,790.59 785,498,000,000.00 50,000,000.00 85,632,636,485.88 
SGA TOTAL  141 7,598,050,485.17 186,948,524,000.00 27,400,000.00 18,888,873,565.67 
CONTRACT VALUE 134 34,979,998.66 284,225,891.26 6,818.42 47,790,071.30 
ACTIVE 149 0.90 1.00 0.00 0.29 
LONGEVITY 149 9.81 50.00 0.00 7.39 
CONTRACT-SIGNED 149 0.81 1.00 0.00 0.39 
RENEGOTIATIONS 148 2.49 20.00 0.00 2.98 
C
A
LC
U
LA
T
E
D
 
V
A
R
IA
B
LE
S
 
RELATIVE PROFITABILITY-USER 144 0.02 0.46 0.00 0.05 
RELATIVE PROFITABILITY- PROVIDER 149 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 
ACTUALS-SLA 148 0.11 4.00 0.00 0.36 
USER-SLA  149 1.94 8.87 1.65 0.64 
PROVIDER-SLA  149 1.67 1.92 1.57 0.07 
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6.2.3  Data Transformations to Improve Normality 
Most statistical tests use assumptions of normality in order to analyse specific 
details in the data and build representative models of reality. In light of that, it is 
always desirable to work with variables that are normally distributed. However 
considering the nature of this research, the single source of the data, and the 
computations associated with calculated variables, non-normality and skewness 
were expected.  Fortunately SEM techniques do not use normality as an 
assumption for the analysis (Blunch, 2008).  This was a consideration in the 
selection of SEM as the analytical tool for the research.  Nonetheless, it is a 
recommended step in data preparation to attempt to improve non-normality 
conditions by different data transformation techniques.   
During the analysis, the input variables were highly skewed and showed 
elevated kurtosis indices of the distribution. Because of that, data 
transformation was justified and more normality was achieved by the following 
procedures:  
i. Normalising the variable RENEGOTIATIONS 
ii. Using the square root (SQRT) of the variables RELATIVE-
PROFITABILITY, LONGEVITY, ACTUALS-SLA, PROVIDER-SLA, and 
USER-SLA. 
iii. Doubling the values of variable FORMALITY   
For the purpose of clarity, from this point forward the names of the variables will 
remain the same, although it needs to be clear that they have been transformed 
as input into the model. Appendix C shows the original variables, the 
transformed variables and the assessment for normality of the transformed 
variables showing skewness, kurtosis and critical ratios for each variable.   
6.2.4 Measurement level and properties of the variables 
Once the variables were transformed they were ready to be loaded into AMOS 
to specify, identify, estimate, and test the structural equations that will confirm 
the proposed pathways and correlations amongst variables.  Within SEM 
CHAPTER 6 QUALITATIVE RESULTS OF FULL STUDY 
204 
 
methods, AMOS uses a unique typology to describe variables included in the 
model. It is critical however, to be aware that the scope of SEM is more general 
than that of a regression. The key distinction is that a variable can act as both 
independent and dependent variable, depending on the path of the model. Thus 
is preferable not to use the traditional regression notation but to follow SEM’s 
particular terminology. 
Observed Variables:  These are the measured variables, also called 
manifest variables or indicators. In AMOS they are represented by 
rectangles or squares.  
Unobserved Variables:  These are factors that have two or more 
indicators, also called latent variables, or constructs.  Unobserved 
variables are represented by circles or ovals in path diagrams. In the 
hypothesised model the constructs INTER-FIRM ALIGNMENT 
COEFFICIENT and CONTRACTUAL ALLIANCE SUCCESS are the 
unobserved variables, as well as the measurement errors of each one of 
the proposed variables.  
Endogenous Variables: When building the specified model, the 
researcher uses two different kinds of variables, 
namely exogenous and endogenous variables. An endogenous variable 
is one that regresses on another variable, even if this same variable is 
also used as a variable to be regressed on. Endogenous variables are 
recognized in AMOS graphic path analysis as the receivers of an 
arrowhead in the model. 
Exogenous Variables:  In the graphic model specification these variables 
do not have any arrows pointing at them.  In the hypothesised model the 
variable INTER-FIRM ALIGNMENT COEFFICIENT is an exogenous 
unobserved variable, as well as the measurement errors of each one of 
the endogenous variables. Exogenous variables can be recognized in a 
graphical version of the model, as the variables sending out arrowheads, 
denoting which variable it is predicting them. In summary the distinction 
CHAPTER 6 QUALITATIVE RESULTS OF FULL STUDY 
205 
 
between these two types of variables is whether the variable regresses 
on another variable or not. 
Table 49 Summary of Variables 
Number of Variables in the 
Hypothesised Model = 17 
Endogenous20 = 8 Exogenous21 = 9 
 
Observed22 = 7 
USER-SLA 
ACTUAL-SLA 
PROVIDER-SLA 
LONGEVITY 
FORMALITY 
RELATIVE PROFITABILITY 
RENEGOTIATIONS 
 
Unobserved23 = 17 
CONTRACTUAL ALLIANCE 
SUCCESS 
(CAS) 
INTER-FIRM ALIGNMENT COEFFICIENT 
e1 
e2 
e3 
e5 
e4 
e12 
e10 
e9 
Table 49, above, summarises all variables in the hypothesised model by their 
unique typology. The input matrix into AMOS was composed of two (2) latent 
unobserved variables: INTER-FIRM ALIGNMENT COEFFICIENT and 
CONTRACTUAL ALLIANCE SUCCESS, plus 8 unobserved variables from the 
error in each one of the endogenous variables.  
Typical regression models require that there should not be any correlation 
amongst observed variables (no multicollinearity). One additional reason to use 
SEM is that lack of multicollinearity is not a required assumption therefore the 
                                            
20
 This is a particular notation of AMOS for variables that are dependent variables also called mediating 
or downstream variables. For purposes of the hypothesized model “CAS” is the latent endogenous 
variable, being predicted by the interactions of the exogenous and observed variables.   
21
 This is a particular notation of AMOS for independent variables, which are assumed to be measured 
without error. These variables are also called upstream variables.  
22
 Observed variables, also called manifest variables, are directly measured by researchers  
23
 Unobserved variables, also known as latent variables, are not measured directly but are inferred by 
the relationships or correlations amongst measured variables in the analysis.  
CHAPTER 6 QUALITATIVE RESULTS OF FULL STUDY 
206 
 
variables were not treated to eliminate it. Appendix 3 offers the full database as 
loaded into AMOS, including the variables before and after transformation 
6.2.5  Validity of Latent Variables (Constructs) 
The effectiveness of SEM analysis and the explanatory power of the model 
depend heavily on measurement issues. This research involves cross-sectional 
data with very solid theoretical underpinnings to hypothesise causal inferences. 
During the course of data preparation and analysis, several transformations 
were conducted to improve normality in the data, allowed when strong 
theoretical foundation suggests keeping the original model specification. This 
section also provided reflective loadings for the latent variables, and the 
assessment of reliability, convergent and discriminant validity.  
The results of the SEM analysis rely on the ability of the latent variables to 
describe and explain the concepts embedded in the variables. This includes 
success of the contractual relationship and alignment of performance 
measurement systems. It is critical to assess the overall validity of the 
measures representing the constructs of interest (Carmines and Zeller, 1979), 
before presenting the results of the structural relationships between the latent 
variables.  The validity of the latent variables is ensured when the measures 
pass for tests:  content validity, unidimensionality, reliability and statistical 
validity.  
6.2.5.1 Content Validity  
Quantitative validity is irrelevant if there are not conceptual and theoretical 
arguments supporting the operationalisation of the construct.  Content validity is 
a precursor of other validity tests because gives sense to select the 
components and to the operations required to calculate measures that 
represent the domain of the construct (Viswanathan, 2005).   
The content validity of the two latent variables in this research, INTER-FIRM 
ALIGNMENT and CONTRACTUAL ALLIANCE SUCCESS, is assessed on 
theoretical and methodological grounds rather than just statistical testing  
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(Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer, 2001).  Content validity requires evaluating 
the correspondence amongst the components selected to become part of the 
final operationalised construct and its conceptual definition (Anderson et al., 
2006).  
Chapters 3 and 4 provided an extensive description of theoretical basis for 
construct derivation and the operations amongst components to measure each 
one of the unobserved variables in the study.  Chapter 5 presented all data 
sources and pilot studies used to measure constructs and the validation with 
industry and academic experts to ensure content validity prior to approaching 
the full quantitative study presented in this chapter.   
Based on the results of both quantitative and qualitative pilot studies, minor 
adjustments were made in terms of the operationalisation of the measures but 
within the initial theoretical framework and the appropriate management 
practice validation.  We argue, then, that both latent variables developed for this 
research satisfy the conditions for content validity. 
6.2.5.2 Unidimensionality, Convergent Validity and Composite Reliability 
This section provides a discussion of direct, indirect and total effects of the 
independent variables on the latent constructs, including unidimensionality. 
Unidimensionality describes the property of a measurement that refers to a 
single trait or concept, underlying the construct. There are two conditions for 
establishing unidimensionality (O'Leary-Kelly and J Vokurka, 1998) 1) that the 
observed measures must be significantly associated with the underlying latent 
variable (unobserved construct), and 2) that the observed measures are 
associated with one and only one latent variable.  In theory confirmation 
studies, unidimensionality is assessed through confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA) and in exploratory studies through exploratory factor analysis (EFA) 
(Pedhazur and Schmelkin, 1991). Considering the confirmatory nature of this 
research CFA was selected as the method for construct unidimensionality, as 
the proposed measurement model was specified a priori. 
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Confirmatory factor analyses for both latent variables were conducted using 
AMOS 19.0 with Maximum Likelihood estimates. The INTER-FIRM 
ALIGNMENT construct exhibits unidimensionality as shown by the results from 
the CFA displayed in Table 50. The factor loading of the three items composing 
the scale was statistically significant at p<.002 and their standardised values are 
0.895 for PROVIDER-SLA (alignment between provider’s financial objectives 
and contract’s SLAs); 0.711 for USER-SLA (alignment between User’s financial 
objectives and contract’s SLAs); and 0.284 for ACTUAL-SLA (alignment 
between contract’s target SLAs and actual SLAs).   
The first two estimates exceed the recommended lower value of 0.5 (Anderson 
et al., 2006). The model fit indices suggest good fit considering CMIN/DF The 
ratio of  2 to df ≤ 3 is useful to assess acceptable fit since data are continuous. 
The rest of the goodness-of-fit ratios are larger than the 0.95 threshold. Figure 
12 below presents the standardised factor loading for the inter-firm alignment 
coefficient. 
 
Figure 13 Standardised Factor Loading for IFA 
Table 50 Regression Weights and Standardised Regression Weights for IFA 
Regression Weights:                                                                                         
(Group 1 – Default model) 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
USER-SLA <--- IFA 1.00 
    
ACTUAL-SLA <--- IFA .382 .124 3.093 .002 
 
 
 
PROVIDER-SLA 
ACTUAL-SLA 
USER-SLA 
 e3 
 e2 
 e1 
.80 
.08 
.51 
 
 
 
 
INTER-FIRM 
ALIGNMENT 
COEFFICIENT 
0.90 
0.28 
.71 
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PROVIDER-SLA <--- IFA 1.490 .478 3.118 .002 
 
Standardised Regression Weights:                                                                                                      
(Group 1 – Default model) 
Estimate 
USER-SLA <--- IFA .711 
ACTUALS-SLA <--- IFA .284 
PROVIDER-SLA <--- IFA .895 
The unidimensionality analysis of the construct CONTRACTUAL ALLIANCE 
SUCCESS follows the same methodology, using CFA in AMOS 19.0.  
Reviewing the standardised regression weights, LONGEVITY has the highest 
correlation with CONTRACTUAL ALLIANCE SUCCESS. This is followed by 
RENEGOTIATIONS.  The lowest correlation to success was RELATIVE 
PROFITABILITY of the contract, followed by the FORMALITY of the 
relationship.  The factor loadings of the component measures of the latent 
variable are significant with a confidence level > 93%.   
Table 51 Regression Weights and Standardize Regression Weights in CAS 
Regression Weights:                                                               
(Group number 1 - Default model) 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
LONGEVITY <--- CAS 1.00     
RELATIVE PROFITABILITY <--- CAS .039 .022 1.766 .077  
FORMALITY <--- CAS .344 .169 2.036 .042  
RENEGOTIATIONS <--- CAS .119 .055 2.153 .031  
Standardised Regression Weights:                                                                                                                  
(Group number 1 - Default model) 
Estimate 
LONGEVITY <--- CAS .606 
RELATIVE PROFITABILITY <--- CAS .237 
FORMALITY <--- CAS .296 
RENEGOTIATIONS <--- CAS .527 
Chi-square = 5,473 with 2 degrees of freedom with 93.5% of confidence. The 
ratio of  2 to df ≤ 3 is a relative value of chi-square is an index of how much of 
the fit of data to model has been reduced by dropping one or more paths.  
A common rule of thumb suggests that if the value is greater than 3 the model 
has dropped too many paths, meaning that CONTRACTUAL ALLIANCE 
SUCCESS is explained by more measures than LONGEVITY, FORMALITY,  
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RELATIVE PROFITABILITY, and RENEGOTIATIONS.  CMIN/DF is equal to = 
2.737. This figure is high considering the saturated model, but less than 50% of 
the worst possible fit represented by the Independence model. These values 
are significant with a 93.5% of confidence. 
RMSEA, is an useful goodness-of-fit measurement. It shows the adequate fit 
value of 0.108. This suggests a reasonable fit (based on Browne et al., (1993) 
threshold of <.10) where the fitness may improve as RMSEA improves when 
the complexity of the model is greater as in the overall SEM analysis.  
Table 52 Goodness-of-Fit Measurements 
CMIN 
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF 
Default model 12 5.473 2 .065 2.737 
Saturated model 14 .000 0   
Independence model 8 32.263 6 .000 5.377 
RMSEA 
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE 
Default model .108 .000 .222 .134 
Independence model .172 .117 .232 .000 
BASELINE COMPARISONS 
 
LONGEVITY 
 
e5 
0, .75 
0.53 
0.02 
1.00 
2.94 
1 
CONTRACTUAL 
ALLIANCE 
SUCCESS 
(CAS) INDEX 
FORMALITY 
 
e12 
RELATIVE PROFITABILITY 
 
e10 
RENEGOTIATIONS 
 
e9 
1 
1 
1 
0.01 
2.62 
0.11 
0.12 
0.36 
0.04 
0.16 
Figure 14 Unstandardized Factor Loading For CAS Measurement Model 
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Model 
NFI 
Delta1 
RFI 
rho1 
IFI 
Delta2 
TLI 
rho2 
CFI 
Default model .830 .491 .885 .603 .868 
Saturated model 1.000  1.000  1.000 
Independence model .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
6.2.5.3 Reliability of Measurements for Composite Latent Variables  
The reliability assessment describes the degree of consistency between 
multiple measurements of the latent construct (Anderson et al., 2006).  
Reliability indicates the amount of random error presented in a measurement 
scale; lower errors translate in higher probability that the conclusions about 
relationships between constructs are correct.  
Cronbach's alpha is the most commonly used statistic for reporting test 
reliability based on item variances. However, the coefficient has several 
limitations including the assumption of equal contribution of all items to reliability 
(Bollen and Lennox, 1991). A better choice for assessing reliability is 
Composite Reliability, which draws on the standardize loadings and 
measurement error for each item that is part of a composite variable.  
Composite reliability is estimated using equation 6 below. Based on Fornell and 
Larcker (1981) an accepted threshold for composite reliability is 0.70, with each 
indicator’s reliability above 0.50 (Shook et al., 2004). 
Equation 6 Formulation of Composite Reliability 
 
 
Considering the standardised regression weights for the latent variable IFA 
(reported in Table 52), and the error variances presented in Table 53 below, the 
composite reliability is .9720 well above the recommended threshold.  
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Table 53 Error Variances for Item Loadings in Composite Variable: IFA 
 Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
IFA .032 .012 2.710 .007  
e1 .031 .011 2.960 .003  
e2 .054 .006 8.377 ***  
e3 .018 .022 .793 .428  
The calculation of composite reliability for the latent variable CAS uses 
standardised regression weights of each item in the composite (presented in 
Table 52) and the error variances for item loadings in Table 54 below. The 
value of composite reliability is 0.68 below 0.7. This suggests that the variable 
may be a formative one rather than a reflective variable. Nonetheless, given the 
strong theoretical support for the composite variable, it will be part of the final 
model specification and estimation.   
Table 54 Error Variances for Item Loadings in Composite Variable: CAS 
 Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
Success .434 .228 1.908 .056  
e5 .749 .219 3.417 ***  
e12 .532 .068 7.823 ***  
e10 .011 .001 8.132 ***  
e9 .016 .003 4.672 ***  
6.3 Model Specification 
In the construction of structural equation models, model specification means the 
formal description of the model to be tested.  Fundamentally, it presents the 
suggested path analysis for the two unobserved variables (CAS). It also 
specifies the pattern by which IFA (in this particular case the exogenous latent 
variable) influences (i.e. cause) changes in the values of CAS (the endogenous 
latent variable in the model).  The rationale and value of using SEM for these 
research questions in the context of the hypothesised theoretical model, was 
described in Chapter 4 in the quantitative methods section. 
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The measurement model defines relations between the observed and the 
unobserved variables. In other words it provides the link between scores on a 
measuring instrument and the underlying constructs they are design to 
measure. The measurement model, then, represented the CFA models 
described for each one of the latent variables of INTER-FIRM ALIGNMENT 
(IFA) and CONTRACTUAL ALLIANCE SUCCESS (CAS) and it specifies the 
pattern by which each measure loads on a particular factor, and analysed in 
Section 6.2.  
Figure 14 presents the specified structural model, in conjunction with the 
measurement model, which explores the causal relationship between 
contractual alliance success and the degree of alignment amongst performance 
measurement systems of the contract’s SLAs and those of the User and 
PROVIDER involved in the relationship.   
The SEM analysis was conducted using AMOS 19.0 (Arbuckle, 2011). It was 
conducted on the three variables that measure alignment of measurement 
systems (Venkatraman, 1989; Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986) and the 
four variables that measure alliance success (Ariño, 2003; Lambe et al., 2002; 
Cravens et al., 2000). Ovals represent latent variables (unobserved) and 
rectangles represent measured (observed) variables.   
During the specification process parameters are determined to be free or fixed. 
Fixed parameters are not estimated from the data and are typically fixed at zero 
(indicating no relationship between variables). Free pathways are estimated 
from the observed data and are regarded, from the theoretical model, to be non-
zero.  This is the contribution of the research when considering the 
hypothesised causal relationship between IFA and CAS .The indication of free 
and fixed parameters is extremely important because it determines which 
parameters will be used to compare the hypothesised diagram with the sample 
population variance and covariance matrix in testing the fit of the model during 
the Model Testing phase.  
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Figure 15 Specification for Default Model with Second-Order Structure for Residual Errors 
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Chapters 2 and 3 have described the theoretical basis for the measurement and 
structural models, as well as the description of all available data collected from 
external sources, their operationalisation into the variables and constructs and 
the treatment of data prior to loading it in AMOS for the SEM analysis.  
The conceptualised model tests the causal relationship between alignment of 
inter-firm performance measurement systems and contractual alliance success. 
However, the IFA is really the misalignment or the distance between two 
constructs. Based on this, we expect that the causal relationship will be inverse 
(negative sign in the estimator between IFA --- > CAS) as theoretical models 
hypothesised that lack of goal alignment amongst alliance members will be 
detrimental to the success of the relationship.  The expected magnitude of the 
parameter estimates should be relatively low, as this relationship is a new and 
unobserved cause of relationship failure.  It seems, from the results of the 
literature review in Chapter 2 that many other obvious and major factors have 
already been described, tested and probably corrected over time.  
Section 6.2 in this Chapter provided a description of every free parameter in the 
SEM model that need to be estimated. Chapter 2 presented other alternative 
parameters not included in this analysis. One extremely important caveat in 
working with SEM is to always tally the number of parameters in the model to 
be estimated prior to running the analyses. This will be critical to know if the 
model to be tested is statistically identified (MacCallum, 1995). In the SEM 
analysis for this research there are 22 different parameters to be estimated (32 
in total – 10 parameters fixed to 1.0 in the regressions) summarised in Table 55 
below. 
Table 55 Parameter Summary for Default Model 
 WEIGHTS COVARIANCES VARIANCES MEANS INTERCEPTS TOTAL 
Fixed 10 0 0 0 0 10 
Labelled 6 0 0 0 0 22 
Unlabelled 0 0 9 0 7 0 
Total 16 0 9 0 7 32 
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6.4 Model Identification 
Research should always specify a set of theoretically plausible models in order 
to assess whether the hypothesised model is the best of the set of possible 
models.  This research must account for the theoretical reasons for building the 
model as it is. The research design must also take into account the number of 
data points and the number of parameters that the model must estimate to 
identify the model.  
One identified model is one in which a specific parameter value uniquely 
identifies the model, and where no other equivalent formulation can be given by 
a different parameter value. A data point is a variable with observed scores. An 
example of this is “LONGEVITY”, a variable that indicates how old the 
relationship is, measured in years. The parameter is the value of interest, which 
might be a regression coefficient between the exogenous and the endogenous 
variable or the factor loading (regression coefficient between an indicator and its 
factor). If there are fewer data points than the number of estimated parameters, 
the resulting model is "unidentified", since there are too few reference points to 
account for all the variance in the model. The solution is to constrain one of the 
paths to zero, which means that it is no longer part of the model 
An SEM model is identified if the known information available implies that there 
is one “best value” for each parameter in the model whose value is not known.  
It assures that the system of equations has as many “known” as “unknown” 
variables. In SEM, the “knowns” are mostly variances and covariances with the 
measured variables24 (Bollen and Lennox, 1991).  The determination of how 
much data is “known” to work with is compiled by the variances and 
covariances of the observed variables (28 = 7*(7+1)/2) and the means and 
                                            
24
 As Bollen (1991) notes, the parameters of a structural equation model are generally considered 
identified if the researcher can solve the covariance structure equations for the unknown parameters. 
That is, the researcher must express the parameters as independent functions of the elements of the 
covariance matrix. Unfortunately, the covariance structure equation quickly become complex as the 
model grows, making algebraic solution "tedious and error-prone," to use Bollen's words. Researchers 
who adopt this approach must also beware of dependencies concealed within the solution 
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intercepts (7), less the number of distinct parameters to be estimated, the 
default model is an overidentified model with 13 degrees of freedom (See Table 
56). AMOS uses covariance matrices throughout the analyses. This calculation 
follows the ‘rank and order condition25’ for model identification (Bollen and 
Lennox, 1991; Chen et al., 2008). 
Table 56 Output with Computation of Degrees of Freedom (Default Model) 
Number of distinct sample moments: 35 
Number of distinct parameters to be estimated: 22 
Degrees of freedom (35 - 22): 13 
When reporting model identification it is worth remarking that no parsimonious26 
models were used to assist with identification. The SEM analysis of the default 
model avoided non-recursive models until identification was assured 
(Schumacker and Lomax, 2010).  
6.5 Model Estimation 
6.5.1 Estimation Method and General Results 
Using Maximum Likelihood estimates the SEM analysis achieved the minimum 
results to be able to calculate the required parameter estimates. The general 
estimation result had a chi-square = 21.488, with 13 degrees of freedom and a 
probability level = .064   
Maximum Likelihood (ML) is deemed an appropriate estimation technique for 
multivariate data with small to moderate sample sizes and produces better 
estimates than other estimation methods such as ADF, CVM or WLS (Finney 
and DiStefano, 2006). The analyses did not generate any Heywood cases 
                                            
25
 The order condition is the state of a set of simultaneous equations in an econometric system such that 
all its parameters may be identified. For an equation in a system of equations to be identified, the 
number of excluded exogenous variables in that equation must be at least as great as the number of 
included endogenous variables, less one. However, a stronger argument is the rank condition which is 
both necessary and sufficient for identification. 
26
 The term parsimony has come to be equated with having relatively few free parameters or relatively 
many degrees of freedom in the factor analysis and SEM literature (Mulaik, 1990). The terms are used 
here in their broader sense to encompass all factors contributing to a model’s degree of falsifiability. 
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(cases with negative variance), no non-positive definite matrices, no non-
convergence problems or inadmissible solutions.  
6.5.2 Software Package for SEM 
For the purposes of this study the SEM method was applied using AMOS 19 
(Analysis of Moments Structures) software from IBM SPSS. AMOS provides 
multiple methods for estimating structural equations models such as maximum 
likelihood (ML), un-weighted least squares, and generalized least squares and 
Bayesian estimation.  One of the key features of AMOS is how it deals with 
missing data. When confronted with missing data AMOS performs state-of-the-
art estimation by full information maximum likelihood instead of relying on ad-
hoc methods like listwise or pairwise deletion or mean imputation (Arbuckle, 
2011). 
6.5.3 Tests of Parameters Estimates 
The first noteworthy feature of the proposed model is the negative relationship 
between CAS and IFA, as illustrated by the statistically significant 
unstandardized regression coefficient of -0.776.  This is conceptually and 
statistically satisfactory.  Conceptually, as discussed in Chapter 3, we theorised 
that lack of alignment (high distance) in the inter-firm performance measures 
would lead to more fragile relationships (low success).   
The following tables analyse the estimated parameters and their significance 
tests using critical ratios and p-values. Table 57 presents the regression 
weights and the estimates, SE, critical ratio and P values for the causal analysis 
between the two latent variables (exogenous and endogenous), as well as for 
each one of the parameters of the structural model. P levels are lower than .1, 
suggesting that all covariances are significant with a minimum 92% of 
confidence level or higher for some estimates.  
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Table 57 Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
CAS <--- IFA -.776 .452 -1.716 .086  
USER-SLA <--- IFA 1.000     
ACTUAL-SLA <--- IFA .386 .125 3.089 .002  
PROVIDER-SLA <--- IFA 1.747 .549 3.184 .001  
LONGEVITY <--- CAS 1.000     
RELATIVE PROFITABILITY <--- CAS .043 .023 1.847 .065  
FORMALITY <--- CAS . 356 .172 2.069 .039  
RENEGOTIATIONS <--- CAS .158 .067 2.344 .019  
Table 58 presents the standardised regression weights by each one of the 
parameters, allowing specific comparison of the relative importance of specific 
observed variables in the behaviour of the latent variables in the default model. 
In this case the estimates report correlations from the individual regression 
models, as oppose to covariances in Table 57.  
Table 58 Standardised Regression Weights (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   Estimate 
CAS <--- IFA -.223 
USER-SLA <--- IFA .657 
ACTUAL-SLA <--- IFA .265 
PROVIDER-SLA <--- IFA .969 
LONGEVITY <--- CAS .530 
RELATIVE PROFITABILITY <--- CAS .231 
FORMALITY <--- CAS .269 
RENEGOTIATIONS <--- CAS .614 
6.5.3.1 Hypothesis H1 CAS < --- IFA  
As was predicted by the hypothesised model the correlation between alignment 
and success has a negative sign. They are negatively correlated as expected 
by theory. The alignment of three sets of performance measures could explain 
the 22.3% of the success index of a contract (see Table 58). We established 
before that contractual alliance success was explained by many individual 
factors. Given that, and according to the results of this research, alignment of 
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performance measures should be included as an additional contributor to 
contractual alliance failure (or success).  
6.5.3.2 Observed Factors < --- IFA  
All signs are positive and in line with the expectations from the hypothesised 
model. The order of magnitude of the correlations is different than predicted by 
extant theories but confirmatory of the new theoretical model in this research.  
Looking at the three factors that are part of the alignment coefficient, the highest 
standardised weight of alignment comes from alignment between the contract’s 
SLAs and the financial objectives of the Provider (PROVIDER-SLA < --- IFA = 
0.969). This is followed by the alignment between the contract’s SLAs and the 
financial objectives of the User (USER-SLA < --- IFA = 0.657). The most 
interesting and confirmatory result is the low relative contribution of ACTUAL-
SLA and alignment. To recap, ACTUAL-SLA reflects the gap between actual 
performance and expected performance measured by the contract’s SLAs 
(ACTUAL-SLA < --- IFA = 0.265). In other words, 96.9% of the inter-firm 
alignment coefficient is explained by the degree of alignment between the 
contract’s SLAs and the financial objectives of the provider, 65.7% is explained 
by the alignment between the contract’s SLAs and the user’s financial 
objectives and 26.5% is explained by the match between target and actual 
SLAs values.  
The view has long been held that success in contractual alliances is driven by 
the ability of the Provider to meet the target contractual SLAs, thereby closing 
the gap between expected and actual performance. This view is so prevalent, 
that within the Provider’s organisation the Programme Management Group’s 
single raison d'être is to monitor and report operational performance indicators 
against SLA targets.  What these coefficients show is that whilst those 
assurances are important, aligning with the performance objectives of User and 
Provider is more critical to the total alignment of the metrics. This alignment 
contributes more to the success of the relationship.  
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6.5.3.3 Observed Factors < --- CAS 
Table 58 above presents the relative weights of observed factors as measures 
of success in the relationships in the study.  The observed factors were derived 
from theory. They include LONGEVITY, RELATIVE PROFITABILITY, 
FORMALITY, and RENEGOTIATIONS of the relationship. According to theory, 
the first three factors are positive measures of success whereas 
RENEGOTIATIONS was a negative measure of contractual alliance success, 
according to the proposed theoretical model.  
The results of the standardised regression weights of the data versus the SEM 
model actually shows that variability measured by the variable 
RENEGOTIATIONS <--- CAS= 0.614, has the largest explanatory weight in the 
CAS construct. This rejects the hypothesised relationship and subsequently 
presents a different result than extant research in the contractual alliance 
success literature.  This result however was anticipated in the qualitative study 
using interviews with PMs. They suggested that actually variability is a positive 
measure of success denoting flexibility and relational activity.  Longevity, 
measured by the number of years User and Provider have been into a 
contractual alliance, is another important measure of IFR success contributing 
53% to explain CAS.  
The correlations between RELATIVE PROFITABILITY and CAS, and between 
FORMALITY and CAS, are positive as expected. However these two variables 
have the lowest explanatory power of contractual alliance success. This differs 
from what has been suggested in the management literature. The presence of 
an active and signed contract accounts for 26.9% of the measurement of CAS. 
The relative profitability of the relationship, measured as the share of the 
contract’s value on the users’ SGA expenses and the provider’s revenue, 
accounts for 23.1% of the measurement of CAS.  These two variables and their 
contribution to success are captured in the variables:  
 RELATIVE PROFITABILITY  <--- CAS = 0.231  
 FORMALITY    <--- CAS = 0.269 
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6.5.3.4  Total, Direct and Indirect Effects 
The following tables include standardised total, direct and indirect effect sizes 
with 90% confidence intervals (using AMOS bias-corrected percentile method), 
for lower bound and a two-tail interval. Tables 59 and 60 compare the results of 
the estimated model against a default model generated by AMOS. These 
results confirm the results presented in the previous analysis of total effects of 
endogenous variables on the unobserved ones.   
Table 59 Standardised Direct Effects - Lower Bounds 
 IFA CAS 
CAS -.422 .000 
RENEGOTIATIONS .000 .221 
RELATIVE PROFITABILITY .000 -.019 
FORMALITY .000 .059 
LONGEVITY .000 .177 
PROVIDER-SLA .714 .000 
ACTUAL-SLA .093 .000 
USER-SLA .441 .000 
Table 60 Standardised Indirect Effects - Lower Bounds 
 IFA CAS 
CAS .000 .000 
RENEGOTIATIONS -.293 .000 
RELATIVE PROFITABILITY -.193 .000 
FORMALITY -.148 .000 
LONGEVITY -.217 .000 
PROVIDER-SLA .000 .000 
ACTUAL-SLA .000 .000 
USER-SLA .000 .000 
In summary all parameters have the expected direction and magnitude 
considered in the hypothesised model. The confidence levels are lower than 
customary (90% vs. 95%). However, considering the unexplored nature of the 
management phenomena being addressed and the source and characteristics 
of the data, these values are confirmatory of the theorised model. Figure 14 
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below presents a graphic representation of the estimated structural and 
measurement model with the standardised regression weights for the each one 
of the modelled paths.   
6.6 Model Testing 
6.6.1 Estimating Global Model Fit  
Assessing a model’s fit is one of the most controversial aspects of structural 
equation modelling (Shook et al., 2004) and is the core of the post-analysis 
activities.  Scholars recommend that before assessing individual parameters 
researchers must evaluate the overall fit of the observed data to an a priori 
model and this is accomplished framed by the dichotomous decision process of 
hypothesis testing.  The model was either accepted as providing good fit to the 
data, or rejected as fitting the empirical data poorly.  SEM as a method is 
essentially different in the way its fitness is evaluated. SEM relies on non-
significance. Fit indices ascertain if the covariance matrix derived from the 
hypothesized model is different from the covariance matrix derived from the 
sample. A non-significant difference indicates that the errors are non-significant, 
lending support to the model.    
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Figure 16 SEM Results for Default Model with Unstandardized Regression Weights 
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AMOS reports all of the recommended statistics for the proposed model by the 
researcher (default) and for the saturated and independence models discussed 
above in Section 6.5. The proposed model lies at the two extremes of the 
saturated and independence model. It takes into consideration that the 
saturated model assumes no constrains on the population moments whereas 
the independence model all the observed variables are assumed to be 
uncorrelated with each other.  
6.6.2 Tests of Absolute Fit 
It is recommended that researchers use multiple indices to determine model 
fitness (Ullman and Bentler, 2003; Schermelleh-Engel et al., 2003). Table 61 
below presents the first two tests of absolute fit of the model with goodness-of-
fit measures: chi-square values and RMSEA27 values for the default model 
(hypothesised model specified Section 6.3) and for the saturated and the 
independence model. These last two models are comparison models 
automatically fitted by AMOS as part of every analysis.  
Table 61 Chi-Square and RMSEA Estimates with Critical Ratios and P-values 
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF 
Default model 22 15.578 13 .273 1.198 
Saturated model28 35 .000 0   
Independence model29 14 129.178 21 .000 6.151 
 
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE 
Default model .037 .000 .095 .577 
Independence model .190 .160 .223 .000 
                                            
27
 Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) is one test of model fit. RMSEA values <.05 are 
considered to indicated good fit. An RMSEA of .1 or more is often taken to indicate poor fit. 
28
 The saturated model contains as many parameter estimates as there are available degrees of freedom 
or inputs into the analysis. The saturated model is thus the least restricted model possible that can be 
fitted by AMOS.  
29
 The independence model, by contrast of the saturated model, is one of the most restrictive models 
that can be fit; it contains estimates of the observed variables only. In other words, the independence 
model assumes all relationships between the observed variables are zero.  
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As stated by Shook et al (2004), the chi-square test is the most common fit 
measure, recommended for moderate samples between 100 and 200 
observations. The chi-square test evaluates overall model fitness and is labelled 
CMIN in the AMOS 19.0 output. For the default model in the study, the CMIN is 
15.578 with 13 degrees of freedom, returning a probability value of 0.273 that a 
chi-square value this large or larger would be obtained by chance if the null 
hypothesis that the model fits the data is true. The 13 degrees of freedom 
represent the level of overidentification of the model for the chi-square test of 
overall model fit.  Since the probability value of the chi-square test is larger than 
the 0.05 level used by convention, we will accept the null hypothesis that the 
model fits the data. The ratio of  2 to df ≤ 2 is useful to assess accept Table fit 
since data are continuous.  
The root mean error of approximation (RMSEA) is another fit index that 
suggests that values smaller than .05 indicate a good fit of the default model, in 
this case against the independence model where variables have no relationship 
between them. RMSEA is also one of the indexes that are less influenced by 
sample size and by the use of estimation methods (Fan et al., 1999).  For the 
purpose of this research the RMSEA = .037, clearly below the threshold of .05 
suggested by Schreiber et al., (2006), or of 0.05 suggested by Fan et al., 
(1999). Lower values of RMSEA (Root mean square error of approximation) 
would indicate a reasonable error of approximation and suggest not employing 
a model with a RMSEA greater than 0.1 (Browne et al., 1993).  
6.6.3 Tests of Relative Fit 
This section examines how well the proposed model fits the sample data, and 
how much better the proposed model (default model in AMOS’ terms) behaves 
versus selected competing models. Competing models include the saturated 
model from AMOS (ideal fit), the independent model from AMOS (a model that 
accepts all null hypotheses) and some selected models that were estimated in 
the previous phase.  
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It is, however, recommended that researchers provide multiple measures of 
fitness given the fact that in SEM models are evaluated based on rules of thumb 
and not significance tests.  Some authors recommend disclosing the effects of 
sample size, estimation methods and model specification on structural 
equation modelling fit indexes. This way, readers can evaluate the fit indices in 
context (Gerbing and Anderson, 1992). 
The default model also performs well in the comparative fit index (CFI) analysis 
against the absolute fit of the independence model. The greater the gap 
between the two models the larger the values of these descriptive statistics. In 
general the CFI should be ≥ .95 for acceptance.  In the hypothesized default 
model CFI = .976 for acceptable fit, and .000 for the independence model. 
Another test of comparative fitness is the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) also 
required to be above .95 for acceptance.  In the default model TLI = .962; 
Bollen’s (1989) Incremental Fitness Index (IFI) = .978 greater than the required 
.95 for fitness acceptance, and IFI values close to 1 indicating a very good fit 
(Shook et al., 2004a; Shook et al., 2004b) .In the baseline comparisons only the 
normed fit index (NFI) is guaranteed to be between 0 and 1, with values close to 
1 indicating a perfect fit. For the default model NFI = .879 less than the 
expected threshold of .95 
Table 62 Tests of Relative Fit Using Baseline Comparisons 
MODEL 
NFI 
Delta1 
RFI 
rho1 
IFI 
Delta2 
TLI 
rho2 
CFI 
Default model .879 .805 .978 .962 .976 
Saturated model 1.000  1.000  1.000 
Independence model .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
This report intentionally excludes some fit indexes that are very sensitive to 
model misspecification, such as GFI, AGFI and CENTRAL. This is important 
considering that SEM methods have been used in this research for theory 
testing against empirical data and thus will be difficult to assess in terms of the 
ultimate quality of its specification. (The exception here is how the predicted 
CHAPTER 6 QUALITATIVE RESULTS OF FULL STUDY 
228 
 
relation pattern should behave based on theory). Additionally GFI and AGFI are 
two indexes which values are strongly influenced by sample size.  
In general all indexes have downward bias under small size conditions. 
According to (Fan et al., 1999) “The existence of such downward bias suggests 
that sample fit indexes tend to present a somewhat more pessimistic picture 
about a model fit than what is true in reality, especially when sample size is 
small”. Therefore the good results of the default model in the six fit indexes 
described above (chi-square, RMSEA, CFI, NFI, TLI, IFI) serve as an indication 
of the fitness of the hypothesized model to fit empirical data and speaks of good 
model specification and estimation grounded by theory.  
6.6.4 Cross-Validation Indices  
The Expected Cross-Validation Index (ECVI) is central to the analysis of model 
fit. The ECVI measures the discrepancy between the fitted covariance matrix in 
the analysed sample, and the expected covariance matrix that would be 
obtained in another sample of equivalent size (Browne et al., 1993). Application 
of the ECVI assumes a comparison of models where an ECVI index is 
computed for each mode, and then all ECVI vales are placed in rank order; the 
model having the smallest ECVI exhibits the greatest potential for replication. 
Because ECVI coefficients can take on any value, there is no determined 
appropriate range of values (Browne et al., 1993).  
To test the fit of the default hypothesised model, Table 63 below presents the 
default model’s ECVI value of .444 with those of the saturated model (ECVI = 
.473) and the independence model (ECVI = 1.124). Given the lower ECVI value 
for the hypothesised model, compared with both the independence and the 
saturated models, it can be asserted that the default hypothesised model 
represents the best fit to the data.  
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Table 63 Expected Cross-Validation Index (ECVI) for Hypothesised Model 
MODEL ECVI LO 90 HI 90 MECVI 
Default model .442 .385 .556 .459 
Saturated model .473 .473 .473 .500 
Independence model 1.124 .898 1.401 1.135 
6.7 Model Modification 
During the course of this research study the initial hypothesised model did not 
suffer any respecifications. This is consistent with the initial theoretical model 
proposed in Chapter 3.  In the course of the model identification some 
alternative paths were considered but those yielded less fitting results. During 
the tentative respecifications of the model no paths were added (no Lagrange 
manipulations) and no paths were dropped.    
6.8 Model Validation  
Some alternative changes that can be incorporated into the model may drive 
future research projects.  Results from the Holter’s Critical N (CN) test describe 
the suitability of adding new observations for a larger sample size in order to 
improve the confidence levels for the chi-square parameter estimation. The 
Hoelter’s CN test is the last statistic appearing on the AMOS SEM analyses 
output in Hoelter’s Critical N (CN) test, labelled as HOELTER .05 and .01.   
Table 64 Hoelter Critical Test 
MODEL 
HOELTER 
.05 
HOELTER 
.01 
Default model 155 191 
Independence model 35 42 
This fit statistic focuses directly on the adequacy of sample size that would be 
sufficient to yield an adequate model fit for a chi-square test (Hu and Bentler, 
1998) cited in (Schermelleh-Engel et al., 2003a). The results for this test provide 
an interesting suggestion for model improvement, because they propose that 
the new sample size required to make the default model’s chi-square results 
significant at a 95% confidence level, should be 155. For a 99% confidence 
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level, the sample ought to be 191 observations in size.  With a current sample 
size of 149 (and a chi-square significant at 91.4%) one may conclude that this is 
a satisfactory sample size, although short of Hoelter’s benchmark that states 
that the CN should exceed 200. This could be an improvement of the model for 
future research.  
Alternative SEM validation actions include replicating the Default model using 
another sample data from another logistics service provider, or sample 
contracts from the same provider but for a different kind of contracted services. 
These actions are beyond the scope of this doctoral research but should be 
considered for future research projects.  
6.9 Results of Hypotheses Testing 
6.9.1 Hypothesis 1 - Correlation of Inter-Firm Alignment and Success 
The previous sections analysed the results of the complete measurement model 
that predicts contractual alliance success, using alignment of inter-firm 
performance measure as a determinant of that success. As demonstrated in the 
previous sections the theoretical model presented in Chapter 3 was 
successfully estimated and tested. The model shows a significant and positive 
causal relation between the degree of alignment of the inter-firm performance 
measurement systems (IFA) and the contractual alliance success (CAS).  
The empirical results of the structural equation model show that the variable IFA 
explains 77.6% of the success results of contractual alliances in the logistics 
outsourcing industry using data from 149 with a confidence level of more than 
90% (p=0.086). This means that if alignment improves by 1 unit, success of the 
relationship will improve by 0.776 units ceteris paribus. Even though the 
confidence level is not the highest and indicates that the conclusion relates 
more to the sample than the population, the measures for the model global fit 
indicate that hypothesis 1 can be confirmed.  
It also confirms that inter-firm alignment of performance measures is one but 
not the only variable that explains alliance success as confirmed by theory. 
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What was not known was the ability of IFA to contribute to the explanation of 
CAS. This is a significant contribution of the research, because it considers 
alignment of inter-firm performance measures a predictor of contractual alliance 
success. In summary the principal hypothesis, hypothesis 1 has been 
confirmed.  
6.9.2 Hypotheses 2-4 – Observed Factors of Inter-Firm Alignment 
(IFA) 
The IFA coefficient was derived by three observed variables:  
i. The alignment between the actual values of the SLAs and the target 
SLAs in the contract (ACTUAL-SLA);  
ii. The alignment between contract’s SLAs and the financial objectives of 
the Users (USER-SLA); and  
iii. The alignment between the contract’s SLAs and the financial objectives 
of the Provider (PROVIDER-SLA).  
Hypotheses 2-4 dealt with the components of the IFA coefficient and the relative 
contributions of each one of the three observed variables. 
 
Figure 17 Estimated Model for IFA Coefficient  
Hypothesis 2 stated that the variable ACTUAL-SLA was positively correlated to 
the variable IFA. In other words, the alignment between the actual values of the 
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contract’s SLAs versus the target SLAs contribute in a positive and significant 
way to the total inter-firm alignment. Although the correlation is positive, the 
level of contribution to IFA is the lowest of the three components. The 
coefficient of 0.265 makes the contribution of ACTUAL-SLA to the overall IFA 
for the contractual alliance smaller than previously theorised in the literature, 
where it was considered the most important factor of aligned objectives. 
Hypothesis 2 is partially confirmed with a 90% confidence level, that the 
contribution of ACTUAL-SLA to IFA is positive but less significant than 
expected.  
Hypothesis 3 stated that the variable USER-SLA was correlated in a significant 
and positive way to the inter-firm alignment coefficient IFA. The results of the 
specific path in the SEM model between USER-SLA and IFA show a positive 
loading coefficient of 0.657. This makes alignment of USER-SLAs three-times 
more significant to explain inter-firm alignment than the variable ACTUAL-SLA. 
This confirms Hypothesis 3 and highlights the importance of aligning the 
contract’s objectives with the users’ financial objectives.   
Hypothesis 4 stated that the variable PROVIDER-SLA was correlated in a 
significant and positive way to the inter-firm alignment coefficient IFA. The 
correlation results between those two variables show a positive and significant 
correlation of 0.969. This means that to explain the total alignment of inter-firm 
performance measures the variable that contributes the most is the level of 
alignment between the contract’s SLAs and the Provider’s financial objectives. 
Additionally the value of the R2 is high (0.94) explaining 94% of variance of the 
model. The p value of the critical ratio (p=0.001; p < 0.01) confirms the 
significance of the variable PROVIDER-SLA as a contributor to the IFA 
coefficient. These results confirm Hypothesis 4.  
In summary these correlations confirm the hypotheses related to inter-firm 
alignment. They demonstrate the greater relative importance of alignment with 
the financial objectives of the alliance partners, over alignment between actual 
and target internal performance measures. 
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6.9.3 Hypotheses 5-8 – Observed Factors of Contractual Alliance 
Success (CAS) 
One of the aims of this research was to build a more robust measure of 
contractual alliance success using variables that were conceptualised in the 
literature but not empirically tested as a set. Empirical testing has been 
challenging in the field of inter-firm relationships due to lack of access to good 
quality data. This study had very detailed and good quality information from 149 
contractual alliances, so it was a good opportunity to test some hypotheses.  
 
Figure 18 Estimated Model for CAS Index 
CONTRACTUAL ALLIANCE SUCCESS or CAS is a composite construct that 
includes multiple measures of what it is regarded as a successful inter-firm 
relationship. The full quantitative study validated the contribution of specific 
variables to the composite construct.  The results of the quantitative study are 
significant from a confirmatory perspective, but also in proposing new areas of 
research regarding determinants of success in contractual alliances.  
Hypothesis 5 stated that active contracts with a signed agreement are 
determinants of more successful contractual alliances. The results of the model 
show a positive correlation between both variables FORMALITY and CAS with 
a level of confidence of 95% (c.r. with p=0.039). The calculated variable of 
FORMALITY explains only 26.9% of the relationship success. This result may 
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seem more significant in the context of the other measures tested in the rest of 
the hypotheses. Given the literature, it was expected a higher contribution under 
the assumption that a signed contract was a more formal element of a 
successful relationship. This confirms Hypothesis 5 as a positive correlation 
between the variables with low significance. 
Hypothesis 6 stated that LONGEVITY was a positive and significant measure of 
contractual alliance success (CAS). According to the model LONGEVITY 
explains 53% of CAS. This hypothesis was confirmed by the model with an 
estimated parameter of 0.53, with a positive sign. In the case of this variable the 
model cannot estimate the critical ratio nor the confidence level since it is a 
variable with a priori value for the model to operate. However the correlation is 
significant. Thus Hypothesis 6 has been confirmed as predicted in the literature.  
Hypothesis 7 suggested a negative correlation between CONTRACTUAL 
ALLIANCE SUCCESS and RENEGOTIATIONS as predicted from the literature. 
Key authors in the field of inter-firm alliances state that renegotiations are a 
measure of alliance failure (Ariño, 2003; Reuer and Ariño, 2002; Bolton, 1990). 
However this research shows that there is a positive correlation between 
RENEGOTIATIONS and CAS. The correlation is also the most significant 
among the four determinants of CAS studied in these set of hypotheses. The 
correlation between renegotiations and success has a positive coefficient of 
0.614 with a p value of 0.002 (p<0.01) for the critical ratio. This is the most 
powerful of all four observed variables. What this coefficient indicates is that for 
every 1 unit of increase in renegotiations, the alliance success index will 
increase by 0.61 units. This result rejects Hypothesis 7 but is consistent with the 
results of the qualitative analysis presented in Chapter 5. 
Hypothesis 8 stated that the RELATIVE PROFITABILITY of the relation for both 
users and provider has a positive and significant correlation with 
CONTRACTUAL ALLIANCE SUCCESS. The correlation was positive but not as 
significant as expected based on conceptual propositions from the literature. 
The contribution to CAS had a coefficient of (0.269) with a p value of 0.065 
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(p<0.1) for the critical ratio. It is a lower confidence level than in other measures 
but there is a significant correlation with the unobserved endogenous variable, 
CAS.  
This concludes the presentation of the full quantitative study to specify, estimate 
and test a model that predicts contractual alliance success determined by the 
degree of alignment among inter-firm performance measures. The model was 
specified using structural equation models that test the fit of the estimated 
model versus the theoretical model and bivariate correlations with observed and 
unobserved variables. Chapter 7 will discuss the implications of these 
quantitative results, the specific contributions from the research, the limitations 
of this work and opportunities for future research.  
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7 DISCUSSION, CONTRIBUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter 7 presents a critical examination of the findings described in previous 
chapters. The discussion connects back the findings in the context of the three 
literature domains that inform this research: inter-firm relationships, 
performance measurement systems, and strategic alignment. The discussion 
claims new knowledge from the results as contributions to theory, methods and 
management practice. This inquiry began with a need to understand some 
factors that make contractual alliances successful. This is not a new topic in the 
literature, but one that could use new approaches. Previous chapters described 
the role that aligned inter-firm performance measures play in making alliances 
successful. Below there is a discussion of the results and the highlighted 
contributions. 
Section 7.2 presents a detailed discussion of the research results along the 
following themes rooted in theory:  
 The role of performance measurement in managing inter-firm relationships 
 The design of inter-firm performance measurement systems 
 Strategic alignment in inter-firm performance measurements 
 The definition of success of contractual alliances 
 Alignment of inter-firm performance measures as a predictor of contractual 
alliance success 
The contributions presented in Section 7.3 are a summary of the specific claims 
this research makes. The results of this research are centred on contributions 
to: 
 Theory in inter-firm relationship management  
 Methods to measure performance alignment 
 Practice by contributions to methods and practice.  
These contributions are deeply rooted in the methods used during the research, 
a sound identification of knowledge gaps in the literature and the previous 
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discussion of results. Chapter 7 also highlights the limitations of this research, 
that may spark new research ideas to close knowledge gaps still open in the 
literature and to address the identified limitations.  
7.2 Discussion of Results 
7.2.1 The role of performance measurement in managing inter-firm 
relationships 
Prior to discussing the key research question of this dissertation – the impact of 
aligned inter-firm performance measures on alliance success – it is worth 
discussing the role of performance measurement systems (PMS) in managing 
inter-firm relationships, as a matter of introduction.  
The literature review presented in Chapter 2 highlights two applications of PMS 
in alliance management: i) the use of performance measurement to assess the 
alliance’s ability to deliver results according to the scope of the relationship 
(relational-level measures) (Gulati and Singh, 1998; Madhok, 2000; Madhok 
and Tallman, 1998); and ii) to justify the positive impact of the inter-firm relation 
on the members’ own performance (firm-level measures) (Kale et al., 2001; 
Zollo et al., 2002; Lambe et al., 2002).  
i. Regarding relational-level measures, the literature presents two streams 
of contributions: a) measures about goals and processes within the 
relationship, mostly known as service level agreements (SLAs) (Ariño, 
2003; Lunnan and Haugland, 2008; Geringer and Hebert, 1991; Parkhe, 
1993); b) measures about the degree of effectiveness of the alliance per 
se as a governance mechanism. This will be related to the longevity of 
the alliance and/or the avoidance of unexpected termination (Madhok 
and Tallman, 1998; Parkhe, 1993; Goerzen and Beamish, 2005; Cravens 
et al., 2000; Das and Teng, 2000), the stability of the mechanism (Chan 
et al., 1997; Anand and Khanna, 2000; Ariño and Reuer, 2004), and the 
quantification of relative profitability for the partners in the alliance 
(Parkhe, 1993; Chan et al., 1997; Chang et al., 2008; Huang and Chan, 
2005; Gleason et al., 2003; Dyer et al., 2001). The relational-level 
CHAPTER 7 DISCUSSION, CONTRIBUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
239 
 
measures will change based on the goals and scope of the relationship, 
and will create specific metrics to monitor alliance’s performance and 
contribution.  
ii. The firm-level measures do not measure internal alliance performance 
but rather the impact on firm’s performance due to alliance activity. The 
literature is extensive when measuring firm performance improvement 
and the contributions have been grouped along three moments in time 
with specific foci on the analysis. The contemporary authors (1990-1999) 
are focused on measurements at the stockholder level, stock 
appreciation and the generation of quasi-rents (Madhok and Tallman, 
1998; Chan et al., 1997; Zajac and Olsen, 1993). The established 
contemporaries (2000-2005) take a look at ‘softer’ benefits of alliance 
activity such as cumulative experience (Zollo et al., 2002; Tomkins, 
2001/3), firm’s customer satisfaction (Poppo and Zenger, 1998), and 
general improvement in market share position (Dussauge et al., 2004; 
Dussauge et al., 2000). The contemporary innovators (2006-2012) 
approach the benefits of alliance activity, at the firm-level from 
improvements in innovation (Kotabe et al., 2003; Murray and Kotabe, 
2005), improved reputation derive from taking a central role in the 
coordination of a network (Koka and Prescott, 2008; Adams and Neely, 
2000), and finally the expectation of better future performance (Lavie, 
2007; Bititci et al., 2004).  
The results of this research highlight an additional role of performance 
measurement systems in managing inter-firm relationships beyond the first two 
roles. Inter-firm Performance Measures ought to become a management tool 
(Kaplan and Norton, 2006), a tool for communication (Kaplan and Norton, 
1996), for learning (Neely and Najjar, 2006; Bourne et al., 2000), not only for 
setting expectations and measuring outcomes, but to open channels across the 
firms involved in the relationship. These are not new concepts. The PMS 
literature has abundant contributions on the multiple uses of performance 
measures but mostly centred in intra-firm contexts. This research claims that 
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inter-firm performance measures are truly management tools to drive successful 
alliances and the qualitative and quantitative results confirm this claim. By 
demonstrating how aligned inter-firm performance measures contribute to 
alliance success, it is clear that the design of the inter-firm performance 
measurement system should go beyond setting service level agreements and 
monitoring their delivery.   
7.2.2 The design of inter-firm performance measurement systems 
The management literature on performance measurement systems is vast and 
yet limited in its current scope (Neely et al., 2005; Bourne et al., 2003; Franco-
Santos et al., 2012; Garengo et al., 2005; Najmi et al., 2005; Kennerley and 
Neely, 2000; Eccles, 1991; Kaplan and Norton, 1992). Many of the key 
contributors exalt the characteristics of well-designed performance 
measurement systems: they should be aligned with strategy, they should drive 
firm’s success by meeting stakeholder expectations and truly the concept of 
measuring performance is at the core of all strategic management theories 
(Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986).  
Yet the fact that most discussions on the design of PMS take place in an intra-
firm context shows the need for additional research in the field.  Some authors 
have started the discussion by extending the scope of financial reporting tools 
outside the boundaries of the firm (Dekker, 2004; Dekker, 2003). Others 
propose a certain level of hierarchical aggregation of firm-level metrics into a 
super-structure of PMS for extended enterprises and connected supply chains 
(Lehtinen and Ahola, 2010; Bititci et al., 2005; Lin et al., 2000; Mullin, 1996; 
Busi and Bititci, 2006). All of these approaches are sound and will yield some 
improvements, but they are based on an assumption that practice dispels. They 
assume that inherently partners have similar objectives and that the alliance will 
contribute to each party’s objectives simultaneously.  
However the key distinction between intra-firm and inter-firm performance 
measurement systems lies in the concept of alignment. Intra-firm PMS - as 
complex as they may be -, can eventually be aligned around common 
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objectives of the firm (Kaplan and Norton, 2006; Kathuria et al., 2007; Decoene 
and Bruggeman, 2006; McAdam and Bailie, 2002). In large organisations it may 
be a herculean task, but conceptually doable. The challenge with non-equity 
inter-firm relationships (IFR), like contractual alliances, is that they lack a central 
point of governance with evident common objectives. Moreover contractual 
alliances, using the case of outsourcing, tend to have evident conflicts of 
interest (Tsai et al., 2012; Stainer and Grey, 2007; Rothaermel et al., 2006). In 
fact there are voices advocating a new way to structure these kinds of IFRs 
seeking more collaboration and vested interests within the relationship (Vitasek 
and Manrodt, 2012; Vitasek and Ledyard, 2009; Boer et al., 2006), yet from 
those contributions the discussion around “aligned objectives” is still more 
philosophical than operational. 
The position of this research is that alignment of objectives must go beyond 
words and be actionable through the appropriate design of an inter-firm 
performance measurement system. This inter-firm PMS should consider 
relational-level performance measures, connecting them with firm-level 
performance measures in an aligned manner. This connection will be a 
synergistic design rather than the mere aggregation of two separate systems, 
as described in section 7.2.1 above.  If the question is how to connect those two 
levels in a synergistic manner, the answer will not be through mere aggregation 
of indicators. The answer revolves around inter-firm PMS that are truly aligned 
to deliver results against conflictive objectives.   
7.2.3 Strategic alignment in inter-firm performance measurements 
As this discussion explores the need to drive alignment in inter-firm 
performance measures it reaches the point of discussing what is known about 
strategic alignment.  In the strategy literature alignment refers to the internal 
congruence of a lower level construct with a higher level construct 
(Venkatraman and Prescott, 1990; Olson et al., 2005). It has been applied to 
assess the level of fit between a functional strategy and a corporate one and 
coherence between a corporate strategy and its environment (Venkatraman, 
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1989; Venkatraman and Camillus, 1984; Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985). These 
early contributions devised methods to quantify the degree of alignment (or 
misalignment) between these constructs.  
Currently, the field of inter-firm relations management also calls for greater 
‘alignment’ between the corporate strategy of the firm and its alliance activity 
(Douma et al., 2000; Nielsen, 2010; Nielsen and Gudergan, 2012). Some 
authors advocate trust, as a way to find this congruence, and they also propose 
new mechanisms to build that relational capital (Yu et al., 2006; Claro et al., 
2003; Levin, 2003; Baker et al., 2002; Poppo and Zenger, 2002). In their view, 
relational measures will improve the level of alignment between the firms’ 
objectives and the objectives of the new governance structure (Murray and 
Kotabe, 2005; Hamel, 1991; Parkhe, 1999). Certainly driving alignment is just 
not a matter of aligning inter-firm performance measures, but it is also not just 
humans’ desire to cooperate and work together. If one acknowledges the power 
of performance measures to change behaviour, clearly the power of aligned 
inter-firm performance goals should contribute to building trust and relational 
capital (Yu et al., 2006; Claro et al., 2003; Levin, 2003; Baker et al., 2002; 
Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Pittino and Mazzurana, 2013; Wittmann et al., 2009; 
Gulati, 2007; Vandaele et al., 2007).  It will also help if managers know the 
applications alignment and measurement fit.  
The methods proposed in this research have been built upon widely known 
tests to measure strategic alignment, coupled with the extant theories on 
aligned performance measures and alignment between a firm’s strategy and its 
inter-firm alliance activities. The contributions revolve around new contexts to 
measure alignment, and combining methods used in the strategic alignment 
field, and now applying them into the inter-firm management domain.  
Chapter 3 presented the theoretical foundations of transaction-cost economics 
applied to inter-firm relationships (Judge and Dooley, 2006; Williamson, 1979; 
McIvor, 2009), and the suitability of applying methods to align inter-firm 
objectives. Chapter 4 operationalised a coefficient of inter-firm performance 
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alignment using Venkatraman’s tests. Chapter 5 tested all these concepts in a 
pilot study with results that were validated qualitatively with alliance managers. 
Chapter 6 presented the results of the calculations of an inter-firm alignment 
coefficient (IFA) for 149 contracts between a service provider and its users. It 
also discussed the correlation between alignment of inter-firm performance 
measures and contractual alliance success. This research has contributed to 
theory testing in two ways: i) by applying existing concepts of alignment of 
strategic constructs and testing them to measure alignment of inter-firm 
performance measures, and ii) by assessing alignment among performance 
measures as an extension of strategic co-alignment techniques.  
7.2.4 The definition of success of contractual alliances 
The main hypothesis of this research proposes that aligned inter-firm 
performance measures could predict contractual alliance success. After 
discussing concepts related to performance management and alignment it is 
now the time to discuss the measurement of contractual alliance success.  
The characteristics of successful alliances are also the measures of that 
success. These measures (relational-level indicators) were reviewed in section 
7.2.1 but the concepts will be revisited here, in order to discuss the pertinence 
of such measures as definitions of success. Operationalising contractual 
alliance success (CAS) is fundamental for the development of this research, as 
the CAS index becomes the dependent variable in the SEM model tested in 
Chapter 6.  
Key researchers in alliance theory have identified four observable 
characteristics that when present will point to a successful inter-firm 
relationship. These are not determinants of success; they are considered 
measures of success:  
i. The formality of the relational activity including the lack of abrupt 
termination situations (Zollo et al., 2002; Ariño, 2003; Das and Teng, 
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2000; Reuer and Ariño, 2002; Reuer and Zollo, 2005; Sengun and Wasti, 
2007) 
ii.  The longevity of the relationship as a marker of a long-term commitment 
between partners (Kale et al., 2001; Goerzen and Beamish, 2005; Anand 
and Khanna, 2000; Kale et al., 2002; Parkhe, 1991) 
iii.  The stability of the terms of the contract and dealing with the level of 
change that the relationship experiences (Ariño and Reuer, 2004; Reuer 
and Ariño, 2002; Bolton, 1990/5; Ariño et al., 2001) 
iv. The relative profitability derived by the members of the alliance, a 
characteristic aimed at testing game theory behaviours among alliance 
members (Lavie, 2007; Parkhe, 1999; Parkhe, 1993) 
The empirical testing of this research considered a sample of 149 contracts 
both ‘successful’ and ‘failed’ (measured by the fact that the relationships were 
still active or decommissioned) to measure alliance success (CAS) according to 
theory’s characteristics. Each one of the contracts, made available by the 
logistics service provider sponsoring the research, had information on the 
degree of formality, longevity, stability and relative profitability of the 
relationship. The results of the operationalisation of contractual alliance success 
(CAS) were described in depth in Chapters 5 and 6. They include results from 
the pilot study, from the qualitative in-depth interviews with all Programme 
Managers, and from the full quantitative study presented in Chapter 6.  
Below is a discussion on the results of each of the four measures of contractual 
alliance success, and how much they contribute to the CAS index. 
i. Formality of the relational activity is a significant measure of contractual 
alliance success, this confirms the hypothesised correlation from theory 
(c.r.=2.069 ; p<0.05). These results emphasise the need to maintain 
formal documentation of the relationship, scheduled performance 
reviews and the role of the Programme Management Group in the case 
of the Provider. Theory predicted that the contribution to success was 
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very large; results from this research show that only 26.9% of contractual 
alliance success is explained by the formality of the relational activity. 
ii. Longevity is the most relevant and confirmed measure of success in 
contractual alliances. The SEM model does not provide the value for the 
critical ratio (c.r.) of this specific variable given the need to pre-assign a 
value for the model to run. However is recommended that more iterations 
of the model will be run to let the c.r. and p value be generated. Theory 
predicted the importance of long-term relationships as a measure of 
success; this research confirms the relation and attaches a measurable 
coefficient of contribution calculated at 53% of the explanation of 
success.  
iii. The predicted correlation from theory between stability and success was 
not confirmed. In fact the sign is the opposite of what was expected. The 
hypothesis stated that the renegotiation variable was negatively 
correlated with success but the available data showed that in this context 
of contractual alliances, more renegotiations are significantly correlated 
(c.r.= 0.019 ; p<0.05) with success. These results were also triangulated 
with 12 Programme Managers that are responsible for these contractual 
alliances and they confirmed the importance of the renegotiation activity 
to ‘keep the relationship alive’. This finding has profound implications for 
those involved in relationship management as they have to manage 
simultaneously a certain degree of ‘formality’ with the flexibility to 
accommodate changes in the terms of the relationship over time. Theory 
predicted a negative contribution of renegotiations and success; this 
research confirms a positive and significant contribution of the 
renegotiation activity and contractual alliance success with 61.4% of the 
explanatory power.  
iv. As for relative profitability, the contribution as a measure of the overall 
success of the contractual alliance is low with an estimate of 0.043, so 
for every 1 unit that relative profitability changes, CAS will vary by 0.043 
units. The estimation is significant at a 90% confidence level (c.r.=1.847 ; 
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p = 0.065). It is important for the discussion to remember that the 
operationalisation of this variable was done using the value of the 
contract in light of the provider’s revenue and the user’s expenses. The 
assumption was that the higher the share of revenues or expenses, the 
more to lose by the partner when there are issues with the alliance. This 
measure may need to be operationalised with more complex values and 
ratios. Theory predicts a significantly positive contribution of relative 
profitability and alliance success; this research finds a positive but limited 
contribution, as relative profitability has been measured here. 
This research confirms the contribution of formality, longevity and relative 
profitability as measures of contractual alliance success, but disputes the claim 
of ‘stability’ as a characteristic of successful inter-firm relationships. The 
implications of the last claim are profound for theory and practice and calls for 
additional studies with multiple providers and different types of relationships. As 
outsourcing and alliance management continue to evolve it is possible that 
there is a new generation of managers that want more flexibility in the terms of 
engagement and some wiggle room to accommodate changes and new needs.  
7.2.5 Alignment of inter-firm performance measures as a predictor of 
contractual alliance success 
This section discusses the principal hypothesis and the original research 
question of this dissertation, why successful alliances fail? The proposed 
hypothesis was that even though an alliance may be delivering to its SLAs, if 
the SLAs are not aligned with the partners’ financial objectives the relationship 
may fail. Sections 7.2.1 to 7.2.4 have reviewed all the relevant theory regarding 
management of inter-firm relations, the role of performance measurement 
systems in IFR management, strategic alignment and measuring contractual 
alliance success.  
The conclusions from this analysis are profound; firstly there is a significant 
causality between alignment and alliance success. In other words, not only the 
relation and the sign are correct but also the directionality means causality, as it 
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was meant to be measured by choosing SEM as the statistical method. If 
alignment improves by one unit, success of the alliance improves by 0.776 
units. The reliability of the estimates is high for the selected sample. The global 
fit of the SEM model is good by all the measures presented in section 6.6. 
Moreover, given a set of contracts, with a 91% confidence, if the inter-firm 
alignment (IFA) coefficient is calculated, the probability of contractual alliance 
success can be estimated using the estimate ratio of 1.00 to 0.776 as estimated 
by the SEM model.  
Of all the variables that are part of the IFA coefficient, the variable that 
contributes the most to overall alignment is PROVIDER-SLA, the alignment 
between the contract’s SLAs and the provider’s financial objectives. Meaning 
that, for contracts to have greater alignment, the SLAs should really contribute 
to the financial objectives of the provider. This is a counter-intuitive conclusion 
since the perception by practitioners and theorist was that the alignment that 
matters was the alignment of target SLAs and actual values (ACTUAL-SLA) 
and/or the contribution to the user’s financial objectives (USER-SLA).  
These conclusions are innovative both for theory and for management practice. 
They actually provide a blue print for how to set-up service level agreements in 
contractual alliances, how to align them to user’s and provider’s financial 
objectives and how to measure and monitor success. For service providers with 
a portfolio of contractual alliances this research provides an opportunity to 
measure degrees of alignment of inter-firm performance measures (starting with 
the contractual SLAs) and from there estimate the risk levels of the portfolio. For 
users with multiple alliances with different service providers, this research 
explores the value of better aligning those relationships with the needs of the 
providers.  
For theory, the results of this analysis add to the body of knowledge on the 
measurements of contractual alliance success. Additionally, it is known now the 
contribution of aligned inter-firm performance measures as a predictor of 
contractual alliance success.  
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7.3 Contributions 
The main objective of this research was to address the question of whether 
alignment of performance objectives amongst partners in an alliance matter to 
its success. This question is relevant in the context of firms’ increasing use of 
inter-firm structures (IFRs) to fulfil their strategic objectives. The performance 
management literature suggests the importance of performance objectives 
alignment across different functions or activities but there is no evidence of a 
practical mechanism to measure such alignment. This methodological gap has 
been exposed in the design of inter-firm performance measurement systems to 
govern IFRs.  The above generalisation was evident in the logistics outsourcing 
industry, - which served as the source of data for this research -, where leading 
service providers witness conflicting signals in relationships that survive or die 
regardless of the fulfilment of the SLAs between users and provider.   
Thus the two key constructs of analysis are contractual alliance success and 
alignment of inter-firm performance. The management literature presented in 
Chapter 2 defines both contractual alliance success and performance 
alignment. Contractual alliance success is defined from two perspectives: the 
firm-level impact of the alliance and the relational-level impact. The firm-level 
impact is defined as the contribution of the IFR to the performance objectives of 
the member firms. The data used for firm-level impact in this research were the 
financial objectives of the firms involved in the CA (Table 5). The relational-level 
impact considered the fulfilment of the agreed upon SLAs and the overall 
effectiveness of the IFR as a governance mechanism (Figure 9), including the 
stability, formality and longevity of the relationship. Measuring alignment of 
performance objectives in an inter-firm context assumes that the performance 
objectives of both firms in the CA are congruent with the internal SLAs of the 
CA.  
This research contributes to theory, practice and methods in the fields of 
performance management systems and inter-firm relationships. The study 
conceptualises and measures the inter-firm alignment coefficient (IFA) by 
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adapting an existing method from the strategy literature. The method is based 
on measuring Euclidean distances between the numerical values of two or more 
constructs and had been used extensively to test alignment of functional 
strategy and corporate strategy (Venkatraman and Camillus, 1984; 
Venkatraman and Prescott, 1990; Venkatraman, 1989).  
The study calculates contractual alliance success using existing variables 
proposed and tested individually in the management literature. The CAS index 
includes contractual alliance characteristics such as longevity (Parkhe, 2003), 
stability (Ariño, 2001), formality and importance of the relationship for the 
partners. Using data from 149 contracts this study shows the contribution of 
each variable to the overall CAS index.  
The study correlates the values of the IFA and the CAS index and estimates the 
contribution of aligned performance measurement systems to the success of 
the inter-firm relationship. This analysis is conducted using a model of structural 
equations (SEM) that simultaneously establishes bivariate correlations and the 
overall fit of the estimated model versus the existing data. The analysis’ output 
measures the goodness of fit of the model to validate all research hypotheses.  
Successful organisations and their performance measurement systems have 
negotiated effectively conflicting objectives by seeking alignment towards a 
common goal (Kaplan and Norton, 2006; Kathuria et al., 2007; Decoene and 
Bruggeman, 2006). By adapting and testing a method to measure degrees of 
alignment of inter-firm objectives and the effect on successful contractual 
alliances this research extends current PMS and IFR theories.  
Applied research must also inform and shape management practice. 
Considering the high level of activity in the formation (and dissolution) of 
contractual alliances, it is important that management research addresses the 
expanding use of service providers to manage non-core business functions 
(Gulati and Singh, 1998; Gulati and Kletter, 2005). The conclusions and 
methods of this research will inform managers on how to set-up better SLAs 
and the importance of aligning them to the Financial objectives of both signing 
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parties.  Especially for existing contractual alliances, service providers will be 
able to identify and predict outcomes of relationships that have a high risk of 
dissolution and low probability of success.  Having this kind of predictive ability 
is what motivated the sponsoring logistics service provider to support this 
research and to provide access to their internal contractual alliances.  Hopefully 
the contextual application of this research in the logistics services industry can 
be extrapolated to many other industries facing the same challenges of aligning 
objectives across IFRs when conflicting goals and complex service level 
agreements are present.  
Table 65 Final Contributions from Hypotheses Testing 
RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
FINAL RELATIONSHIP 
CONFIRMED 
RESEARCH 
CONTRIBUTION 
H1 
The degree of alignment amongst inter-firm 
performance measures is positively correlated with 
contractual alliance success 
Positive and significant 
causal relation 
Hypothesis 
confirmed 
H2 
The measure of alignment between the contract’s 
service level agreements and the actual performance 
values contributes significantly to the measure of inter-
firm alignment 
Positive contribution 
Non-significant 
Hypothesis 
partially 
confirmed 
H3 
The measure of alignment between the contract’s 
service level agreements (SLA) and the provider’s 
financial objectives contributes significantly to the 
measure of inter-firm alignment. 
Significantly positive 
contribution 
Hypothesis 
confirmed 
H4 
The measure of alignment between the contract’s 
service level agreements (SLA) and the user’s financial 
objectives contributes significantly to the measure of 
inter-firm alignment 
Positive contribution 
Non-significant 
Hypothesis 
partially 
confirmed 
H5 
An active inter-firm relationship governed by a formal 
mechanism is significantly and positively correlated to 
contractual alliance success  
Significantly positive 
contribution 
Hypothesis 
confirmed 
H6 
The length of the inter-firm relationship is significantly 
and positively correlated to contractual alliance 
success 
Significantly positive 
contribution 
Hypothesis 
confirmed 
H7 
The number of renegotiations of the terms of the inter-
firm relationship is significantly and negatively 
correlated to contractual alliance success 
Significantly Positive 
Contribution 
Hypothesis 
rejected as it 
predicted a 
negative 
contribution 
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RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
FINAL RELATIONSHIP 
CONFIRMED 
RESEARCH 
CONTRIBUTION 
H8 
The relative profitability of the inter-firm relationship is 
significantly and positively correlated to contractual 
alliance success 
Positive contribution 
Non-significant 
Hypothesis 
partially 
confirmed 
 
 
Figure 19 Loci of Confirmed Contributions from Research 
7.4 Limitations 
The research process forces certain early decisions and methodological 
preferences that later become limitations of the application of the research 
results.  In this case, limitations arise from the simplification of the constructs, 
the research design, the sources of data, the selected research methods, and 
the choice of specific theoretical lenses and philosophical positions. It is the 
objective of this section not only to disclose such limitations, but to challenge 
future research studies to overcome them.  
- Limitations from Simplification of Constructs: As discussed in Chapter 4, 
the operationalisation of the contractual alliance success (CAS) index 
was done by using observable factors from the pool of alliances 
considered in the study. These factors are those dimensions of success 
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related to outcomes from formal mechanisms of CA governance. The 
CAS index included the formality of the relationship, its longevity, stability 
and relative profitability of the inter-firm relationship. However, it is 
important to acknowledge that there are other factors that determine and 
the success of an alliance. These factors of alliance success were 
introduced in Chapter 2, Section 2.2.4.2 when discussing Dynamic 
Determinants of Success. They include factors such as Knowledge 
Sharing Routines, Relational Capabilities, and building Relational Capital 
as a measure of alliance success. Future studies could add external 
factors and ‘softer’ determinants to the operationalisation of the CAS 
index.   
- Limitations from research design: The main limitation from research 
design is the fact that the contractual alliances subject to study are 
between a common service provider and their own existing customers. 
This design may introduce a bias towards certain contract structure and 
a particular profile of customers that have outsourced their logistics 
operations to this provider. Also, the design is based on sectional data 
considering one year of SLA information for the contracts, as opposed to 
a longitudinal review of SLAs.  
- Limitiations from available data:  The data was provided by a single 
primary source. The single source may have introduced a bias in the way 
contracts are structured and how SLAs are defined. Also, due to the 
requirements for financial information, all firms in the study are publicly 
quoted firms, which skew the sample towards firms of a certain size and 
reporting disciplines. Considering this, the results may not apply to 
privately held companies where the financial performance requirements 
are less transparent or stringent.  
- Limitations from selected research methods: Early on the research 
design called for the use of structural equation modelling. The use of this 
technique is favoured by quantitative researchers that want to test full 
causal models for theory-testing. This introduces a particular bias in the 
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analysis when considering the assumptions and limitations of SEM that 
were discussed in Chapter 4.  
- Limitations from theoretical lenses and philosophical positions: The 
choice of Transaction Cost Economics adds to the explanatory power of 
the model of IFA to predict CAS. However, it also brings some 
assumptions that may limit the generalisation of the results. Using TCE 
coloured the selection of variables to include in the calculation of the 
CAS index, and in the assumptions behind the concept of inter-firm 
alignment (IFA). We still believe TCE is a powerful theoretical lens to 
study contractual alliances. Nonetheless, we acknowledge the limitations 
of this choice.  From a philosophical position, the post-positivist stance 
may cause some problems for those looking at a more constructivist 
explanation of contractual alliance success.  
Section 8.4 of the conclusions proposes avenues for future research that may 
overcome some of the limitations presented above.  
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8 CONCLUSIONS 
8.1 Aim of the Research and Research Questions 
The aim of the research was to investigate why seemingly successful inter-firm 
relationships fail and get abruptly terminated. More specifically why contractual 
alliances, a particular type of inter-firm relations, may deliver results according 
to their pre-specified goals (SLAs) and still be terminated. Contractual alliances 
are a complex type of inter-firm relationship because the participating partners 
do not share equity in the new governance structure. They create value by 
interchanging products and services with each other, with one acting as the 
provider and the other as the user.  
The management literature has explored in depth the three domains of 
knowledge that this research connects: inter-firm relationships, performance 
measurement systems and strategic alignment. The concepts of alignment of 
strategic objectives are mature and well operationalised. So is the theory behind 
performance measurement systems, especially in an intra-firm context. The 
extant literature on inter-firm relationships is vast and covers all aspects of 
typologies, motivations to enter an IFR, determinants of success, causes of its 
failures, and the measurement of alliance success.  
What this research does is connecting the literature on PMS with the IFR 
domain via aligned performance measures in an inter-firm context, as an 
additional explanatory variable of IFR success. The key proposition, later a 
research hypothesis, is that lack of alignment between the partners’ objectives 
and the goals of the contractual alliance contributes to explain the failure of the 
relationship.  
This chapter summarises the key elements of the research and its results. 
Section 8.2, a summary of chapters 4 and 5, reviews the research methods and 
the process followed to answer the research questions. Section 8.3 summarises 
the key contributions to knowledge from this research in the context of the 
literature domains presented in chapter 2. The full discussion of contributions 
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and limitations of the research was presented in chapter 7. Section 8.4 
proposes future research ideas in order to address current limitations and close 
additional knowledge gaps acknowledged in this research.   
8.2 Research Methods and Process 
Based on the general aim of the research, the methods and processes 
answered specific questions: 
1. How to measure inter-firm alignment amongst the performance 
objectives of the provider, the performance objectives of the user, and 
the internal service level agreements between both parties? 
2. How to measure contractual alliance success and what are the critical 
dimensions that contribute to that success?  
3. How much inter-firm performance alignment explains contractual alliance 
success?  
The main hypothesis was that relationships fail because the so called ‘success’ 
was partial. This means that ‘success’ is only measuring the ability of the 
contractual alliance to fulfil the contract’s promises. However, current measures 
of success do not address the relationship’s ability to contribute to specific 
financial objectives of the partnering firms.  
The research questions were initially analysed in a review of the management 
literature on the subject of inter-organisation relationships (IFRs) and the 
features of optimal performance measurement systems. The key conclusions of 
what is known in the literature about these domains are: 
- Success in IFRs is defined by the fulfilment of the internal goals of the 
relationship. This success is measured by indicators of alliance-level 
effectiveness. They include the use of service level agreements (SLAs) 
to track the relationship’s ability to fulfil its objectives (Ariño, 2003; 
Madhok and Tallman, 1998).  
- The overall effectiveness of the new inter-firm organisational form is 
tracked by measurements of abrupt termination (Das and Teng, 2000; 
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Lunnan and Haugland, 2006), longevity (Beamish, 1988; Parkhe, 1993; 
Lin and Germain, 1998) and, contract stability (Chan et al, 1997; Anand 
and Khanna, 2000; and Ariño, 2003).  
- Alliance success is also measured by the impact of the alliance activity 
on firm performance. Measurements of firm-level impact include 
measures of stock price appreciation post-alliance formation (Chan et al, 
1997; Madhok and Tallman, 1998; Kale, Dyer and Singh, 2002). A 
different type of impact is the generation of relational rents derived from 
alliance activity (Lavie, 2006 and 2007, Koka and Prescott, 2008). 
- Alignment is seen as a desirable feature of intra-firm performance 
measurement system. It is defined as the congruency amongst the goals 
and objectives across different metrics (Bititci et al, 2006; Busi and Bititci, 
2006; Hitt, 1998; Neely et al, 2005; Yeung et al, 2006; Kaplan and 
Norton, 2006). This feature is prominent when discussing alignment of 
functional objectives against a corporate goal. There are references to 
alignment between inter-firm performance measurement systems, but 
mostly as a desirable feature without much operationalisation of the way 
to get it.  
- There are methodologies to assess alignment between two constructs. In 
the management literature the methodology has been applied to assess 
strategic alignment between a functional and a corporate strategy 
(Venkatraman and Camillus, 1984; Venkatraman, 1990), and the fit of a 
corporate strategy and its environment (Venkatraman and Prescott, 
1990; Ittner et al, 2003). The most popular method for measuring 
alignment is based on geometric distances between two points 
(Euclidean distances based on the square root of the differences 
between two values of the same construct).  
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) has been used frequently as the theoretical 
lens to study inter-firm relationships and the role of aligned performance 
measures to manage this particular governance mechanism. It was evident that 
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PMS serves a purpose to mitigate opportunism and bounded rationality, thus it 
was selected as the theoretical lens for this research.  
In summary, from the review of the relevant literature, there was not found an 
empirical study connecting the role of aligned inter-firm performance measures 
to explain contractual alliance success. Generally, is alignment of inter-firm 
performance measures a predictor of contractual alliance success?  
Considering the hypothesis and the extant knowledge gap, the research set out 
to operationalise and measure alignment of inter-firm performance measures 
(IFA), and to operationalise and measure contractual alliance success (CAS). 
According to the results of the research, these two variables are positively and 
inter-firm alignment is an additional causal factor of contractual alliance 
success.  
The two constructs - Inter-firm Alignment Coefficient (IAC) and Contractual 
Alliance Success (CAS) – were operationalised and measured through an initial 
pilot study based on a small set of logistics outsourcing contracts, furnished by 
a leading logistics service provider. The results of the pilot study and a 
explanatory qualitative study are presented in Chapters 4 and 5 of this 
document.  
The satisfactory results of the pilot study and qualitative study gave way to a full 
quantitative study using a sample of 149 contracts between a logistics service 
provider and some key users. All firms involved in the research, - provider and 
users- are publicly-traded companies with full access to past and current 
financial performance indicators. Financial indicators were selected as proxy for 
the performance objectives of the firms in the relationship in order to assess 
alignment between the contract’s SLAs and the firms’ objectives.  
The full quantitative study relied on a statistical technique known as structural 
equation modelling (SEM) that tests in a simultaneous way multiple correlations 
between dependent and independent variables. In this case the independent 
variable was the inter-firm alignment coefficient (IAC) measuring the distance 
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between the internal contract’s SLAs and the partners’ financial objectives. The 
dependent variable was the contractual alliance success (CAS) index. This 
index defines a successful relationship by its longevity, stability measured as 
the number of renegotiations, the degree of formality and the relative profitability 
for the members. Relative profitability was defined considering the value of the 
contract as a per cent of the users’ SGA costs or as a per cent of the provider’s 
revenues. The qualitative study confirmed the relevance of these measures of 
CAS as suggested by the literature.  
8.3 Research Findings and Contributions 
The conclusion of the full quantitative study is that there is a significant and 
positive correlation between the degree of alignment of inter-firm performance 
measures and the success of the relationship. However, not all components of 
alignment are equally important. Alignment between the contract’s SLAs and 
the provider’s financial objectives is more important (has a greater statistical 
contribution), than SLAs and the provider’s financial objectives. What is more 
interesting is that alignment between target SLAs and actual service levels has 
the lowest contribution to the inter-firm performance alignment coefficient (IFA).  
The contributions to the literature on management of inter-firm organisations are 
centred on the determinants of IFR success. Current knowledge identifies two 
types of determinants of success: member-provided determinants (existing 
within the partners prior to alliance formation) and dynamic determinants 
(generated as post-formation dynamics).  
The member-provided determinants of IFR success include: 
- Network resources and relation-specific assets (Dyer, 1997; Gulati and 
Kletter, 2005; Madhok, 2000; Gulati, 2007 Williamson, 2005). 
- Collaborative management competencies (Anand and Khana, 2000; 
Lambe, 2002, Bititci et al, 2007; Khale and Singh, 2007)  
- Reputation and legitimacy to the new IFR provided by its members 
(Parkhe, 1993; Dacin, 2007).  
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This research adds a new member-provided determinant with significant 
correlation to contractual alliance success: aligned inter-firm performance 
measurement systems. The new determinant is regarded as a management 
competency, where participating firms are capable of designing aligned 
performance measurement systems for the new organisational form. 
As for dynamic determinants the literature considers a number of alliance post-
formation determinants of success, such as:  
- Relational capabilities, including concepts of trust, commitment, 
willingness to collaborate and compromise (Huxham, 1996; Bruner and 
Speckman, 1998; Ariño et al, 2001; Das and Teng, 2001; Zineldin and 
Bredenlow, 2003; Bititci et al, 2007)  
- Governance frameworks, critical in the study of alliances under the TCE 
lens (Williamson, 1981; Oxley, 1997; Dyer, 1997; Das and Teng, 2001; 
White, 2005)  
- Information and knowledge sharing routines to create relational capital 
(Parkhe, 1993; Zollo, 2002; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Greve, 2003;  
Ariño and Reuer, 2004; Bititci et al, 2007) 
This research adds a determinant, called aligned inter-firm performance 
measures, which should be introduced in governance frameworks as a dynamic 
determinant of IFR success, considering that the tracking of firms’ objectives 
and SLAs is a continuous effort throughout the duration of the relationship. The 
results confirm the importance of understanding the financial objectives of the 
partners and quantify the effectiveness of translating this understanding onto 
the right set of contract’s SLAs. The quantification is achieved with the 
coefficient of alignment of inter-firm performance measures (IFA).  
Additionally, the results of the research confirm the correlation of renegotiations, 
as an information and knowledge sharing routines, and contractual alliance 
success.These findings enhance previous knowledge in the literature by 
extending the measurements of alliance-level effectiveness beyond the use of 
SLAs to track the relationship’s ability to fulfil its objectives (Ariño, 2003; 
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Madhok and Tallman, 1998). It adds to the literature on measurement of 
alliance success by introducing the concept of aligned inter-firm performance as 
an indicator of success.  
Regarding contractual alliance success (CAS), the model demonstrated that 
there is a positive correlation, as predicted by the literature, between longevity 
and success (Beamish, 1988; Parkhe, 1993; Lin and Germain, 1998). However 
two different bodies of literature predicted different results regarding stability (or 
renegotiation activity in the alliance. In the alliance literature stability is 
considered a measure of success (Chan et al, 1997; Anand and Khanna, 2000; 
and Ariño, 2003), whereas in the organisational learning and performance feed-
back literature, less stability and more renegotiations are opportunities to 
improve performance and increase knowledge (Greve, 2003; Brass, et all, 
2004; Bititici et al, 2007). Therefore the results of this research confirm 
empirically the benefits of constant performance feed-back as means to 
organisational learning and contractual alliance success.  
The contributions to the performance management literature are mostly relatd to 
the design of PMS for extended enterprises. Since the conceptualisation of 
inter-firm relationships, the performance management literature has proposed 
different mechanisms to extend intra-firm, or intra-function performance 
measurements outside of the boundaries of the firm (Busi and Bititci, 2006). In 
some instances the focus has been on considering the objectives of external 
stakeholders (Atkinson et al, 1997; Adams and Neely, 2000;  Kaplan and 
Norton, 1992 and 1996), or by applying multi-objective optimisation techniques 
that create a single common objective (Altiparmak et al, 2006). In the 
management accounting literature some authors propose extending current 
financial statements and aggregate them to those of the partnering firms 
(Dekker, 2003 and 2004; Coletti et al, 2005). 
The theoretical model tested in this research proposes a design of an inter-firm 
performance measurement system that is not created by aggregation of local 
metrics or by the elimination of partners’ goals. It is generated by aligning 
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partner objectives to the metrics of the alliance. This is achieved through the 
IFA (inter-firm performance alignment) coefficient, as described in chapters 4 
and 5, and measured quantitatively through SEMs presented in chapter 6.   
Table 66 presents explicitly the contributions of the research in the context of 
the literature domains that inform the knowledge gaps and research questions 
of this thesis. The research results contribute to knowledge on management of 
inter-firm relationships, design of performance measurement systems in 
extended enterprises, and furthered the methods to assess alignment amongst 
performance measures.  
The main objective of this research was to explain contractual alliance success 
based on the degree of alignment between the alliance’s performance 
measures and the partners’ goals. It is clear that aligned inter-firm measures 
are not the only determinants of alliance success, but they are significant 
contributors. This is the main contribution of the research; testing empirically a 
new determinant of contractual alliance success.  
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Table 66 Summary of main contributions to knowledge 
Literature Domain Previous Knowledge Contributions to Knowledge 
Management of Inter-firm organisations.  
(Member-provided determinants of IFR 
success)  
 
The extant literature on inter-firm organisations 
acknowledges determinants of IFR success provided by 
its members, i.e.: 
i. Network resources and relation-specific assets 
(Dyer, 1997; Gulati and Kletter, 2005; Madhok, 
2000; Gulati, 2007 Williamson, 2005). 
ii. Collaborative management competencies (Anand 
and Khana, 2000; Lambe, 2002, Bititci et al, 2007; 
Khale and Singh, 2007)  
iii. iv) reputation and legitimacy to the new IFR 
provided by its members (Parkhe, 1993; Dacin, 
2007) 
(1)  This research adds a new member-provided determinant 
with significant correlation to contractual alliance success: 
aligned inter-firm performance measurement systems.  
The new determinant is regarded as a management 
competency, where participating firms are capable of 
designing aligned performance measurement systems for the 
new organisational form.  
Management of Inter-firm organisations.  
(Dynamic determinants of success)  
 
The literature considers a number of alliance post-
formation determinants of success, such as:  
i. Relational capabilities, including concepts of trust, 
commitment, willingness to collaborate and 
compromise (Huxham, 1996; Bruner and 
Speckman, 1998; Ariño et al, 2001; Das and 
Teng, 2001; Zineldin and Bredenlow, 2003; Bititci 
et al, 2007)  
ii. Governance frameworks, critical in the study of 
alliances under the TCE lens (Williamson, 1981; 
(2) This research adds a determinant, called aligned inter-firm 
performance measures, which should be introduced in 
governance frameworks as a dynamic determinant of IFR 
success, considering that the tracking of firms’ objectives and 
SLAs is a continuous effort throughout the duration of the 
relationship.  
(3) The results confirm the importance of understanding the 
financial objectives of the partners and quantify the 
effectiveness of translating this understanding onto the right 
set of contract’s SLAs. The quantification is achieved with the 
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Literature Domain Previous Knowledge Contributions to Knowledge 
Oxley, 1997; Dyer, 1997; Das and Teng, 2001; 
White, 2005)  
iii. Information and knowledge sharing routines to 
create relational capital (Parkhe, 1993; Zollo, 
2002; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Greve, 2003;  
Ariño and Reuer, 2004; Bititci et al, 2007) 
coefficient of alignment of inter-firm performance measures 
(IFA).  
(4) The results of the research confirm the correlation of 
renegotiations, as an information and knowledge sharing 
routines, and contractual alliance success.   
Performance Measurement Systems  
(Alignment as a Feature) 
 
- Multiple streams of the performance measurement 
system literature agree on the importance of 
alignment of measures, on their internal 
congruence (Bititci et al, 2006; Busi and Bititci, 
2006; Hitt, 1998; Neely et al, 2005; Yeung et al, 
2006; Kaplan and Norton, 2006) 
- Alignment has been operationalised and measured 
in the strategic management literature, by 
evaluating the degree of congruence (or fit) 
between functional and corporate strategy 
(Venkatraman and Camillus, 1984; Venkatraman, 
1990), and the fit of a corporate strategy and its 
environment (Venkatraman and Prescott, 1990; 
Ittner et al, 2003). 
(5)  This research contributes to the performance 
measurement literature but developing a method to assess 
degrees of alignment between two sets of measures, using 
Venkatraman’s technique for strategic alignment (Euclidean 
distances) 
 
Performance Measurement Systems for 
Extended Enterprises  
- Since the conceptualisation of inter-firm 
relationships, the performance management 
literature has proposed different mechanisms to 
extend intra-firm, or intra-function performance 
measurements outside of the boundaries of the 
(6)  The theoretical model tested in this research proposes a 
design of an inter-firm performance measurement system that 
is not created by aggregation of local metrics or by the 
elimination of partners’ goals. It is generated by aligning 
partner objectives to the metrics of the alliance. This is 
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Literature Domain Previous Knowledge Contributions to Knowledge 
firm (Busi and Bititci, 2006).  
- In some instances the focus has been on 
considering the objectives of external stakeholders 
(Atkinson et al, 1997; Adams and Neely, 2000;  
Kaplan and Norton, 1992 and 1996), or by applying 
multi-objective optimisation techniques that create 
a single common objective (Altiparmak et al, 2006).  
- In the management accounting literature some 
authors propose extending current financial 
statements and aggregate them to those of the 
partnering firms (Dekker, 2003 and 2004; Coletti et 
al, 2005).  
achieved through the IFA (inter-firm performance alignment) 
coefficient.   
 
Measurement of Contractual Alliance 
Success 
- Alliance success has been measured in the inter-
firm relationship literature in two different ways. 
One way measures the impact of alliance activity 
on firm performance. The second mechanism 
measures the effectiveness of the alliance itself. 
Currently these measurements have been 
considered individually.  
- Measurements of firm-level impact include 
measures of stock price appreciation post-alliance 
formation (Chan et al, 1997; Madhok and Tallman, 
1998; Kale, Dyer and Singh, 2002). A different type 
of impact is the generation of relational rents 
derived from alliance activity (Lavie, 2006 and 
(7)  This research combines in a single construct indicators of 
contractual alliance success both at the firm-level impact and 
alliance effectiveness. This index was calculated as the CAS 
including relative profitability (firm-level impact), stability, 
formality and longevity (alliance-level).  
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Literature Domain Previous Knowledge Contributions to Knowledge 
2007, Koka and Prescott, 2008).  
- Oher measurements of firm-level impact are the 
relative benefits for both parties to be involved in 
the relationship (Parkhe, 1993) mainly by 
bargaining a collective benefit rather than an 
individual one (game-theory).  
- Measurements of alliance-level effectiveness 
include the use of SLAs to track the ability to fulfil 
objectives (Ariño, 2003; Madhok and Tallman, 
1998), as well as the effectiveness of the 
organisational form.  
- This effectiveness is tracked by measurements of 
abrupt termination (Das and Teng, 2000; Lunnan 
and Haugland, 2006), longevity (Beamish, 1988; 
Parkhe, 1993; Lin and Germain, 1998), and 
contract stability (Chan et al, 1997; Anand and 
Khanna, 2000; and Ariño, 2003).  
(8) The results of the research confirm the importance of 
renegotiations as a dimension of CAS and in line of the 
organisational learning literature, but opposed to alliance 
literature suggesting stability as a dimension of success.  
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8.4 Recommendations and Future Research  
8.4.1 Recommendations 
The formation of inter-firm relationships will continue to grow. It is time 
management research, and all domains of management science move away 
from the intra-firm paradigm, and fully embrace the understanding and analysis 
of the inter-firm phenomena.  
Performance measurement and management will need to step-up into a world 
where the ability to design and measure controlled processes is diminished.  
One of the key challenges of managing and measuring inter-firm operations is 
the limited access to partner information. These fields will have to embrace 
mobility in data collection, and social networks as means to collect and analyse 
inter-firm performance information.  
The future of research in strategic alignment has to encompass more than 
philosophical and verbal congruence. An important step in developing the 
construct in performance measures but an initial step nevertheless. Strategic 
alignment must deliver almost immediate feed-back to those making decisions. 
Instant feed-back will keep managers seeking system-wide optimisation, over 
local improvements. Commensurately, incentives and pay-per-performance 
should embrace the need for alignment to general objectives. Measuring 
alignment at the inter-firm or intra-firm level will not matter if performance 
measurement systems mostly reward local success.  
This research matters to theory, to methods, and to practice. It matters to theory 
because it advances the conversation on how to manage, practically, inter-firm 
relationships and the role of PMS in it. Performance measurement systems 
need more than frameworks to explain how metrics fit with each other or how 
they must be classified. Performance measurement systems need to become 
communication tools, not punishment or bragging tools, but mechanisms that 
allow people in business to tell each other what is going on and act accordingly.  
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This research matters to methods, mostly because it uses an existing one, the 
measurement of strategic co-alignment, and applies it in another context to 
derive new conclusions. Finally, this research matters to practice. The 
outsourcing industry is really a love-to-hate industry. Firms may despise it but 
they cannot live without it. In the advent of managing a firm’s periphery, as its 
core shrinks, using tools like PMS in a smart way makes a difference to 
practitioners.   
8.4.2 Future Research 
Research projects are limited by design in their scope. However, the findings 
and contributions from this research suggest new avenues for future research.  
- It was clear from the beginning of the research, that alignment of inter-
firm performance measures was isolated as a causal factor to contractual 
alliance success.  It will be interesting to propose a research that 
combines the effects of inter-firm performance alignment with other 
known determinant of alliance success, such as relational capabilities, 
and explore the impacts of both determinants combined.   
- This research design considered one service provider with n-number of 
users. This design assured access to data from a single company with a 
fairly standard contract structure. Future studies may consider a research 
design with one user and n-number of providers for different services, or 
similar services. An extension of Dyer’s (1997) studies with buyer-
supplier relationships may incorporate this design with alignment as a 
key construct to test and explore.  
- The triangulation of methods seems to enrich the conclusions and the 
understanding of research results. The topic of alignment of inter-firm 
performance measures and inter-firm success seems suitable for case 
study research, with access to multiple relationship managers, a full 
periphery of business partners within industries that rely heavily on inter-
firm alliances. The Quan-Qual methods provide interesting inter-play of 
results as demonstrated in this thesis.  
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- One of the main contributions of this research was the operationalisation 
of the variables IFA and CAS. Of those variables, contractual alliance 
success is the most interesting to revisit. The results of this research 
highlighted the importance of renegotiations and longevity as measures 
of contractual alliance success. Both relations need to be retested in a 
study that specifically explores these measures.  
- The concept of relative profitability (Parkhe, 1993) needs to be fully 
developed and operationalised in light of game theory and TCE 
assumptions. This concept may become a powerful contributor to 
understand inter-firm relationship success mostly in contractual bi-lateral 
non-equity alliances.  
- The industry setting of this research was the logistics outsourcing 
industry. Future studies may consider replicating the same research 
design in other outsourcing sectors with similar or more challenging 
conditions. One of these sectors is the IT outsourcing industry, plagued 
by the same illness of failed alliances even when delivering results 
according to agreed upon SLAs.  
- Finally, future inquiries into the role of aligned inter-firm performance 
measurement systems should move beyond contractual alliances, and 
move into different type of inter-firm relationships. Interesting choices will 
be equity-based IFRs such as joint ventures and triads.  
At the speed at which inter-firm relationships are formed many more new 
questions will arise to keep management researchers interested and managers 
curious. Hopefully this research has contributed to both. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A Primary Contract SLAs from Service 
Provider  
The full content of this appendix is contained in an Excel spread sheet that 
accompanies this manuscript. The content could be obtained from 
maria.rey@cranfield.ac.uk as well. Enclosed is a sample screen of the data 
contained in the file. It shows 138 records of contracts between the Provider 
and the Users. The additional 11 contracts were added from the pilot study for a 
total of 149 contracts in the study and were presented in Chapter 5.   
The file includes the following fields:   
- User ID (replacing name of customer that will remain confidential) 
- SLA Description (name of key performance indicator) 
- Goal (target value of the SLA) 
- Average (average performance for the period of time of the report) 
- Difference (between Goal and Average) 
- High/Low (clarification if high is better or low is better by indicator) 
- Contractual (Yes/No for existing contract of relational activity) 
- Year of Data 
- Months of the Year with specific values 
- Account Vertical (industry represented) 
- Director of the Account and Programme Manager 
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Figure 20 Appendix A Screen Capture for Primary Data File
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Appendix B Financial Information for All Firms in the 
Analysis 
The full content of this appendix is contained in an Excel spread sheet that 
accompanies this manuscript. It could also be obtained from 
maria.rey@cranfield.ac.uk. Enclosed is a sample screen capture of the data 
contained in the file.  
The file includes the following fields: 
- Contract ID (Replacing name and ID of User will remain confidential) 
- SIC Code (Identifying the key economic activity of the firm. Critical to 
establish the financial gaps and objectives) 
- Revenue (Annual sales of the firm in the analysis in USD) 
- SGA as % of Sales (SGA Expenses as a percentage of sales) 
- SGA Value (Annual expenditure in sales, general and administrative 
expenses in USD) 
- Days in AP (Days in accounts receivables) 
- Revenue Growth (Percentage of change in revenues on an annual basis) 
- EBITDA/Revenue (Percentage of operational margin related to sales) 
- Cash Operating Cycle (Number of days of the cash conversion cycle) 
- Revenue/Fixed Assets (Equivalent to the asset turnover of the firm and its 
capital utilisation) 
- This information is repeated for three different moments in time: 
o Actual Performance (as reported in financial statements) 
o Performance Target (based on the value of the best performance 
by indicator in the same SIC code) 
o Performance Gap to Close (difference between actual and target, 
used to estimate financial objectives) 
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Figure 21 Appendix B Screen Capture for Financial Information of Participating Firms.  
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Appendix C Information on Contract Profiles  
The full content of this appendix is contained in an Excel spread sheet that 
accompanies this manuscript. It could also be obtained from 
maria.rey@cranfield.ac.uk. Enclosed is a sample screen capture of the file with 
contract profile information.  
The file includes the following fields: 
- Contract ID (Replacing name and ID of User will remain confidential) 
- SIC Code (Identifying the key economic activity of the firm. Critical to 
establish the financial gaps and objectives) 
- Revenue (Annual sales of the firm in the analysis in USD) 
- Contract Value (Annual value of the services rendered by the provider 
and paid by the user; in USD) 
- KPIs in SLAs (number of key performance indicators in the service level 
agreements) 
- Active or Decommissioned? (status of the current relationship) 
- Contract Longevity (number of years of the contractual alliance between 
provider and user) 
- Program Manager in Place? (Y/N to a dedicated relationship manager 
from the provider’s PMG) 
- Signed Contract in Place (Y/N to a signed legal document to govern the 
relationship) 
- Number of Renegotiations (during the length of the relationship how many 
times has it been renegotiated) 
- Contract Value as % of SGA (of User) and % of Revenue (of Provider) 
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Figure 22 Appendix C Screen Capture for Contract Profile Information 
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Appendix D Data Transformations for the SEM Model 
As explained in Chapter 6, prior to loading the data into AMOS, some variables 
need to be transformed. This transformation is done to improve normality, 
reduce collinearity (although irrelevant in SEM analysis), calculate missing 
values, etc. The file presented in this appendix contains the original data from 
the calculations of the variables and the transformed variables that went into 
AMOS. The final variables were used for the estimation and testing of the SEM 
model to correlate Inter-Firm Alignment (IFA) and Contractual Alliance Success 
(CAS), and the estimation of CAS = f(LONGEVITY; FORMALITY; 
RENEGOTIATIONS; RELATIVE PROFITABILITY), and IFA = f(USER-SLA; 
ACTUAL-SLA; PROVIDER-SLA).  
The full content of this appendix is contained in an Excel spread sheet that 
accompanies this manuscript. It could also be obtained from 
maria.rey@cranfield.ac.uk. Enclosed is a sample screen capture of the data 
contained in the file.  
- Active Relationship: Tested as  
o 2AS (double the product active and signed contract) 
- Renegotiations  
o Renegotiations Normalised 
o Renegotiations SQRT (Square Root) 
- SGA 
o SGARev (Product of SGA as % of Revenue) 
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Figure 23 Appendix D Screen Capture for File with Data Transformation 
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Appendix E Statistical Output Model from AMOS 19.0 
Analysis Summary of Estimated Model 
Date: Saturday, January 21, 2012         
Time: 18:08:24 
Title: Model IFA vs. CAS: Saturday, January 21, 2012 18:08 
Notes: Details of each bootstrap sample are not available for a parametric 
bootstrap. 
 
Groups  
Group number 1 (Group number 1) 
Notes for Group (Group number 1) 
The model is recursive. 
Sample size = 149 
 
Variable Summary (Group number 1) 
Your model contains the following variables (Group number 1) 
 
Observed endogenous variables 
MIS_USCON SQRT30    
MIS_CONACT SQRT31 
MIS_PRCON SQRT32 
Longevity SQRT33 
2AS34 
SGA SQRT35 
Renegotiations Normalized36 
                                            
30
 Equivalent to USER-SLA variable after transformation of the square root of the coefficient of 
misalignment between user’s financial objectives and contract’s SLAs in the calculation of IFA 
31
 Equivalent to ACTUAL-SLA variable after transformation of the square root of the coefficient of 
misalignment between contract’s SLAs and actual values of the KPIs in the calculation of IFA 
32
 Equivalent to PROVIDER-SLA variable after transformation of the square root of the coefficient 
of misalignment between provider’s financial objectives and contract’s SLAs in the calculation of 
IFA 
33
 Equivalent to the square root of the number of years of the relationship between provider and 
user known as the LONGEVITY variable in the calculation of CAS 
34
 Equivalent to twice the product of an active relationship with a signed contract known as the 
FORMALITY variable in the calculation of CAS 
35
 Equivalent to the square root of the value of the contract as a % of the Users’ SGA or the 
Provider’s revenue, known as the RELATIVE PROFITABILITY variable in the calculation of CAS 
36
 Equivalent to the normalized values of the number of renegotiations that have taken place 
during the life of the contract, known as the RENEGOTIATIONS variable in the calculation of 
CAS 
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Unobserved Endogenous variables 
Success37 
 
Unobserved exogenous variables 
Misalign38 
e1 
e2 
e3 
e5 
e4 
e12 
e10 
e9 
 
Variable counts (Group number 1) 
Number of variables in your model: 17 
Number of observed variables: 7 
Number of unobserved variables: 10 
Number of exogenous variables: 9 
Number of endogenous variables: 8 
 
Parameter summary (Group number 1) 
 Weights Covariances Variances Means Intercepts Total 
Fixed 10 0 0 0 0 10 
Labelled 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unlabelled 6 0 9 0 7 22 
Total 16 0 9 0 7 32 
 
Assessment of normality (Group number 1) 
Variable min max skew c.r. kurtosis c.r. 
Renegotiations Normalized .000 1.000 2.635 13.129 9.614 23.956 
SGA SQRT .000 .680 2.527 12.591 9.446 23.536 
2AS .000 3.000 -2.138 -10.657 3.814 9.504 
Longevity SQRT .000 7.071 .595 2.965 1.176 2.930 
MIS_PRCON SQRT .000 1.257 -.633 -3.153 -.092 -.230 
                                            
37
 Corresponds to the unobserved endogenous variable known as the “Contractual Alliance 
Success” index or CAS throughout the manuscript, calculated as a f(LONGEVITY, FORMALITY, 
RENEGOTIATIONS, RELATIVE PROFITABILITY) 
 
38
 Corresponds to the unobserved exogenous variable known as the “Inter-Firm Alignment” 
coefficient or IFA throughout the manuscript, calculated as a f(USER-SLA, ACTUAL-SLA, 
PROVIDER-SLA) 
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MIS_CONACT SQRT .000 2.000 3.344 16.665 18.037 44.941 
MIS_USCON SQRT .000 1.267 -.201 -1.003 -.425 -1.059 
Multivariate      38.482 20.924 
 
Observations farthest from the centroid (Mahalanobis distance) (Group number 1) 
Observation number Mahalanobis d-squared p1 p2 
37 56.332 .000 .000 
112 37.509 .000 .000 
25 33.636 .000 .000 
40 30.425 .000 .000 
82 23.020 .002 .000 
84 20.379 .005 .000 
76 17.431 .015 .007 
149 16.940 .018 .005 
19 16.819 .019 .002 
30 16.590 .020 .001 
34 15.996 .025 .001 
135 15.408 .031 .003 
107 15.100 .035 .002 
148 15.096 .035 .001 
139 14.937 .037 .000 
118 14.648 .041 .000 
106 14.349 .045 .000 
9 13.351 .064 .007 
43 12.937 .074 .014 
108 12.625 .082 .020 
64 12.306 .091 .029 
16 12.082 .098 .034 
124 11.741 .109 .057 
70 11.456 .120 .082 
113 10.846 .145 .251 
79 10.677 .153 .268 
110 10.606 .157 .236 
31 10.203 .177 .400 
73 9.860 .197 .557 
122 9.771 .202 .540 
41 9.402 .225 .720 
24 9.305 .231 .715 
146 9.195 .239 .721 
81 9.079 .247 .732 
103 8.842 .264 .816 
20 8.735 .272 .824 
138 8.661 .278 .814 
36 8.607 .282 .794 
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8 8.441 .295 .838 
46 8.380 .300 .825 
35 8.064 .327 .926 
77 8.015 .331 .916 
131 7.813 .349 .951 
111 7.525 .376 .984 
114 7.440 .385 .986 
85 7.426 .386 .980 
136 7.345 .394 .981 
7 7.333 .395 .973 
109 7.285 .400 .969 
52 7.064 .422 .988 
87 7.062 .422 .981 
74 7.060 .423 .972 
115 6.777 .453 .993 
29 6.624 .469 .997 
104 6.524 .480 .998 
123 6.502 .482 .997 
96 6.500 .483 .994 
143 6.476 .485 .993 
133 6.475 .486 .989 
58 6.417 .492 .988 
92 6.381 .496 .986 
145 6.375 .497 .980 
18 6.335 .501 .977 
93 6.325 .502 .969 
137 6.074 .531 .992 
66 6.068 .532 .988 
98 5.754 .569 .999 
130 5.748 .569 .998 
68 5.626 .584 .999 
53 5.554 .593 .999 
99 5.542 .594 .999 
78 5.454 .605 .999 
127 5.300 .623 1.000 
132 5.250 .629 1.000 
39 4.976 .663 1.000 
3 4.919 .670 1.000 
47 4.810 .683 1.000 
134 4.738 .692 1.000 
63 4.656 .702 1.000 
57 4.512 .719 1.000 
129 4.488 .722 1.000 
56 4.421 .730 1.000 
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119 4.335 .740 1.000 
32 4.325 .742 1.000 
120 4.268 .748 1.000 
83 4.267 .749 1.000 
17 4.219 .754 1.000 
94 4.136 .764 1.000 
22 4.089 .769 1.000 
140 4.059 .773 1.000 
42 4.057 .773 1.000 
142 3.939 .787 1.000 
60 3.822 .800 1.000 
5 3.817 .801 1.000 
126 3.487 .837 1.000 
4 3.427 .843 1.000 
26 3.421 .844 1.000 
72 3.376 .848 1.000 
97 3.366 .849 1.000 
49 3.288 .857 1.000 
 
Sample Moments (Group number 1) 
Sample Covariances (Group number 1) 
 
Renegotiations 
Normalized 
SGA 
SQRT 
2AS 
Longevity 
SQRT 
MIS_PR
CON 
SQRT 
MIS_CO
NACT 
SQRT 
MIS_USCO
N SQRT 
Renegotiations 
Normalized 
.022       
SGA SQRT .001 .012      
2AS .018 .018 .584     
Longevity 
SQRT 
.054 .017 .115 1.183    
MIS_PRCON 
SQRT 
-.009 -.005 .016 -.015 .089   
MIS_CONACT 
SQRT 
-.001 -.003 -.016 -.023 .018 .058  
MIS_USCON 
SQRT 
-.003 -.001 .025 -.005 .048 .012 .064 
 
Condition number = 118.654 
Eigenvalues 
1.208 .565 .132 .051 .027 .018 .010 
Determinant of sample covariance matrix = .000 
 
Sample Correlations (Group number 1) 
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Renegotiations 
Normalized 
SGA 
SQRT 
2AS 
Longevity 
SQRT 
MIS_PR
CON 
SQRT 
MIS_C
ONACT 
SQRT 
MIS_USC
ON 
SQRT 
Renegotiations 
Normalized 
1.000       
SGA SQRT .055 1.000      
2AS .159 .218 1.000     
Longevity SQRT .337 .147 .138 1.000    
MIS_PRCON 
SQRT 
-.201 -.155 .069 -.046 1.000   
MIS_CONACT 
SQRT 
-.038 -.133 -.086 -.087 .254 1.000  
MIS_USCON 
SQRT 
-.086 -.033 .129 -.018 .637 .202 1.000 
 
Condition number = 5.657 
Eigenvalues 
1.907 1.485 1.069 .829 .771 .602 .337 
Sample Means (Group number 1) 
Renegotiations 
Normalized 
SGA 
SQRT 
2AS 
Longevity 
SQRT 
MIS_PRCON 
SQRT 
MIS_CONACT 
SQRT 
MIS_USCON 
SQRT 
.125 .105 2.624 2.939 .674 .242 .714 
 
Models 
Default model (Default model) 
Notes for Model (Default model) 
 
Computation of degrees of freedom (Default model) 
Number of distinct sample moments: 35 
Number of distinct parameters to be estimated: 22 
Degrees of freedom (35 - 22): 13 
 
Result (Default model) 
Minimum was achieved 
Chi-square = 21.488 
Degrees of freedom = 13 
Probability level = .064 
 
Group number 1 (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Estimates (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Scalar Estimates (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
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Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
Success <--- Misalign -.776 .452 -1.716 .086  
MIS_USCON SQRT <--- Misalign 1.000     
MIS_CONACT SQRT <--- Misalign .386 .125 3.089 .002  
MIS_PRCON SQRT <--- Misalign 1.747 .549 3.184 .001  
Longevity SQRT <--- Success 1.000     
SGA SQRT <--- Success .043 .023 1.847 .065  
2AS <--- Success .356 .172 2.069 .039  
Renegotiations Normalized <--- Success .158 .067 2.344 .019  
 
Standardized Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   Estimate 
Success <--- Misalign -.223 
MIS_USCON SQRT <--- Misalign .657 
MIS_CONACT SQRT <--- Misalign .265 
MIS_PRCON SQRT <--- Misalign .969 
Longevity SQRT <--- Success .530 
SGA SQRT <--- Success .231 
2AS <--- Success .269 
Renegotiations Normalized <--- Success .614 
 
Intercepts: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
MIS_USCON SQRT .714 .021 34.406 ***  
MIS_CONACT SQRT .242 .020 12.155 ***  
MIS_PRCON SQRT .674 .025 27.468 ***  
Longevity SQRT 2.939 .089 32.863 ***  
Renegotiations Normalized .125 .012 10.246 ***  
SGA SQRT .105 .009 11.912 ***  
2AS 2.624 .063 41.790 ***  
 
Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
Misalign .027 .010 2.682 .007  
e4 .316 .164 1.934 .053  
e1 .036 .009 3.918 ***  
e2 .054 .006 8.435 ***  
e3 .005 .025 .214 .831  
e5 .850 .174 4.899 ***  
e12 .541 .068 8.013 ***  
e10 .011 .001 8.178 ***  
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e9 .014 .004 3.562 ***  
 
Squared Multiple Correlations: (Group number 1 - Default model)39 
 Estimate 
Success .050 
Renegotiations Normalized .377 
SGA SQRT .054 
2AS .072 
Longevity SQRT .281 
MIS_PRCON SQRT .940 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .070 
MIS_USCON SQRT .431 
 
Matrices (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Residual Covariances (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 
Renegotiations 
Normalized 
SGA 
SQRT 
2AS 
Longevity 
SQRT 
MIS_PR
CON 
SQRT 
MIS_CON
ACT 
SQRT 
MIS_USCO
N SQRT 
Renegotiations 
Normalized 
.000       
SGA SQRT -.001 .000      
2AS -.001 .013 .000     
Longevity 
SQRT 
.002 .003 -.003 .000    
MIS_PRCON 
SQRT 
-.003 -.003 .029 .022 .000   
MIS_CONACT 
SQRT 
.000 -.003 -.013 -.015 .000 .000  
MIS_USCON 
SQRT 
.000 .000 .032 .016 .000 .002 .000 
 
 
Residual Means (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Renegotiations 
Normalized 
SGA 
SQRT 
2AS 
Longevity 
SQRT 
MIS_PRCON 
SQRT 
MIS_CONACT 
SQRT 
MIS_USCON 
SQRT 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
                                            
39 Squared multiple correlations are also independent of units of measurement. Amos 
displays a squared multiple correlation for each endogenous variable. The squared 
multiple correlation of a variable is the proportion of its variance that is accounted for by 
its predictors. In the present example, knowledge, value, and satisfaction account for 
40% of the variance of performance. 
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Standardized Residual Covariances (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 
Renegotiations 
Normalized 
SGA 
SQR
T 
2AS 
Longevity 
SQRT 
MIS_PRC
ON SQRT 
MIS_CON
ACT SQRT 
MIS_USC
ON SQRT 
Renegotiations 
Normalized 
.000       
SGA SQRT -1.049 .000      
2AS -.064 1.890 .000     
Longevity 
SQRT 
.128 .287 -.049 .000    
MIS_PRCON 
SQRT 
-.823 
-
1.277 
1.548 .831 .000   
MIS_CONACT 
SQRT 
-.024 
-
1.450 
-.849 -.673 -.031 .000  
MIS_USCON 
SQRT 
.047 .010 2.049 .720 .002 .334 .000 
 
Standardized Residual Means (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Renegotiations 
Normalized 
SGA 
SQRT 
2AS 
Longevity 
SQRT 
MIS_PRCON 
SQRT 
MIS_CONACT 
SQRT 
MIS_USCON 
SQRT 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
 
Factor Score Weights (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 
Renegotiations 
Normalized 
SGA 
SQRT 
2AS 
Longevity 
SQRT 
MIS_PRCON 
SQRT 
MIS_CONACT 
SQRT 
MIS_USCON 
SQRT 
Misalign -.007 -.002 .000 -.001 .512 .011 .043 
Success 1.759 .603 .100 .180 -.191 -.004 -.016 
 
Total Effects (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 Misalign Success 
Success -.776 .000 
Renegotiations Normalized -.122 .158 
SGA SQRT -.033 .043 
2AS -.276 .356 
Longevity SQRT -.776 1.000 
MIS_PRCON SQRT 1.747 .000 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .386 .000 
MIS_USCON SQRT 1.000 .000 
Standardized Total Effects (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 Misalign Success 
Success -.223 .000 
Renegotiations Normalized -.137 .614 
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SGA SQRT -.052 .231 
2AS -.060 .269 
Longevity SQRT -.118 .530 
MIS_PRCON SQRT .969 .000 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .265 .000 
MIS_USCON SQRT .657 .000 
 
Direct Effects (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 Misalign Success 
Success -.776 .000 
Renegotiations Normalized .000 .158 
SGA SQRT .000 .043 
2AS .000 .356 
Longevity SQRT .000 1.000 
MIS_PRCON SQRT 1.747 .000 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .386 .000 
MIS_USCON SQRT 1.000 .000 
 
Standardized Direct Effects (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 Misalign Success 
Success -.223 .000 
Renegotiations Normalized .000 .614 
SGA SQRT .000 .231 
2AS .000 .269 
Longevity SQRT .000 .530 
MIS_PRCON SQRT .969 .000 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .265 .000 
MIS_USCON SQRT .657 .000 
 
Indirect Effects (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 Misalign Success 
Success .000 .000 
Renegotiations Normalized -.122 .000 
SGA SQRT -.033 .000 
2AS -.276 .000 
Longevity SQRT -.776 .000 
MIS_PRCON SQRT .000 .000 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .000 .000 
MIS_USCON SQRT .000 .000 
Standardized Indirect Effects (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 Misalign Success 
Success .000 .000 
Renegotiations Normalized -.137 .000 
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SGA SQRT -.052 .000 
2AS -.060 .000 
Longevity SQRT -.118 .000 
MIS_PRCON SQRT .000 .000 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .000 .000 
MIS_USCON SQRT .000 .000 
 
Modification Indices (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Covariances: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   M.I. Par Change 
e12 <--> e10 4.345 .014 
 
Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   M.I. Par Change 
 
Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   M.I. Par Change 
 
Means: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   M.I. Par Change 
 
Intercepts: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   M.I. Par Change 
 
Bootstrap (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Bootstrap standard errors (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Scalar Estimates (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 
Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Parameter SE SE-SE Mean Bias SE-Bias 
Success <--- Misalign .543 .027 -.634 .142 .038 
MIS_USCON SQRT <--- Misalign .000 .000 1.000 .000 .000 
MIS_CONACT SQRT <--- Misalign .137 .007 .396 .010 .010 
MIS_PRCON SQRT <--- Misalign .881 .044 1.856 .109 .062 
Longevity SQRT <--- Success .000 .000 1.000 .000 .000 
SGA SQRT <--- Success .116 .006 .069 .026 .008 
2AS <--- Success .805 .040 .526 .170 .057 
Renegotiations Normalized <--- Success .336 .017 .217 .059 .024 
Standardized Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Parameter SE SE-SE Mean Bias SE-Bias 
Success <--- Misalign .162 .008 -.181 .042 .011 
MIS_USCON SQRT <--- Misalign .158 .008 .682 .025 .011 
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MIS_CONACT SQRT <--- Misalign .093 .005 .275 .010 .007 
MIS_PRCON SQRT <--- Misalign .206 .010 .975 .006 .015 
Longevity SQRT <--- Success .177 .009 .520 -.011 .013 
SGA SQRT <--- Success .196 .010 .277 .046 .014 
2AS <--- Success .164 .008 .307 .038 .012 
Renegotiations Normalized <--- Success .347 .017 .615 .002 .025 
 
Intercepts: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Parameter SE SE-SE Mean Bias SE-Bias 
MIS_USCON SQRT .021 .001 .715 .001 .001 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .019 .001 .241 .000 .001 
MIS_PRCON SQRT .026 .001 .677 .003 .002 
Longevity SQRT .090 .004 2.932 -.006 .006 
Renegotiations Normalized .012 .001 .124 -.001 .001 
SGA SQRT .009 .000 .105 .000 .001 
2AS .062 .003 2.622 -.002 .004 
 
Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Parameter SE SE-SE Mean Bias SE-Bias 
Misalign .020 .001 .031 .004 .001 
e4 .229 .011 .336 .020 .016 
e1 .019 .001 .032 -.004 .001 
e2 .006 .000 .053 -.001 .000 
e3 .040 .002 .000 -.005 .003 
e5 .237 .012 .811 -.039 .017 
e12 .105 .005 .511 -.031 .007 
e10 .003 .000 .010 -.001 .000 
e9 .019 .001 .011 -.003 .001 
 
Squared Multiple Correlations: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Parameter SE SE-SE Mean Bias SE-Bias 
Success .056 .003 .059 .009 .004 
Renegotiations Normalized .853 .043 .498 .122 .060 
SGA SQRT .215 .011 .115 .062 .015 
2AS .159 .008 .121 .049 .011 
Longevity SQRT .194 .010 .301 .020 .014 
MIS_PRCON SQRT .460 .023 .994 .054 .033 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .049 .002 .084 .014 .003 
MIS_USCON SQRT .296 .015 .490 .059 .021 
 
Matrices (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Sample Covariances - Standard Errors (Group number 1 - Default model) 
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Renegotiations 
Normalized 
SGA 
SQRT 
2AS 
Longevity 
SQRT 
MIS_PR
CON 
SQRT 
MIS_CO
NACT 
SQRT 
MIS_USCO
N SQRT 
Renegotiations 
Normalized 
.003       
SGA SQRT .001 .001      
2AS .009 .006 .065     
Longevity 
SQRT 
.015 .009 .066 .139    
MIS_PRCON 
SQRT 
.004 .003 .018 .026 .010   
MIS_CONACT 
SQRT 
.003 .002 .015 .022 .006 .007  
MIS_USCON 
SQRT 
.003 .002 .016 .020 .007 .005 .007 
 
Sample Correlations - Standard Errors (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 
Renegotiations 
Normalized 
SGA 
SQRT 
2AS 
Longevity 
SQRT 
MIS_PR
CON 
SQRT 
MIS_CO
NACT 
SQRT 
MIS_USCO
N SQRT 
Renegotiations 
Normalized 
.000       
SGA SQRT .076 .000      
2AS .080 .073 .000     
Longevity 
SQRT 
.078 .074 .079 .000    
MIS_PRCON 
SQRT 
.083 .080 .079 .080 .000   
MIS_CONACT 
SQRT 
.081 .078 .080 .083 .075 .000  
MIS_USCON 
SQRT 
.079 .079 .083 .073 .052 .071 .000 
 
Sample Means - Standard Errors (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 
Renegotiations 
Normalized 
SGA 
SQRT 
2AS 
Longevity 
SQRT 
MIS_PRC
ON SQRT 
MIS_CONA
CT SQRT 
MIS_USC
ON SQRT 
Renegotiations 
Normalized 
.012 .009 .062 .090 .026 .019 .021 
 
 
Factor Score Weights - Standard Errors (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 
Renegotiations 
Normalized 
SGA 
SQRT 
2AS 
Longevity 
SQRT 
MIS_PRCON 
SQRT 
MIS_CONACT 
SQRT 
MIS_USCON 
SQRT 
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Misalign .060 .083 .010 .005 .283 .061 .495 
Success .805 .510 .073 .200 .169 .019 .085 
 
Total Effects - Standard Errors (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 Misalign Success 
Success .543 .000 
Renegotiations Normalized .099 .336 
SGA SQRT .047 .116 
2AS .296 .805 
Longevity SQRT .543 .000 
MIS_PRCON SQRT .881 .000 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .137 .000 
MIS_USCON SQRT .000 .000 
 
Standardized Total Effects - Standard Errors (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 Misalign Success 
Success .162 .000 
Renegotiations Normalized .104 .347 
SGA SQRT .068 .196 
2AS .068 .164 
Longevity SQRT .081 .177 
MIS_PRCON SQRT .206 .000 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .093 .000 
MIS_USCON SQRT .158 .000 
 
Direct Effects - Standard Errors (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 Misalign Success 
Success .543 .000 
Renegotiations Normalized .000 .336 
SGA SQRT .000 .116 
2AS .000 .805 
Longevity SQRT .000 .000 
MIS_PRCON SQRT .881 .000 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .137 .000 
MIS_USCON SQRT .000 .000 
 
Standardized Direct Effects - Standard Errors (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 Misalign Success 
Success .162 .000 
Renegotiations Normalized .000 .347 
SGA SQRT .000 .196 
2AS .000 .164 
Longevity SQRT .000 .177 
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MIS_PRCON SQRT .206 .000 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .093 .000 
MIS_USCON SQRT .158 .000 
 
Indirect Effects - Standard Errors (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 Misalign Success 
Success .000 .000 
Renegotiations Normalized .099 .000 
SGA SQRT .047 .000 
2AS .296 .000 
Longevity SQRT .543 .000 
MIS_PRCON SQRT .000 .000 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .000 .000 
MIS_USCON SQRT .000 .000 
 
Standardized Indirect Effects - Standard Errors (Group number 1 - Default 
model) 
 Misalign Success 
Success .000 .000 
Renegotiations Normalized .104 .000 
SGA SQRT .068 .000 
2AS .068 .000 
Longevity SQRT .081 .000 
MIS_PRCON SQRT .000 .000 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .000 .000 
MIS_USCON SQRT .000 .000 
 
Bootstrap Confidence (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Percentile method (Group number 1 - Default model) 
90% confidence intervals (percentile method) 
Scalar Estimates (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 
Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Parameter Estimate Lower Upper P 
Success <--- Misalign -.776 -1.553 .340 .261 
MIS_USCON SQRT <--- Misalign 1.000 1.000 1.000 ... 
MIS_CONACT SQRT <--- Misalign .386 .161 .622 .017 
MIS_PRCON SQRT <--- Misalign 1.747 .978 3.699 .010 
Longevity SQRT <--- Success 1.000 1.000 1.000 ... 
SGA SQRT <--- Success .043 -.006 .182 .131 
2AS <--- Success .356 .091 1.300 .028 
APPENDIX E Statistical Output Model from AMOS 19.0 
316 
 
Renegotiations Normalized <--- Success .158 .065 .464 .014 
 
Standardized Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Parameter Estimate Lower Upper P 
Success <--- Misalign -.223 -.422 .130 .261 
MIS_USCON SQRT <--- Misalign .657 .441 .903 .010 
MIS_CONACT SQRT <--- Misalign .265 .093 .433 .016 
MIS_PRCON SQRT <--- Misalign .969 .714 1.364 .010 
Longevity SQRT <--- Success .530 .177 .806 .010 
SGA SQRT <--- Success .231 -.019 .594 .131 
2AS <--- Success .269 .059 .529 .029 
Renegotiations Normalized <--- Success .614 .221 1.128 .014 
 
Intercepts: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Parameter Estimate Lower Upper P 
MIS_USCON SQRT .714 .681 .747 .010 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .242 .209 .274 .010 
MIS_PRCON SQRT .674 .635 .721 .010 
Longevity SQRT 2.939 2.767 3.074 .010 
Renegotiations Normalized .125 .106 .145 .010 
SGA SQRT .105 .090 .120 .010 
2AS 2.624 2.529 2.741 .010 
 
Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Parameter Estimate Lower Upper P 
Misalign   .027 .012 .056 .010 
e4   .316 .034 .774 .010 
e1   .036 .013 .050 .053 
e2   .054 .043 .063 .010 
e3   .005 -.080 .043 .739 
e5   .850 .397 1.154 .023 
e12   .541 .378 .637 .017 
e10   .011 .007 .013 .019 
e9   .014 -.007 .021 .136 
 
Squared Multiple Correlations: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Parameter Estimate Lower Upper P 
Success   .050 .000 .184 .010 
Renegotiations Normalized   .377 .049 1.272 .010 
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Parameter Estimate Lower Upper P 
SGA SQRT   .054 .001 .353 .010 
2AS   .072 .005 .280 .010 
Longevity SQRT   .281 .031 .649 .010 
MIS_PRCON SQRT   .940 .510 1.861 .010 
MIS_CONACT SQRT   .070 .009 .187 .010 
MIS_USCON SQRT   .431 .194 .816 .010 
 
Matrices (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Sample Covariances (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 
Sample Covariances - Lower Bounds (PC) (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 
Renegotiations 
Normalized 
SGA 
SQRT 
2AS 
Longevity 
SQRT 
MIS_PR
CON 
SQRT 
MIS_CO
NACT 
SQRT 
MIS_US
CON 
SQRT 
Renegotiations 
Normalized 
.018       
SGA SQRT -.001 .010      
2AS .003 .009 .486     
Longevity 
SQRT 
.029 .004 .005 .949    
MIS_PRCON 
SQRT 
-.015 -.010 -.021 -.057 .071   
MIS_CONACT 
SQRT 
-.006 -.007 -.040 -.058 .008 .047  
MIS_USCON 
SQRT 
-.008 -.004 -.005 -.039 .035 .005 .051 
 
Sample Covariances - Upper Bounds (PC) (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 
Renegotiations 
Normalized 
SGA 
SQRT 
2AS 
Longevity 
SQRT 
MIS_PRC
ON SQRT 
MIS_CONA
CT SQRT 
MIS_USC
ON SQRT 
Renegotiations 
Normalized 
.026       
SGA SQRT .003 .014      
2AS .035 .029 .698     
Longevity 
SQRT 
.078 .033 .231 1.399    
MIS_PRCON 
SQRT 
-.002 -.001 .038 .034 .105   
MIS_CONACT 
SQRT 
.003 .000 .009 .011 .028 .069  
MIS_USCON 
SQRT 
.002 .003 .046 .028 .061 .020 .075 
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Sample Covariances - Two Tailed Significance (PC) (Group number 1 - Default 
model) 
 
Renegotiations 
Normalized 
SGA 
SQR
T 
2AS 
Longevity 
SQRT 
MIS_PRC
ON SQRT 
MIS_CO
NACT 
SQRT 
MIS_USCO
N SQRT 
Renegotiations 
Normalized 
.010       
SGA SQRT .425 .010      
2AS .062 .010 .010     
Longevity 
SQRT 
.010 .018 .090 .010    
MIS_PRCON 
SQRT 
.040 .043 .539 .492 .010   
MIS_CONACT 
SQRT 
.600 .126 .331 .339 .012 .010  
MIS_USCON 
SQRT 
.254 .594 .231 .667 .010 .010 .010 
 
Sample Correlations (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Sample Correlations - Lower Bounds (PC) (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 
Renegotiation
s Normalized 
SGA 
SQR
T 
2AS 
Longevit
y SQRT 
MIS_PRCO
N SQRT 
MIS_CONAC
T SQRT 
MIS_USCO
N SQRT 
Renegotiation
s Normalized 
1.000       
SGA SQRT -.074 1.000      
2AS .029 .097 
1.00
0 
    
Longevity 
SQRT 
.203 .038 .006 1.000    
MIS_PRCON 
SQRT 
-.312 -.290 -.088 -.175 1.000   
MIS_CONAC
T SQRT 
-.165 -.258 -.221 -.222 .116 1.000  
MIS_USCON 
SQRT 
-.209 -.165 -.029 -.140 .545 .090 1.000 
 
 
Sample Correlations - Upper Bounds (PC) (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 
Renegotiation
s Normalized 
SGA 
SQR
T 
2AS 
Longevit
y SQRT 
MIS_PRCO
N SQRT 
MIS_CONAC
T SQRT 
MIS_USCO
N SQRT 
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Renegotiation
s Normalized 
1.000       
SGA SQRT .189 1.000      
2AS .302 .339 
1.00
0 
    
Longevity 
SQRT 
.454 .273 .268 1.000    
MIS_PRCON 
SQRT 
-.046 -.030 .170 .109 1.000   
MIS_CONAC
T SQRT 
.098 .013 .047 .046 .381 1.000  
MIS_USCON 
SQRT 
.058 .106 .233 .099 .724 .340 1.000 
 
Sample Correlations - Two Tailed Significance (PC) (Group number 1 - Default 
model) 
 
Renegotiation
s Normalized 
SGA 
SQR
T 
2AS 
Longevity 
SQRT 
MIS_PRC
ON SQRT 
MIS_CONAC
T SQRT 
MIS_USCO
N SQRT 
Renegotiation
s Normalized 
...       
SGA SQRT .425 ...      
2AS .062 .010 ...     
Longevity 
SQRT 
.010 .019 .090 ...    
MIS_PRCON 
SQRT 
.040 .044 .539 .492 ...   
MIS_CONAC
T SQRT 
.599 .125 .331 .339 .012 ...  
MIS_USCON 
SQRT 
.254 .593 .231 .668 .010 .010 ... 
 
 
Sample Means (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Sample Means - Lower Bounds (PC) (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 
Renegotiation
s Normalized 
SGA 
SQRT 
2AS 
Longevity 
SQRT 
MIS_PRC
ON SQRT 
MIS_CONA
CT SQRT 
MIS_USC
ON SQRT 
Renegotiation
s Normalized 
.106 .090 2.529 2.767 .635 .209 .681 
 
Sample Means - Upper Bounds (PC) (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 
Renegotiation
s Normalized 
SGA 
SQRT 
2AS 
Longevity 
SQRT 
MIS_PRC
ON SQRT 
MIS_CONA
CT SQRT 
MIS_USC
ON SQRT 
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Renegotiation
s Normalized 
.145 .120 2.741 3.074 .721 .274 .747 
 
Sample Means - Two Tailed Significance (PC) (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 
Renegotiations 
Normalized 
SGA 
SQRT 
2AS 
Longevity 
SQRT 
MIS_PRC
ON SQRT 
MIS_CONA
CT SQRT 
MIS_USC
ON SQRT 
Renegotiations 
Normalized 
.010 .010 .010 .010 .010 .010 .010 
 
Factor Score Weights (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Factor Score Weights - Lower Bounds (PC) (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 
Renegotiations 
Normalized 
SGA 
SQRT 
2AS 
Longevity 
SQRT 
MIS_PRCON 
SQRT 
MIS_CONACT 
SQRT 
MIS_USCON 
SQRT 
Misalign -.052 -.025 -.003 -.005 .194 -.110 -.376 
Success .096 -.002 -.019 -.035 -.381 -.032 -.133 
 
Factor Score Weights - Upper Bounds (PC) (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 
Renegotiations 
Normalized 
SGA 
SQRT 
2AS 
Longevity 
SQRT 
MIS_PRCON 
SQRT 
MIS_CONACT 
SQRT 
MIS_USCON 
SQRT 
Misalign .102 .045 .006 .008 .797 .072 .647 
Success 2.820 1.423 .214 .546 .152 .030 .142 
 
Factor Score Weights - Two Tailed Significance (PC) (Group number 1 - Default 
model) 
 
Renegotiations 
Normalized 
SGA 
SQRT 
2AS 
Longevity 
SQRT 
MIS_PRCON 
SQRT 
MIS_CONACT 
SQRT 
MIS_USCON 
SQRT 
Misalign .852 .859 .864 .872 .053 .779 .739 
Success .057 .114 .168 .158 .361 .843 .863 
 
Total Effects (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Total Effects - Lower Bounds (PC) (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 Misalign Success 
Success -1.553 .000 
Renegotiations Normalized -.288 .065 
SGA SQRT -.141 -.006 
2AS -.759 .091 
Longevity SQRT -1.553 1.000 
MIS_PRCON SQRT .978 .000 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .161 .000 
MIS_USCON SQRT 1.000 .000 
 
Total Effects - Upper Bounds (PC) (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 Misalign Success 
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Success .340 .000 
Renegotiations Normalized .030 .464 
SGA SQRT .019 .182 
2AS .225 1.300 
Longevity SQRT .340 1.000 
MIS_PRCON SQRT 3.699 .000 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .622 .000 
MIS_USCON SQRT 1.000 .000 
 
Total Effects - Two Tailed Significance (PC) (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 Misalign Success 
Success .261 ... 
Renegotiations Normalized .251 .014 
SGA SQRT .351 .131 
2AS .281 .028 
Longevity SQRT .261 ... 
MIS_PRCON SQRT .010 ... 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .017 ... 
MIS_USCON SQRT ... ... 
 
Standardized Total Effects (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Standardized Total Effects - Lower Bounds (PC) (Group number 1 - Default 
model) 
 Misalign Success 
Success -.422 .000 
Renegotiations Normalized -.293 .221 
SGA SQRT -.193 -.019 
2AS -.148 .059 
Longevity SQRT -.217 .177 
MIS_PRCON SQRT .714 .000 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .093 .000 
MIS_USCON SQRT .441 .000 
 
Standardized Total Effects - Upper Bounds (PC) (Group number 1 - Default 
model) 
 Misalign Success 
Success .130 .000 
Renegotiations Normalized .048 1.128 
SGA SQRT .030 .594 
2AS .066 .529 
Longevity SQRT .056 .806 
MIS_PRCON SQRT 1.364 .000 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .433 .000 
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MIS_USCON SQRT .903 .000 
 
Standardized Total Effects - Two Tailed Significance (PC) (Group number 1 - 
Default model) 
 Misalign Success 
Success .261 ... 
Renegotiations Normalized .251 .014 
SGA SQRT .350 .131 
2AS .281 .029 
Longevity SQRT .261 .010 
MIS_PRCON SQRT .010 ... 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .016 ... 
MIS_USCON SQRT .010 ... 
 
Direct Effects (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Direct Effects - Lower Bounds (PC) (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 Misalign Success 
Success -1.553 .000 
Renegotiations Normalized .000 .065 
SGA SQRT .000 -.006 
2AS .000 .091 
Longevity SQRT .000 1.000 
MIS_PRCON SQRT .978 .000 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .161 .000 
MIS_USCON SQRT 1.000 .000 
 
Direct Effects - Upper Bounds (PC) (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 Misalign Success 
Success .340 .000 
Renegotiations Normalized .000 .464 
SGA SQRT .000 .182 
2AS .000 1.300 
Longevity SQRT .000 1.000 
MIS_PRCON SQRT 3.699 .000 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .622 .000 
MIS_USCON SQRT 1.000 .000 
 
 
Direct Effects - Two Tailed Significance (PC) (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 Misalign Success 
Success .261 ... 
Renegotiations Normalized ... .014 
SGA SQRT ... .131 
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2AS ... .028 
Longevity SQRT ... ... 
MIS_PRCON SQRT .010 ... 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .017 ... 
MIS_USCON SQRT ... ... 
 
Standardized Direct Effects (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Standardized Direct Effects - Lower Bounds (PC) (Group number 1 - Default 
model) 
 Misalign Success 
Success -.422 .000 
Renegotiations Normalized .000 .221 
SGA SQRT .000 -.019 
2AS .000 .059 
Longevity SQRT .000 .177 
MIS_PRCON SQRT .714 .000 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .093 .000 
MIS_USCON SQRT .441 .000 
 
Standardized Direct Effects - Upper Bounds (PC) (Group number 1 - Default 
model) 
 Misalign Success 
Success .130 .000 
Renegotiations Normalized .000 1.128 
SGA SQRT .000 .594 
2AS .000 .529 
Longevity SQRT .000 .806 
MIS_PRCON SQRT 1.364 .000 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .433 .000 
MIS_USCON SQRT .903 .000 
 
Standardized Direct Effects - Two Tailed Significance (PC) (Group number 1 - 
Default model) 
 Misalign Success 
Success .261 ... 
Renegotiations Normalized ... .014 
SGA SQRT ... .131 
2AS ... .029 
Longevity SQRT ... .010 
MIS_PRCON SQRT .010 ... 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .016 ... 
MIS_USCON SQRT .010 ... 
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Indirect Effects (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Indirect Effects - Lower Bounds (PC) (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 Misalign Success 
Success .000 .000 
Renegotiations Normalized -.288 .000 
SGA SQRT -.141 .000 
2AS -.759 .000 
Longevity SQRT -1.553 .000 
MIS_PRCON SQRT .000 .000 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .000 .000 
MIS_USCON SQRT .000 .000 
 
Indirect Effects - Upper Bounds (PC) (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 Misalign Success 
Success .000 .000 
Renegotiations Normalized .030 .000 
SGA SQRT .019 .000 
2AS .225 .000 
Longevity SQRT .340 .000 
MIS_PRCON SQRT .000 .000 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .000 .000 
MIS_USCON SQRT .000 .000 
 
Indirect Effects - Two Tailed Significance (PC) (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 Misalign Success 
Success ... ... 
Renegotiations Normalized .251 ... 
SGA SQRT .351 ... 
2AS .281 ... 
Longevity SQRT .261 ... 
MIS_PRCON SQRT ... ... 
MIS_CONACT SQRT ... ... 
MIS_USCON SQRT ... ... 
 
 
 
 
 
Standardized Indirect Effects (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Standardized Indirect Effects - Lower Bounds (PC) (Group number 1 - Default 
model) 
 Misalign Success 
Success .000 .000 
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Renegotiations Normalized -.293 .000 
SGA SQRT -.193 .000 
2AS -.148 .000 
Longevity SQRT -.217 .000 
MIS_PRCON SQRT .000 .000 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .000 .000 
MIS_USCON SQRT .000 .000 
 
Standardized Indirect Effects - Upper Bounds (PC) (Group number 1 - Default 
model) 
 Misalign Success 
Success .000 .000 
Renegotiations Normalized .048 .000 
SGA SQRT .030 .000 
2AS .066 .000 
Longevity SQRT .056 .000 
MIS_PRCON SQRT .000 .000 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .000 .000 
MIS_USCON SQRT .000 .000 
 
Standardized Indirect Effects - Two Tailed Significance (PC) (Group number 1 - 
Default model) 
 Misalign Success 
Success ... ... 
Renegotiations 
Normalized 
.251 ... 
SGA SQRT .350 ... 
2AS .281 ... 
Longevity SQRT .261 ... 
MIS_PRCON SQRT ... ... 
MIS_CONACT SQRT ... ... 
MIS_USCON SQRT ... ... 
 
Bias-corrected percentile method (Group number 1 - Default model) 
90% confidence intervals (bias-corrected percentile method) 
Scalar Estimates (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 
 
Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Parameter Estimate Lower Upper P 
Success <--- Misalign -.776 -1.710 .094 .127 
MIS_USCON SQRT <--- Misalign 1.000 1.000 1.000 ... 
MIS_CONACT SQRT <--- Misalign .386 .123 .611 .024 
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MIS_PRCON SQRT <--- Misalign 1.747 1.095 4.730 .004 
Longevity SQRT <--- Success 1.000 1.000 1.000 ... 
SGA SQRT <--- Success .043 -.012 .160 .182 
2AS <--- Success .356 .042 .832 .059 
Renegotiations Normalized <--- Success .158 .082 1.796 .003 
 
Standardized Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Parameter Estimate Lower Upper P 
Success <--- Misalign -.223 -.451 .063 .154 
MIS_USCON SQRT <--- Misalign .657 .407 .843 .019 
MIS_CONACT SQRT <--- Misalign .265 .048 .376 .051 
MIS_PRCON SQRT <--- Misalign .969 .716 1.453 .008 
Longevity SQRT <--- Success .530 .201 .827 .007 
SGA SQRT <--- Success .231 -.109 .429 .397 
2AS <--- Success .269 .012 .455 .074 
Renegotiations Normalized <--- Success .614 .350 2.114 .003 
 
Intercepts: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Parameter Estimate Lower Upper P 
MIS_USCON SQRT .714 .676 .743 .019 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .242 .208 .273 .012 
MIS_PRCON SQRT .674 .632 .710 .020 
Longevity SQRT 2.939 2.795 3.104 .006 
Renegotiations Normalized .125 .108 .148 .004 
SGA SQRT .105 .090 .120 .010 
2AS 2.624 2.539 2.766 .004 
 
Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Parameter Estimate Lower Upper P 
Misalign .027 .011 .050 .018 
e4 .316 .067 .879 .004 
e1 .036 .021 .055 .021 
e2 .054 .046 .068 .002 
e3 .005 -.082 .043 .758 
e5 .850 .488 1.213 .013 
e12 .541 .457 .711 .002 
e10 .011 .009 .016 .001 
e9 .014 -.029 .020 .216 
 
Squared Multiple Correlations: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Parameter Estimate Lower Upper P 
Success .050 .002 .202 .005 
Renegotiations Normalized .377 .122 4.480 .002 
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SGA SQRT .054 .000 .184 .056 
2AS .072 .001 .207 .030 
Longevity SQRT .281 .041 .684 .007 
MIS_PRCON SQRT .940 .512 2.111 .008 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .070 .002 .141 .034 
MIS_USCON SQRT .431 .166 .711 .019 
 
 
Matrices (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Sample Covariances (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Sample Covariances - Lower Bounds (BC) (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 
Renegotiation
s Normalized 
SGA 
SQR
T 
2AS 
Longevit
y SQRT 
MIS_PRCO
N SQRT 
MIS_CONAC
T SQRT 
MIS_USCO
N SQRT 
Renegotiation
s Normalized 
.018       
SGA SQRT -.001 .010      
2AS .003 .004 .498     
Longevity 
SQRT 
.034 .004 
-
.032 
1.004    
MIS_PRCON 
SQRT 
-.015 -.010 
-
.016 
-.054 .072   
MIS_CONAC
T SQRT 
-.006 -.007 
-
.043 
-.071 .007 .048  
MIS_USCON 
SQRT 
-.007 -.004 .002 -.035 .036 .005 .052 
 
Sample Covariances - Upper Bounds (BC) (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 
Renegotiations 
Normalized 
SGA 
SQRT 
2AS 
Longevity 
SQRT 
MIS_PR
CON 
SQRT 
MIS_CON
ACT 
SQRT 
MIS_USCO
N SQRT 
Renegotiations 
Normalized 
.027       
SGA SQRT .003 .014      
2AS .034 .028 .718     
Longevity 
SQRT 
.084 .032 .200 1.496    
MIS_PRCON 
SQRT 
-.002 -.001 .043 .040 .106   
MIS_CONACT 
SQRT 
.003 .000 .007 .006 .027 .069  
MIS_USCON 
SQRT 
.003 .004 .059 .030 .061 .020 .076 
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Sample Covariances - Two Tailed Significance (BC) (Group number 1 - Default 
model) 
 
Renegotiations 
Normalized 
SGA 
SQRT 
2AS 
Longevity 
SQRT 
MIS_PR
CON 
SQRT 
MIS_CON
ACT 
SQRT 
MIS_USCO
N SQRT 
Renegotiations 
Normalized 
.006       
SGA SQRT .534 .005      
2AS .069 .019 .004     
Longevity 
SQRT 
.004 .024 .206 .002    
MIS_PRCON 
SQRT 
.038 .030 .373 .626 .007   
MIS_CONACT 
SQRT 
.548 .092 .273 .190 .020 .007  
MIS_USCON 
SQRT 
.335 .897 .084 .819 .009 .015 .006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sample Correlations (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Sample Correlations - Lower Bounds (BC) (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 
Renegotiations 
Normalized 
SGA 
SQRT 
2AS 
Longevity 
SQRT 
MIS_PR
CON 
SQRT 
MIS_CO
NACT 
SQRT 
MIS_USCO
N SQRT 
Renegotiations 
Normalized 
1.000       
SGA SQRT -.083 1.000      
2AS .004 .069 1.000     
Longevity 
SQRT 
.205 .034 -.046 1.000    
MIS_PRCON 
SQRT 
-.312 -.284 -.069 -.159 1.000   
MIS_CONACT 
SQRT 
-.169 -.261 -.231 -.266 .103 1.000  
MIS_USCON 
SQRT 
-.189 -.144 .000 -.131 .542 .068 1.000 
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Sample Correlations - Upper Bounds (BC) (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 
Renegotiations 
Normalized 
SGA 
SQRT 
2AS 
Longevity 
SQRT 
MIS_PR
CON 
SQRT 
MIS_CO
NACT 
SQRT 
MIS_USCO
N SQRT 
Renegotiations 
Normalized 
1.000       
SGA SQRT .173 1.000      
2AS .291 .327 1.000     
Longevity 
SQRT 
.456 .270 .232 1.000    
MIS_PRCON 
SQRT 
-.046 -.022 .183 .122 1.000   
MIS_CONACT 
SQRT 
.088 -.005 .035 .028 .362 1.000  
MIS_USCON 
SQRT 
.075 .128 .276 .113 .718 .311 1.000 
 
Sample Correlations - Two Tailed Significance (BC) (Group number 1 - Default 
model) 
 
Renegotiations 
Normalized 
SGA 
SQRT 
2AS 
Longevity 
SQRT 
MIS_PR
CON 
SQRT 
MIS_CO
NACT 
SQRT 
MIS_USCO
N SQRT 
Renegotiations 
Normalized 
...       
SGA SQRT .568 ...      
2AS .095 .018 ...     
Longevity 
SQRT 
.009 .024 .246 ...    
MIS_PRCON 
SQRT 
.040 .058 .360 .700 ...   
MIS_CONACT 
SQRT 
.565 .092 .273 .199 .020 ...  
MIS_USCON 
SQRT 
.347 .876 .098 .859 .013 .025 ... 
 
 
Sample Means (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Sample Means - Lower Bounds (BC) (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 
Renegotiations 
Normalized 
SGA 
SQRT 
2AS 
Longevity 
SQRT 
MIS_PR
CON 
SQRT 
MIS_CO
NACT 
SQRT 
MIS_USCO
N SQRT 
Renegotiations 
Normalized 
.108 .090 2.539 2.795 .632 .208 .676 
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Sample Means - Upper Bounds (BC) (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 
Renegotiations 
Normalized 
SGA 
SQRT 
2AS 
Longevity 
SQRT 
MIS_PR
CON 
SQRT 
MIS_CO
NACT 
SQRT 
MIS_USCO
N SQRT 
Renegotiations 
Normalized 
.148 .120 2.766 3.104 .710 .273 .743 
 
Sample Means - Two Tailed Significance (BC) (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 
Renegotiations 
Normalized 
SGA 
SQRT 
2AS 
Longevity 
SQRT 
MIS_PR
CON 
SQRT 
MIS_CO
NACT 
SQRT 
MIS_USCO
N SQRT 
Renegotiations 
Normalized 
.004 .010 .004 .006 .020 .012 .019 
 
Factor Score Weights (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Factor Score Weights - Lower Bounds (BC) (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 
Renegotiations 
Normalized 
SGA 
SQRT 
2AS 
Longevity 
SQRT 
MIS_PRCON 
SQRT 
MIS_CONACT 
SQRT 
MIS_USCON 
SQRT 
Misalign -.355 -.684 -.033 -.016 .267 -.100 -.398 
Success .775 -.017 -.018 .003 -.646 -.057 -.201 
 
Factor Score Weights - Upper Bounds (BC) (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 
Renegotiations 
Normalized 
SGA 
SQRT 
2AS 
Longevity 
SQRT 
MIS_PRCON 
SQRT 
MIS_CONACT 
SQRT 
MIS_USCON 
SQRT 
Misalign .015 .006 .002 .002 .877 .076 .489 
Success 3.301 1.367 .220 .687 -.006 .012 .078 
 
Factor Score Weights - Two Tailed Significance (BC) (Group number 1 - Default 
model) 
 
Renegotiations 
Normalized 
SGA 
SQRT 
2AS 
Longevity 
SQRT 
MIS_PRCON 
SQRT 
MIS_CONACT 
SQRT 
MIS_USCON 
SQRT 
Misalign .274 .316 .450 .380 .025 .722 .836 
Success .011 .152 .160 .091 .082 .374 .497 
 
APPENDIX E Statistical Output Model from AMOS 19.0 
331 
 
Total Effects (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Total Effects - Lower Bounds (BC) (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 Misalign Success 
Success -1.710 .000 
Renegotiations Normalized -.313 .082 
SGA SQRT -.169 -.012 
2AS -.879 .042 
Longevity SQRT -1.710 1.000 
MIS_PRCON SQRT 1.095 .000 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .123 .000 
MIS_USCON SQRT 1.000 .000 
 
Total Effects - Upper Bounds (BC) (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 Misalign Success 
Success .094 .000 
Renegotiations Normalized .016 1.796 
SGA SQRT .013 .160 
2AS .113 .832 
Longevity SQRT .094 1.000 
MIS_PRCON SQRT 4.730 .000 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .611 .000 
MIS_USCON SQRT 1.000 .000 
 
Total Effects - Two Tailed Significance (BC) (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 Misalign Success 
Success .127 ... 
Renegotiations Normalized .147 .003 
SGA SQRT .257 .182 
2AS .167 .059 
Longevity SQRT .127 ... 
MIS_PRCON SQRT .004 ... 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .024 ... 
MIS_USCON SQRT ... ... 
 
Standardized Total Effects (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Standardized Total Effects - Lower Bounds (BC) (Group number 1 - Default 
model) 
 Misalign Success 
Success -.451 .000 
Renegotiations Normalized -.335 .350 
SGA SQRT -.235 -.109 
2AS -.173 .012 
Longevity SQRT -.252 .201 
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MIS_PRCON SQRT .716 .000 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .048 .000 
MIS_USCON SQRT .407 .000 
 
Standardized Total Effects - Upper Bounds (BC) (Group number 1 - Default 
model) 
 Misalign Success 
Success .063 .000 
Renegotiations Normalized .010 2.114 
SGA SQRT .020 .429 
2AS -.002 .455 
Longevity SQRT -.003 .827 
MIS_PRCON SQRT 1.453 .000 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .376 .000 
MIS_USCON SQRT .843 .000 
 
Standardized Total Effects - Two Tailed Significance (BC) (Group number 1 - 
Default model) 
 Misalign Success 
Success .154 ... 
Renegotiations Normalized .121 .003 
SGA SQRT .246 .397 
2AS .091 .074 
Longevity SQRT .092 .007 
MIS_PRCON SQRT .008 ... 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .051 ... 
MIS_USCON SQRT .019 ... 
 
Direct Effects (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Direct Effects - Lower Bounds (BC) (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 Misalign Success 
Success -1.710 .000 
Renegotiations Normalized .000 .082 
SGA SQRT .000 -.012 
2AS .000 .042 
Longevity SQRT .000 1.000 
MIS_PRCON SQRT 1.095 .000 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .123 .000 
MIS_USCON SQRT 1.000 .000 
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Direct Effects - Upper Bounds (BC) (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 Misalign Success 
Success .094 .000 
Renegotiations Normalized .000 1.796 
SGA SQRT .000 .160 
2AS .000 .832 
Longevity SQRT .000 1.000 
MIS_PRCON SQRT 4.730 .000 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .611 .000 
MIS_USCON SQRT 1.000 .000 
 
Direct Effects - Two Tailed Significance (BC) (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 Misalign Success 
Success .127 ... 
Renegotiations Normalized ... .003 
SGA SQRT ... .182 
2AS ... .059 
Longevity SQRT ... ... 
MIS_PRCON SQRT .004 ... 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .024 ... 
MIS_USCON SQRT ... ... 
 
Standardized Direct Effects (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Standardized Direct Effects - Lower Bounds (BC) (Group number 1 - Default 
model) 
 Misalign Success 
Success -.451 .000 
Renegotiations Normalized .000 .350 
SGA SQRT .000 -.109 
2AS .000 .012 
Longevity SQRT .000 .201 
MIS_PRCON SQRT .716 .000 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .048 .000 
MIS_USCON SQRT .407 .000 
 
Standardized Direct Effects - Upper Bounds (BC) (Group number 1 - Default 
model) 
 Misalign Success 
Success .063 .000 
Renegotiations Normalized .000 2.114 
SGA SQRT .000 .429 
2AS .000 .455 
Longevity SQRT .000 .827 
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MIS_PRCON SQRT 1.453 .000 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .376 .000 
MIS_USCON SQRT .843 .000 
 
Standardized Direct Effects - Two Tailed Significance (BC) (Group number 1 - 
Default model) 
 Misalign Success 
Success .154 ... 
Renegotiations Normalized ... .003 
SGA SQRT ... .397 
2AS ... .074 
Longevity SQRT ... .007 
MIS_PRCON SQRT .008 ... 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .051 ... 
MIS_USCON SQRT .019 ... 
 
Indirect Effects (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Indirect Effects - Lower Bounds (BC) (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 Misalign Success 
Success .000 .000 
Renegotiations Normalized -.313 .000 
SGA SQRT -.169 .000 
2AS -.879 .000 
Longevity SQRT -1.710 .000 
MIS_PRCON SQRT .000 .000 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .000 .000 
MIS_USCON SQRT .000 .000 
 
Indirect Effects - Upper Bounds (BC) (Group number 1 - Default model) 
 Misalign Success 
Success .000 .000 
Renegotiations Normalized .016 .000 
SGA SQRT .013 .000 
2AS .113 .000 
Longevity SQRT .094 .000 
MIS_PRCON SQRT .000 .000 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .000 .000 
MIS_USCON SQRT .000 .000 
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Indirect Effects - Two Tailed Significance (BC) (Group number 1 - Default 
model) 
 Misalign Success 
Success ... ... 
Renegotiations Normalized .147 ... 
SGA SQRT .257 ... 
2AS .167 ... 
Longevity SQRT .127 ... 
MIS_PRCON SQRT ... ... 
MIS_CONACT SQRT ... ... 
MIS_USCON SQRT ... ... 
 
Standardized Indirect Effects (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Standardized Indirect Effects - Lower Bounds (BC) (Group number 1 - Default 
model) 
 Misalign Success 
Success .000 .000 
Renegotiations Normalized -.335 .000 
SGA SQRT -.235 .000 
2AS -.173 .000 
Longevity SQRT -.252 .000 
MIS_PRCON SQRT .000 .000 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .000 .000 
MIS_USCON SQRT .000 .000 
 
Standardized Indirect Effects - Upper Bounds (BC) (Group number 1 - Default 
model) 
 Misalign Success 
Success .000 .000 
Renegotiations Normalized .010 .000 
SGA SQRT .020 .000 
2AS -.002 .000 
Longevity SQRT -.003 .000 
MIS_PRCON SQRT .000 .000 
MIS_CONACT SQRT .000 .000 
MIS_USCON SQRT .000 .000 
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Standardized Indirect Effects - Two Tailed Significance (BC) (Group number 1 - 
Default model) 
 Misalign Success 
Success ... ... 
Renegotiations Normalized .121 ... 
SGA SQRT .246 ... 
2AS .091 ... 
Longevity SQRT .092 ... 
MIS_PRCON SQRT ... ... 
MIS_CONACT SQRT ... ... 
MIS_USCON SQRT ... ... 
 
Minimization History (Default model) 
Iteration  
Negative 
eigenvalues 
Condition 
# 
Smallest 
eigenvalue 
Diameter F NTries Ratio 
0 e 3  -.153 9999.000 175.697 0 9999.000 
1 e* 1  -.208 1.533 54.654 21 .607 
2 e 1  -.049 .407 29.278 6 .880 
3 e 0 2754.191  .464 25.709 5 .674 
4 e 0 425.626  .330 24.223 4 .000 
5 e 0 464.414  .440 22.190 1 1.172 
6 e 0 836.184  .211 21.590 1 1.172 
7 e 0 957.467  .151 21.495 1 1.081 
8 e 0 1100.244  .031 21.488 1 1.039 
9 e 0 1111.465  .004 21.488 1 1.005 
10 e 0 1108.677  .000 21.488 1 1.000 
 
Bootstrap (Default model) 
Summary of Bootstrap Iterations (Default model) 
(Default model) 
Iterations Method 0 Method 1 Method 2 
1 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 
5 0 0 0 
6 0 0 0 
7 0 0 0 
8 0 0 0 
9 0 0 0 
10 0 1 1 
11 0 0 0 
12 0 3 0 
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13 0 9 0 
14 0 7 0 
15 0 13 2 
16 0 17 0 
17 0 30 1 
18 0 10 0 
19 0 94 12 
Total 0 184 16 
 
0 bootstrap samples were unused because of a singular covariance matrix. 
68 bootstrap samples were unused because a solution was not found. 
200 usable bootstrap samples were obtained. 
 
Bootstrap Distributions (Default model) 
 
ML discrepancy (implied vs sample) (Default model) 
  |-------------------- 
 13.219 |*** 
 16.226 |*** 
 19.234 |******* 
 22.241 |************ 
 25.248 |*************** 
 28.255 |*************** 
 31.262 |*********** 
N = 200 34.269 |************ 
Mean = 29.704 37.276 |********* 
S. e. = .584 40.283 |******* 
 43.290 |**** 
 46.297 |*** 
 49.304 |** 
 52.311 | 
 55.318 |* 
  |-------------------- 
 
ML discrepancy (implied vs pop) (Default model) 
  |-------------------- 
 30.321 |* 
 33.759 |****** 
 37.196 |************* 
 40.634 |************** 
 44.071 |************* 
 47.509 |***************** 
 50.946 |********** 
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N = 200 54.384 |********** 
Mean = 47.307 57.821 |******** 
S. e. = .659 61.259 |*** 
 64.696 |*** 
 68.134 |*** 
 71.571 | 
 75.009 |* 
 78.446 |* 
  |-------------------- 
 
K-L overoptimism (unstabilized) (Default model) 
  |-------------------- 
 -83.555 |* 
 -63.806 |** 
 -44.056 |** 
 -24.307 |** 
 -4.558 |***** 
 15.192 |********* 
 34.941 |************** 
N = 200 54.691 |********* 
Mean = 52.094 74.440 |******** 
S. e. = 3.476 94.190 |******** 
 113.939 |******* 
 133.688 |** 
 153.438 |* 
 173.187 |* 
 192.937 |* 
  |-------------------- 
 
K-L overoptimism (stabilized) (Default model) 
  |-------------------- 
 19.161 |* 
 24.724 |***** 
 30.287 |******* 
 35.850 |********* 
 41.413 |************** 
 46.977 |************* 
 52.540 |*************** 
N = 200 58.103 |*************** 
Mean = 51.879 63.666 |****** 
S. e. = 1.121 69.230 |******** 
 74.793 |***** 
 80.356 |* 
 85.919 |** 
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 91.482 |*** 
 97.046 |* 
  |-------------------- 
 
ML discrepancy (implied vs pop) (Default model) 
  |-------------------- 
 30.321 |* 
 33.759 |****** 
 37.196 |************* 
 40.634 |************** 
 44.071 |************* 
 47.509 |***************** 
 50.946 |********** 
N = 200 54.384 |********** 
Mean = 47.307 57.821 |******** 
S. e. = .659 61.259 |*** 
 64.696 |*** 
 68.134 |*** 
 71.571 | 
 75.009 |* 
 78.446 |* 
  |-------------------- 
 
Model Fit Summary 
CMIN 
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF 
Default model 22 21.488 13 .064 1.653 
Saturated model 35 .000 0   
Independence model 14 138.386 21 .000 6.590 
 
Baseline Comparisons 
Model 
NFI 
Delta1 
RFI 
rho1 
IFI 
Delta2 
TLI 
rho2 
CFI 
Default model .845 .749 .932 .883 .928 
Saturated model 1.000  1.000  1.000 
Independence model .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
 
Parsimony-Adjusted Measures 
Model PRATIO PNFI PCFI 
Default model .619 .523 .574 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 1.000 .000 .000 
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NCP 
Model NCP LO 90 HI 90 
Default model 8.488 .000 25.319 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 117.386 83.863 158.408 
 
FMIN 
Model FMIN F0 LO 90 HI 90 
Default model .145 .057 .000 .171 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 .000 
Independence model .935 .793 .567 1.070 
 
RMSEA 
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE 
Default model .066 .000 .115 .264 
Independence model .194 .164 .226 .000 
 
AIC 
Model AIC BCC BIC CAIC 
Default model 65.488 68.002   
Saturated model 70.000 74.000   
Independence model 166.386 167.986   
 
ECVI 
Model ECVI LO 90 HI 90 MECVI 
Default model .442 .385 .556 .459 
Saturated model .473 .473 .473 .500 
Independence model 1.124 .898 1.401 1.135 
 
HOELTER 
Model 
HOELTER 
.05 
HOELTER 
.01 
Default model 155 191 
Independence model 35 42 
 
Execution time summary 
Minimization: .047 
Miscellaneous: .953 
Bootstrap: 7.359 
Total: 8.359 
 
 
